


# **THE ARMY**

COMBAT FORCES

# **JOURNAL**

NOVEMBER 1955

50¢



IN THIS ISSUE

**FULL REPORT ON THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE  
ASSOCIATION OF THE U. S. ARMY**

# THE ORIGINS OF THE BERGENSCHULTZ-SCHLETTERKUME METHOD

*Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Scruton*

**I**t is not generally known that the BERGENSCHULTZ-SCHLETTERKUME method of instruction, widely used in our military training today, was developed shortly before World War I by an officer of the German Great General Staff, Colonel Werner von Bergenschultz, foreseeing the need of a simplified training method for the Kaiser's expanding armies, approached his superior, Schletterkume, with a plan that remains unchanged to this day.

As is often the case with something new, however, Bergenschultz's chief, General of Infantry Gunther von der Schletterkume, Inspector General of Training, was at first cool toward Bergenschultz's idea.

"Change, Bergenschultz," Schletterkume is reported to have lectured his junior, "is not always progress. . . . Dismissed!"

In the ensuing weeks, Schletterkume was beset with seemingly insurmountable training problems. As the mobilization authorities poured thousands of raw troops into the training establishment, he struggled with the ever-increasing demands for instructors, training facilities and equipment. Night after night his lamp burned late, and harshly he overrode the excuses of his staff that nothing more could be done. Finally, after an exhaustive tour of the training centers, Schletterkume admitted to himself that Bergenschultz's method might allay the difficulties. Bergenschultz was summoned.

"I have decided, Bergenschultz,"

Schletterkume said, "to employ your method. Are you ready to effectuate it?"

Bergenschultz was. At first, as often happens with something new, it met that dogged resistance to change peculiar to military establishments the world over. Critics, many of high rank, rose to denounce Bergenschultz. Field Marshal Count Freiherr Schatz-Mergenberg accused Bergenschultz of being a disgrace to the General Staff—a grave charge. Fortunately for Bergenschultz, however, Schatz-Mergenberg fell into bad odor at court, was transferred to a distant and inconsequential command, and effectively silenced.

**M**EANWHILE, Schletterkume held his own counsels, neither damning nor praising Bergenschultz, but maintaining an Olympian silence as the furore rattled and banged through the corridors of the Great General Staff. They were difficult days for Schletterkume, for the responsibility was his, and he was later to admit that he was often on the verge of abandoning the new method and reestablishing the old. However, he did not, and after an extended visit to the training centers, he returned to his headquarters convinced of the new method's popularity, particularly among instructors. He sent for Bergenschultz.

"I think we may say, Bergenschultz," Schletterkume stated, "that your method has achieved a measure of success."

"Your method, Herr General," Ber-

genschultz replied diplomatically.

"Very well, then. We shall call it the Bergenschultz-Schletterkume method."

"May I suggest, Herr General, that we call it the Schletterkume-Bergenschultz method. Your name should have the honor of appearing first."

"No, Bergenschultz," Schletterkume decided, "the idea was yours, only the responsibility mine. We shall call it the Bergenschultz-Schletterkume method." (This was a fortunate arrangement of names, as we shall see in a moment.)

**F**OLLOWING World War I, Bergenschultz and Schletterkume were temporarily without jobs in Germany and travelled extensively in the Far East and certain Latin American countries where military forces were in being. Although dubiously received at first, their method soon achieved a wide popularity—a fact which was noted by one of our Army attachés. Shortly thereafter it was introduced into our military structure and has remained there unchanged to this day.

What, you ask, is the Bergenschultz-Schletterkume method?

The BS method of instruction is nothing more than endless talk by the instructor—interminable lecturing, if you will. Though not without severe critics in high places, it nevertheless enjoys a universal popularity among instructors. At this moment, throughout our military establishment, thousands of lectures are being given. Some of them are being heard.

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
**FLIGHT TESTING THE ANTI-SUB HSS**—At Patuxent River, Maryland, the Navy has subjected the HSS helicopter to carefully-instrumented, grueling tests. This submarine-hunter is one version of the high-performance

Sikorsky S-58. It uses electronic sonar gear to locate and track subs. Addition of arming racks enables it to launch torpedoes or mines. The S-58 has twice the payload capacity of the S-55. Rotor blades fold back for shipboard use.

## AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS



**FOR VENEZUELA**—A new Sikorsky S-55 type helicopter, pictured above, has been delivered to the Venezuelan Air Force. With the delivery, Venezuela joined the ranks of 14 nations whose armed forces or commercial air operators rely upon the efficiency and dependability of versatile Sikorsky helicopters. Pilots were trained in the S-55 at Sikorsky's Bridgeport plant.



**FOR THAILAND**—A representative of United Aircraft Service Corporation supervises the assembly of Sikorsky S-55 type helicopters in Bangkok. The machines will be flown by the Royal Thailand Air Force, on low-level border patrol duty. Six of the big Sikorsky helicopters were ordered. The type has achieved an outstanding record operating in jungles and other remote areas.





## HELICOPTER HISTORY



### FIRST HELICOPTER AIR-SEA RESCUE

In November, 1945—almost ten years before the recent flood disaster in which Sikorsky helicopters saved hundreds of people—a Sikorsky R-5 made what is believed to be the first helicopter rescue. Crewmen were brought safely ashore from a storm-swept barge wrecked on Penfield reef, off Fairfield, Connecticut.

**HELP FROM THE SKY**—When flash floods hit the northeastern states in late August, helicopters picked up nearly a thousand people and carried them to safety. People were rescued from houses being torn to pieces by savage flood waters, from hilltops, and from stranded trains and cars. In Connecticut alone, more than 500 were saved by Sikorsky helicopters. Above, a USAF Air Rescue Service Sikorsky H-19, pictured in Pennsylvania, lifts a woman to safety as a man waits his turn at a second floor window. Helicopters were often the only means of rushing food, medicine, and rescue workers to the stricken areas.



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"The Association of the U. S. Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components in providing for and assuring the Nation's military security."

## ASSOCIATION'S JOURNAL

THE regular quarterly meeting of the Executive Council of your Association, held the evening of 26 September, was one of the longest in the recent history of the organization. Beginning within a minute or two of the scheduled 1630 hours, the discussions ended at 1930 only because some items were held over for consideration at later meetings.

The resignations of Major Generals Trudeau, Hertford, Mudgett and Caraway, and Master Sergeant Wooldridge, due to retirement or change of station, were accepted with regret. Major General Roper's resignation was not acted upon, and the Secretary was directed to inform General Roper that since he intended to remain in Washington, the Council asked that he consider withdrawing his resignation.

Major Generals Donald P. Booth, James D. O'Connell and Louis W. Prentiss, Brigadier General Theodore S. Riggs, and Master Sergeant Eugene F. Britti were elected to the vacancies created by the resignations.

Lieutenant General Floyd L. Parks's resignation as Vice President was accepted, and Lieutenant General Walter L. Weible was elected to fill this vacancy; General Weible's vacancy in turn was filled by the election of Colonel William E. Maulsby, Jr. Photographs of your new Council members appear on page 49.

The By-Laws were changed to permit the Annual Meeting to be held at times other than in conjunction with the June Council meeting.

GENERAL WEIBLE reported for the Annual Meeting Committee; the report was accepted with a commendation for a job well done. A full report on the meeting appears elsewhere in this section.

General Weible reported also for the Membership Committee, and individual members of this Committee made recommendations for intensifying the Association's drive for members.

One important change ordered by the Executive Council was a change in name for The JOURNAL, to signify its broad mission of representing all the Army. In a few months the name of the magazine will be ARMY; there will be a more complete announcement of this in a later issue.

The Council considered some routine items that we can't crowd into this limited space. The membership of the Association can be assured that your elected officers and members of the Executive Council are acting energetically and wisely to make the Association and its publication a real voice for the Army and a potent factor in National Defense. The staff's morale has reached new highs with the knowledge that the directing heads of the Association believe strongly in its aims and purposes, and are giving much of their time and effort to furthering the Association's goals.

YOUR SECRETARY

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

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The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is a professional military magazine devoted to the dissemination of information and ideas relating to the military art and science representing the interests of the entire Army. The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL strives to—

Advance man's knowledge of warfare in the fields of strategy, tactics, logistics, operations, administration, weapons and weapons systems.

Advance man's knowledge and understanding of the soldier as an individual, as a member of a trained unit, and as a member of the whole Army; emphasizing leadership, esprit, loyalty, and a high sense of duty.

Disseminate knowledge of military history, especially articles that have application to current problems or foster tradition and create esprit.

Explain the important and vital role of the United States Army in the Nation's defense and show that the Army is alert to the challenges of new weapons, machines, and methods.

Advance the status of the soldier's profession.

(Adopted by the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

# The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

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## THE MONTH'S MAIL

### *Prewar Enlisted Men*

● I have little hope of changing the now firmly held conviction that pre-World War II enlisted men were pretty sad sacks, but I feel duty bound not to pass unchallenged the generalization of General Sultan, as reported by Dr. Eli Ginzberg in the October issue. General Sultan is supposed to have said that the old Regular Army would have given its eyeteeth to have had enlisted men as good as the hospitalized nervous-in-the-service types of World War II.

I was an enlisted man in General Sultan's own arm (Corps of Engineers) for six pre-World War II years and I know perfectly well what he was thinking of when he made the statement, but unfortunately it was, as I feel he would admit, a generalization and a pretty sweeping one.

The company in which I served varied in strength from 60 to 80 men during those years and while it had its share of not exactly sterling characters or mental giants, it had some excellent men pass through it too.

There was, for example, a then corporal who attended the Engineer OCS in 1942 when he was on the shady side of forty and served with distinction during the war and afterwards. When I last heard from him he was in Korea (during the hot war) as a lieutenant colonel but was being sent home for disability retirement, much to his disgust.

Another man in that company is now a full colonel in the Regular Army (integrated in 1946).

I remember a downy-checked youngster from the Texas cotton country who enrolled in a correspondence school course in surveying and mapping to which he applied himself with frightening zeal during off duty hours. Today he is a responsible civilian employee in a district office of the Engineer rivers and harbor organization.

Another one of us got a Civil Service appointment and is now a responsible employee of the Ordnance Corps.

One of my favorites is a witty extrovert of French Canadian stock. He retired as a master sergeant in 1946 after twenty years of service and although he had never finished high school he enrolled in a technical school under the G.I. Bill of

Rights and studied construction methods and theory for a couple of years. Today he is operating his own home repair and remodeling business.

I am reminded that when I was a recruit we had two young second lieutenants fresh out of the Military Academy. One of them was dismissed from the service a few years before World War II while the other was a full colonel the last time I heard of him and he may now be wearing a star. On the basis of this I might generalize that half of the pre-World War II officer corps wasn't all it might have been. This would be monstrously false, but hardly more so than the kind of generalization that has implanted the idea in the post-World War II mind that all prewar enlisted men were sad sacks.

JONATHAN CARMEN

### *Armor in Infantry Division*

● Here's an idea, no doubt with many rough spots, that might have tactical possibilities, especially for training, let us say, for one month a year.

Have an armored command in each infantry division. Its headquarters would be headed by a colonel and staff, with a headquarters and service company commanded by a major. Any organic armor (that is, tank battalion or recon company) would be assigned to this armored command. Any additional armored groups or augmentation by attachments or support would come under the infantry division's armored regiment. For one month a year the division's AAA and infantry regiment I&R platoons would be assigned for training. This would simplify supply and maintenance in addition to gaining the extra professional advantage for personnel of these special divisional forces. Corps-wide, this would allow in special situations a pooling of every tank belonging to infantry regiments, infantry division, and armored command regiments for exploitation.

LT. LOTHAR L. PETROVER  
Co. K, 86th Inf.  
APO 39, N. Y.

### *Forewarned Is Forearmed*

● Having spent 34 months as a prisoner of war in Korea, I find Colonel Murray's

"Singing is for the Birds" (August) most refreshing and significant. A great many articles have been written concerning brainwashing, confessions, and general treatment encountered by UN personnel captured by the Communists, but this is one of the best.

Name, rank, service number and date of birth only should be given upon interrogation. That standard is guaranteed by the Geneva Conventions. However, here are a few difficulties encountered by those unfortunate enough to be captured by the Communists. They do not recognize that Convention.

The battle lines are arrayed. On one side you have the captor—cruel, sadistic, atheistic, with the philosophy that the end justifies the means. Supporting him are armed guards, trained interrogators and indoctrinators. He controls rations, quarters, clothing, medicines and everything else necessary for sustaining or destroying life.

On the other side you have the captured, armed only with his faith in God, his country, and his fellow men. Supporting him are his religion, his moral fiber and patriotism, his mental and physical stamina, his education and family environment.

At first glance the odds seem overwhelming, but the experiences of POWs in Korea show that although a few battles were lost, the war was won by those who were captured.

\* \* \*

Initially the Communists had the advantage, for the reason that there had been no previous training and education of UN personnel as to what to expect when captured. In order to defend one's self and counter enemy tactics, one must first understand these tactics and be trained to fight back.

\* \* \*

A great asset in a POW stockade is a sense of humor. Persons possessing it can add not only to everyone's morale, but can help to strengthen the moral fiber.

The stringent motivation to resist comes from one's religion. A strong belief in God can support a person through the trials imposed by the Communists. Belief and faith in one's country, in its



principles and freedoms, and lastly, faith in one's fellow men are next in importance.

The Communists realize this and try to destroy those faiths. If they succeed, they know they will have another tool to help destroy the faiths of others.

Time and again the statement was made, "If we only knew what they are going to try—if we only had some training in what to expect." That statement calls for the old adage, "Forewarned is forearmed." A comprehensive series of lectures, talks and films, not only on Communist methods, but on Communism itself and on American democracy—such as the "Why We Fight" series of World War II—would be fine.

If this can be done (and it should be), any future prisoners of the Communists will never be singing "Let's All Sing Like the Birdies Sing" as we did to American prisoners of the Communists who gave information.

CAPT. WALTER L. MAYO, JR.  
AOAC No. 1  
Fort Sill, Okla.

### Higher Quality of Leadership

- The quality most lacking in our present Army is positive and forceful leadership. Such a defect, if permitted to carry forward into war, could become our principal weakness in combat. During this period of peace, therefore, it should become our most urgent duty to improve the standards and quality of leadership throughout the Army.

To this end, Department of the Army has recently established specialist grades apart from NCO grades to stress the supervisory and leadership roles of non-coms. To obtain more localized control within units, DA is recommending that unit commanders be allowed more immediate and direct control over enlisted promotions and demotions.

What is needed is continued reform—dynamic change where change is indicated.

While much has been said about NCO grades, little has been said about the faults of the current policy relating to commissioned officers. . . . New officers should be selected and proved individuals. A sacrifice in officer strength may be necessary to obtain this type of man. The appearance of too many unqualified junior officers is extremely demoralizing to personnel of lower grades. Graduation from ROTC and the appropriate branch school doesn't test one's ability and shouldn't entitle him to a commission. The policy relating to ROTC should be substantially revised. Graduation from ROTC should entitle a man not to a commission, but to immediate entry into an OCS. ROTC personnel should be subject to the same attrition rate presently applicable in these schools. Those failing

to complete the OCS should be required to serve two years in an enlisted grade. . . .

Present-day junior officers coming into the Army the easy way, through the doors of ROTC, lack dedication. Large numbers of them disapprove of the Army and make no effort to hide their disapproval. Yet it is upon these junior officers, some of whom are so immature as to count the days until their discharge, that the burden of troop leadership falls.

SGT. DONALD E. CLOSE  
Hq & Hq Btry, 538th FA Bn.  
Fort Carson, Colo.

### No More Uniformed Noncombatants

- If a Britisher may butt in on a problem which, after all, is common to all armies of the Free World, I should like most heartily to endorse Lt. Col. George H. Russell's "Make 'em All Fighters" Cerebration [September].

In the British Army the problem is no new one, nor has it entirely been neglected. Prior to the South African War our Army Service Corps—the equivalent of U.S. service troops—was quite incapable of defending itself. In a terrain which reproduced, within its limitations, most of the characteristics of the discontinued battle front of the future, the demand for escorts to protect these non-combatants-in-uniform proved a very serious problem. Time and time again, cavalry and mounted infantry, urgently required elsewhere for the purpose of making life unhealthy for "brother Boer," had to be diverted to the negatively constructive task of playing nursemaid to a lot of healthy men who, in a military sense, just lacked the training to look after themselves.

But the lessons of the Boer War were not ignored. The men of the Army Service Corps were trained in musketry and elementary tactics; and they speedily exhibited the value of their new indoctrination during the "open warfare" phase of 1914-18. There was no question of escorts to "hold their hands." If they struck trouble, they had been trained to deal with it—and they did.

It is possible that for this, above all other reasons, they were honored at the war's end by the award of a new prefix, which transformed them into the Royal Army Service Corps.

\* \* \*

There was a bad relapse, unfortunately, in 1939-45, when airfields bulging with ground staff—excellent at their technical work, but if confronted with a rifle incapable of telling which end made the noise—had to have an especially recruited RAF regiment, trained as infantrymen, enrolled to ensure their protection and that of the airfield where they were situated.

In any future war there will be no noncombatants even among the civilian



Kaman HO4S-1 helicopter rescuing flood victim in Farmington, Conn. area. (Hartford Times Photo)

## HELICOPTERS SAVE HUNDREDS OF LIVES DURING FLOOD

Dramatic rescues by rotary wing aircraft became almost commonplace in the gray rain of August 19, 1955.

Disastrous as they were, the terrible floods in the northeast would have claimed many more lives without these ". . . wonderful, comforting and beautiful little donkeys of the air".

Kaman Aircraft is proud to have supplied part of the fleet of armed forces helicopters which lessened the tragedy.

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population. There certainly should be none in the services.

**MAJOR REGINALD HARGREAVES**  
British Army, Retired  
Wootton St. Lawrence  
Hants, England

**Rolling Tails**

• In 1952 I was with the 82d Division "from start to finish" of Exercise LONGHORN. In that exercise ranges, tables and utensils were arranged on 2½-ton trucks and the whole "kitchen on wheels" was flyproofed (screened in) so that no packing and unpacking was necessary. The result was a mobile kitchen. Supplies were stored in the trailer. The same procedure was established for the supply room—they just put it on wheels.

Now, in the atomic era, the emphasis is on tracked vehicles, highly mobile and protective. It seems that the armored personnel carrier could be used to the same advantage. It is not hard to imagine that several tracked vehicles could contain a battalion aid station, complete for treatment at a momentary halt or while moving under more or less favorable terrain conditions. Applying the idea to kitchens and supply administration would make the whole problem of rear-area mobility a thing of the company commander's past.

Perhaps the tankers have already worked this out. In that case, maybe the other combat forces could get the poop from them through a guest feature writer.

**CAPT. RICHARD J. BUCK**  
2807 Yale Station  
New Haven, Conn.

**Barracuda I**

• I think the caption to the picture on page 45 of the August issue creates an incorrect impression of the units that participated in Exercise BARRACUDA I. It indicates to the average reader that the exercise was for the 2d BCT of the 188th Airborne Infantry, without participation by other troops. Even though the picture on the cover shows troops of the 33d Infantry participating in BARRACUDA I, there is no caption to indicate this. The contents page gives this information, but I believe many readers may have overlooked it.

Actually the exercise was a joint Army, Navy and Air Force affair directed by Lt. Gen. W. K. Harrison, Commander in Chief of Caribbean Command, and consisted of airborne, air-landing, and amphibious phases. This joint exercise was planned for and implemented by a joint task force under Maj. Gen. Lionel C. McCarr, CG, USARCARIB, and was conducted at Rio Hato in the Republic of Panama. The 2d Battalion, 188th Airborne Infantry, furnished the force for the air drop from C-124s under difficult wind conditions. The 1st Battalion, 33d Infantry, furnished the force for the air-

landing phase; the 33d Infantry furnished an armored infantry task force for the amphibious phase. The 62d Troop Carrier Wing provided lift for the air drop and air-landing phase. Caribbean Air Command furnished air cover for the airborne phase, and the 45th VP Squadron from Coco Solo furnished the air cover for the amphibious phase. USARCARIB and Fifteenth Naval District provided the necessary lift for the amphibious phase.

This exercise provided intensive training and a test of our ability to function militarily as a combined-arms team. It also demonstrated to the 223 high government and military leaders of the twenty Latin American nations, who both observed and received reports of this exercise, of our unrelenting and determined efforts to further Western Hemisphere cooperation and solidarity.

**LT. COL. ELMER G. OWENS**  
Box H  
Fort Amador, C. Z.

• We certainly had no intention of slighting any of the fine outfits that participated in the exercise.

**ROTC Summer Camps**

• "Ex Assistant PMST," writing in your excellent October issue, appears to have damned the ROTC summer camp program with general accusations which may or may not apply at specific camps. I do not question his experience, but I do not permit him to question mine.

I was deputy commander of an ROTC camp in 1955, and there was no perversion of the program. While I dare to hope that our students enjoyed the program and benefited by it, our purpose was to carry out the stated objectives for such a camp, and we were successful in so doing.

Not all cadets attending ROTC camps are "sold" on the Army prior to attendance, and we attempted to sell them on strict discipline, high standards required, exemplary conduct, hard work, and off-duty treatment of cadets as junior officers. The response was splendid.

Review of material studied in college is a necessary step, but should be kept to a minimum. As to firing weapons, each cadet fired one score for record. There was no pencil-pushing or retraining. Companies averaged from 60 to 90 per cent qualified. It was noted that the low companies had wind, rain, or both, while the high companies had low wind and sunny weather. We spent five days in the field, which I consider sufficient. With my staff I had full opportunity to recommend changes in the ATP, and admit that those recommended were minor in nature.

I feel that the writer of that Cerebra-tion covered too large an area.

**COL. HARRY E. MCKINNEY**  
Indiana University  
Bloomington, Ind.

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
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## FRONT AND CENTER

### Get Well, Mr. President

As the unofficial spokesman for the comrades-in-arms of the Commander in Chief, the Association of the U.S. Army adds its prayers to those of millions of Americans and friends of Americans who pray for the restoration of the health of our leader. As a soldier and as the President, Mr. Eisenhower has been a symbol of the strength and unity of the free world for more than a decade, and even the temporary absence of his sure hand from the helm is a severe blow.

### Neither Indecision, Nor Complacency

A young infantry lieutenant called on us a few weeks ago, and during our conversation he stated that many of his contemporaries of the infantry arm were disturbed and disheartened by the seeming inability of infantry to come up with firm doctrines and organization for atomic war.

We sincerely hope that not many officers are as disturbed as our good friend, the lieutenant, thinks. We have been at Fort Benning and have heard the people working on these problems discuss them. We know just enough about them to know that the problems are most difficult. There is no indecision in the sense of an inability to come to a decision. Rather than indecision, it seems to be a policy of withholding firm decisions until the right answers are forthcoming.

It would be very easy, we suppose, for The Infantry School to make some superficial changes in doctrine and organization and document them with plausible arguments that would win approval of higher authority. It would be

easy for the chiefs and Indians who have the responsibility for developing doctrines and organization to exhibit a vast complacency and assert that infantry is ready for what may come.

We know of no such complacency and we don't think there is any. Indeed, we would be scared to death if there were any evidence of it. We must not miss the difference that separates decisions delayed by thorough inquiry from an inability to resolve things.

It should not be too difficult to reassure our young lieutenant and others who are seriously and honestly disturbed by showing them that infantry is indeed making substantial progress.

### Radioactive Fall-Out

As those of you who try to understand and keep up with information on atomic energy will remember, Dr. Willard F. Libby, a member of the Atomic Energy Commission, made a speech on radioactive fall-out in Chicago last June that the press made valiant attempts to explain to its readers but without too much success. In its September issue the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* published the text of the speech with the following explanation that is the most understandable summary yet published of what Dr. Libby said. Soldiers will quickly grasp its significance:

"It is reassuring to learn from Dr. Libby that the AEC is not guilty of recklessness in conducting its test program on nuclear weapons. The data he presents should go a long way toward convincing skeptics that the Nevada tests do not involve a great present danger to the inhabitants

### They Measured Up



These Americans can smile because they never lost faith in themselves or their country when they were in a Communist prison camp and because this was their first reunion since they were separated in Korea. They are five of the six members of "Pate's reactionary squad" that made things tough for their Communist captors.

From left to right, they are: Sgt. Alfred R. McMillan, a patient at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver; Sgt.

Donnell Adams, Fort Lewis, Washington; Cpl. Vernon Clark, Fort Devens, Mass.; SFC Lloyd W. Pate (leader of the band), Camp Gordon, Ga.; and Mr. Willie Joe Dorrill, Troy, Ala. The sixth member, Mr. Cletys Nordin, was not present.

For a report on why the Army pursued the only possible course in the case of Americans who didn't measure up when they were prisoners, see page 15.



### The Inventive Army

Sgt. Matthew Zotti shows Lt. Col. Daniel Gallagher the blank adapter which he devised to make tactical problems more authentic. The adapter fits on the muzzle end of the M1 and makes it possible to fire the weapon semi-automatically when using blank ammunition. Colonel Gallagher, an infantryman, is Director of the Department of Field Training at the Signal Corps School, Fort Monmouth, N. J., and Sergeant Zotti is noncom in charge of the Department's armory.



of the USA nor to the world in general. Such facts are the only antidote to fear.

"On the other hand, Dr. Libby makes no bones about the catastrophe of a nuclear war. Whereas a weapon test program can be conducted safely, it seems highly unlikely that any rules of good conduct will apply to the detonation of nuclear weapons in war. The contrary will probably be true. Weapons may be used deliberately to maximize the radioactive fall-out.

"Since some of Dr. Libby's remarks are couched in technical language, following is a summary of what seem to be significant points.

"(1) He mentions a 'ten-megaton fission weapon' which would yield 500 times more radioactive products than the Hiroshima bomb. Previously, President Eisenhower (Dec. 8, 1953) had spoken of a '25 times larger' fission bomb. Libby's is the first official reference to such a powerful fission weapon.

"(2) An area as large as 100,000 square miles may be dusted with fall-out. Although Dr. Libby does not say how probable such an extensive fall-out would be, this figure should do much to jolt people from thinking of the 7,000 square miles (AEC release of Feb. 15, 1955) as a generally valid figure. Fall-out is not a neatly predictable affair.

"(3) Dr. Libby's explanation of the radiostrontium hazard illustrates the complex series of events which can ensue when man touches off a nuclear blast at any point on the globe. Highly refined experimental techniques developed by Dr. Libby can be used to trace the fall-out of tiny amounts of strontium around the world. This becomes incorporated in plants and animals. The level of radiostrontium produced by tests is not dangerous. According to Dr. Libby, it would have to be raised ten-thousand-fold before bone tumors would be likely to develop. However, fall-out from tests and fall-out from a war are two different things. A ten-thousand-fold increase in radiostrontium precipitation could easily occur in war over many thousands of square miles.

"Now that Dr. Libby has broken the ice in presenting

reliable data to the public, we may expect follow-up publications from the AEC filling in the still missing details about the fall-out.

"The press has focused great attention upon the ten-megaton figure in Dr. Libby's speech, as revealing a new type of fission weapon. Certainly, Dr. Libby did not spell out any details of such a weapon. But his speech came at a time when much speculation had already taken place. While not explicit in itself, the speech confirmed for the first time that the so-called H-bomb was, in its ultimate effect, essentially a gigantic fission bomb. Since fission and radioactivity go hand in hand, the great significance of Libby's speech is the confirmation of the fact that radioactive fall-out has become an immensely important new aspect of nuclear warfare. This is not because the fall out

*(Continued on page 49)*

### First Flight of XV-3 Convertiplane



The Bell XV-3 Convertiplane developed for the Army is here shown making its first flight at the Bell plant at Fort Worth. After vertical take-off the test pilot maneuvered it about in every direction as a helicopter. The design features combination rotor-propellers which tilt forward from helicopter position to become airplane propellers for long-range, high-speed flight. Flight testing continues under Army and Air Force auspices.





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THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL





**Two of 57 Who Were Decorated for Exemplary Conduct in POW Camps**

*Bronze Stars for CPL CHARLES LOUITT and CPL EDWARD M. GAITHER*



# JUSTICE FOR ALL RECAP-K'S

A behind-the-scenes view of how the Army faced the problem of  
Returned or Exchanged POWs who were charged with misconduct

**MAJOR GEORGE S. PRUGH, JR.**

**O**UT of the Korean War there arose a vast, difficult and far-reaching legal problem of what to do about prisoners of war charged with serious crimes against their country and their fellow prisoners. In the language of the military, these are known as RECAP-K cases: Returned or Exchanged Captured American Personnel in Korea.

During the Korean War about 4,428 American servicemen survived the hell of Communist POW compounds. Of these, 3,973 were members of the Army, 31 of the Navy, 200 of the Marines and 224 of the Air Force. Most of the Army prisoners were captured in the early days of the war, particularly in the original thrust by the North Korean forces in mid-1950, but the disaster following the entry into the war of the Chinese Communist Forces in the winter of 1950-1951 resulted in the capture of an additional large group, including many Marines. The captured Air Force and

Navy men were generally survivors of downed aircraft. It is significant that about 90 per cent of the RECAP-Ks were soldiers.

The program of repatriation of POWs began with Operation Little Switch, wherein 127 soldiers (and 22 other Americans) were returned to U.S. control during the period 19-25 April 1953. It was followed by Big Switch, when the remaining American surviving POWs were returned during the period 5 August 1953 to 6 September 1953. Two other Americans, Corporals Edward S. Dickenson and Claude J. Batchelor, who will be referred to later, were subsequently returned, and even more recently three others—Lewie Griggs, Otho Bell, and William Cowart—left the Chinese Communists' control and returned to the United States.

Long before the repatriation of a single POW, authorities in the Department of Defense and in the

military departments were aware that the Communists had somehow elicited from captured American servicemen statements which on their face were disloyal, false, and generally treasonable in nature. Sometimes these statements took the form of so-called "peace petitions." Others appeared in various broadcasts, motion pictures, articles in newspapers like the *Shanghai News*, *The China Monthly Review*, or a POW camp paper, such as *Towards Truth and Peace*. Still others appeared in "Surrender" leaflets distributed among UNC troops facing the enemy.

While armies have always engaged in psychological warfare, it was extremely disconcerting to see large numbers of American prisoners succumbing to certain features of the Communist propaganda effort. Not since the Civil War had there been such large-scale apparent collaboration by American servicemen. Furthermore, some of the materials were obviously authentic to the extent that they were actually supplied by Americans; motion pictures furnished irrefutable proof of this.

Authorities concerned with such matters knew that the solution to the problem lay not in condemning and punishing all of the prisoners who engaged in the least act of collaboration with the enemy. Long-term confinement and the concentrated efforts by an enemy to break the mind and spirit of a man already suffering from shock, fear, and often wounds and sickness were bound to result in some small acts of collaboration. Then, too, it is known that many prisoners availed themselves of peace petitions and broadcasts only in an effort to let their families know they were still alive.

**A**S early as 3 July 1953 the Army's basic policy was announced, directing that intelligence files be screened, suspected offenses investigated, and disciplinary measures initiated where warranted.

Shortly afterwards, the Department of the Army policy was established that prosecution should be initiated in RECAP-K cases only where there appeared to be the most compelling and convincing evidence of the guilt of the accused of a serious offense, and that no returned prisoner eligible for discharge should be retained for the purpose of trial in the absence of that kind of evidence.

The Department of Defense announced its policy in a press release on 24 September 1953, stating that: "Any action by the Department of Defense will be on an individual basis, will be just and fair and in line with established facts and evidence and the rules, regulations, and laws in regard to military conduct . . . We do not as a general principle condone those who made false confessions contrary to the interests of their country, or whose actions caused their fellow prisoners added misery. Such cases will be carefully and sympathetically examined by the services concerned to ascertain whether in any of them there has been an unreasonable failure to measure up to the standard of individual conduct which is expected even of a prison-

### Seven Who Were Convicted by Courts-Martial



PFC CLAUDE BATCHELOR



MSGT WILLIAM H. OLSON



SGT JAMES C. GALLAGHER

er of war, or deviations from standards of behavior prescribed by law."

The policy having been established that prosecutions would be initiated against those American prisoners of war who (1) committed crimes against their fellow prisoners, or (2) committed acts of treason or in the nature of treason, following the repatriation of Americans from North Korean prisoner of war camps, it fell to the several services to undertake the necessary preliminary work.

However, except for transcribed recordings of radio broadcasts, intercepted overseas by listening posts, or for a few issues of Communist newspapers reproducing POW statements, there was initially at hand in the RECAP-K cases little real evidence to support any criminal action against the POW. That material had to come from fellow prisoners. It did!

**L**ET us turn back, then, to the initial repatriations and the interrogations that followed thereafter. As soon as prisoners returned in Operation Little Switch, their interrogation, both psychiatric and intelligence, began. There was no questioning designed primarily for any punitive purpose. Information had been obtained as



CPL HAROLD M. DUNN



PFC ROTHWELL B. FLOYD



CPL EDWARD S. DICKENSON



LTCOL HARRY FLEMING

early as 1951, however, which led military authorities to suspect certain of the POWs of conduct falling far below that of their colleagues and reasonably expected of American soldiers. This was corroborated by the results of the interrogations of our returning prisoners. As such information was obtained it was placed in the file of the subject suspect.

Prisoners returning in Operation Little Switch were interrogated initially overseas and then upon their return to the United States, but for prisoners returning in Operation Big Switch interrogations continued during the prisoner's trip home. Most of the enlisted prisoners had served out the balance of their enlistments while still in the enemy POW compounds, so these men were given an opportunity to be discharged from the service in accordance with the policy previously mentioned. Only in a very few cases (2 or 3) where there was already on file some compelling and convincing evidence indicating the possible commission of a serious crime was a man retained in the service over his own objection, if his term of enlistment had expired.

Gradually the files of some few men began to fill with derogatory information sufficient to require further screening of their cases. Approximately 1,600 of the

RECAP-Ks were separated from the service soon after repatriation, and of this group 211 were later determined to have sufficient derogatory information in their files that further inquiry into their cases was necessary. The remaining 2,373 were still on active duty serving their original enlistment or were officers who, not having specified terms of service, were still on active duty.

**W**HAT was the content of the files of derogatory information? It was at all times appreciated that prisoners lived in a narrow world, and were particularly susceptible to rumor and hearsay. Having little outside information, they lived—"existed" might be more accurate—in such a small society that frequently very intense feelings of bitterness arose between individual prisoners or groups of prisoners. All this had a tendency to detract from the trustworthiness or reliability of any POW's derogatory statement. While constantly repeated derogatory stories justified inquiry, mere numbers of such remarks in a file are not and were not considered to be sufficient to form a basis for trial action. Nevertheless, it is significant that the bulk of the material supporting charges was supplied by prisoners of war. The actual charges in RECAP-K cases stem primarily from the charges made by POWs themselves.

By early spring of 1954, cases had been developed by field investigators in a few instances to the point where trial action could be started. The task was, however, enormous. The witnesses had scattered all over the United States. In some cases there was great difficulty in locating discharged servicemen who knew the true facts about a case. Many of these men wanted to forget what had happened, or were reluctant to testify for some other reason. In some cases the memory of witnesses had suffered because of the POW camp treatment, and almost all witnesses had difficulty correlating a given event with a definite day, month or even year. Extreme diligence on the part of the field commanders was required in order to complete the investigations. Today, more than two years after the return of most of the RECAP-Ks to the United States, the herculean task of investigation is not yet completed.

**I**t will be recalled that two prisoners of war, Dickenson and Batchelor, returned subsequent to Operation Big Switch. In July and August 1953, the POWs on both sides were given the opportunity to decide whether to be repatriated or to go to a neutral nation or to remain with the enemy. The United Nations position at the truce talks had opposed forcible repatriation of POWs, largely because of the great numbers of North Korean and Chinese POWs in United Nations hands who did not under any circumstances want to return to Communist control. The wisdom of this position was borne out by the fact that some 27,000 Communist POWs broke out of their compounds to avoid repatriation, and another 14,000 chose not to be repatriated after having been placed in the hands of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC).

In any event, among the Americans 23 POWs (including Dickenson) chose not to come home in Operation Big Switch, and were accordingly delivered to the troops of the NNRC about 24 September 1953. Pursuant to the terms of the Truce Agreement of 27 July 1953, each side was to be permitted 90 days thereafter in order to persuade, if possible, its doubting personnel to "come home." The official U.S. position, rigidly adhered to, was that it would not try to induce any of the Americans to come home but would, at the most, merely insist that they make a free choice with full knowledge of the facts.

Before any explanation sessions were scheduled for the Americans, Corporal Dickenson on 21 October 1953, requested return to U.S. control. Shortly thereafter, on 25 October 1953, Dickenson, on his own initiative, emulating many civilians, including school children, sent letters to the remaining 22 Americans urging them to "come home." On 6 November 1953 the 22 prisoners sent a letter to the NNRC protesting the "come home" letters, disregarding the fact that none were official appeals by U.S. officials. On 14 December 1953, when it was requested that they be produced for an "explanation session," the prisoners refused to appear. On 22 December 1953 a letter was sent by the United Nations Command through the NNRC to the prisoners, indicating the choice had to be their own. No further effort was made to persuade the 22 to return, but on the night of 23 December 1953, U.S. officials undertook to make a last-minute public address broadcast across the barbed wire to the compound holding the 22 Americans. Major Edward Moorar read the statement appearing in the box on this page.

THE Armistice Agreement provided for 30 additional days, following 23 December 1953, before the prisoners would be discharged from their POW status. On 1 January 1954 Corporal Claude J. Batchelor returned to U.S. control. His only statement as to why he had returned was that he had answered the appeal of his wife.

On 23 January 1954, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army administratively dishonorably discharged the 21 American POWs, now called VNRs (Voluntary Non-Repatriates), who had remained in Communist hands. Each of these men, then, was thereby placed in civilian status. Court-martial jurisdiction could be exercised over them, but only pursuant to the provisions of Article 3a, Uniform Code of Military Justice, which permits court-martial of civilians under certain circumstances.

The first trial against a RECAP-K took place at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in the case of Private First Class Rothwell B. Floyd, who was convicted on 1 April 1954 for assaulting a lieutenant colonel who was a fellow prisoner of war; assaulting other fellow POWs and misappropriating food belonging to them; and stealing from deceased and wounded U.S. POWs. He was sentenced to be dishonorably discharged, to forfeit all pay and allowances, and to be confined at hard labor for 40 years. This trial received little or no publicity, and was handled at the operating level without any instruction from the Department of the Army. On the 24th of March 1955, the Board of Review in the Office of The Judge Advocate General of the Army reduced the confinement in this case to 10 years and, the United States Court of Military Appeals recently

### Final Appeal Broadcast By Loud Speaker To The 22 Americans Who Chose To Remain

Attention, all P.O.W.s in the compound. Attention.

I am Major Edward Moorar of the United Nations Command explainer group. This is the final day of the ninety-day explanation period provided as a condition of the armistice in the terms of reference. Repeatedly, through the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, we have offered you the opportunity to exercise your right to attend an explanation period. You have not availed yourselves of this opportunity and right, which expires today.

We believe that there are some among you who desire to be repatriated. Who want to return home, but who are being forcibly prevented from expressing your free will by fear, threats and strong-arm methods of certain of your fellow prisoners. It is clear that your so-called representatives are withholding information and restricting your freedom to speak and act as individuals.

Do not be afraid. Seven Koreans and one American have returned to freedom from your compound. They report that they risked their lives in order to escape. You can obtain your freedom without danger if you take advantage of the safe situation which exists here at this time.

We have taken this means to insure that your rights as individuals can be exercised. The Indian guards are present to insure your safety. We are personally here to receive any of you who desire to return home. Corporal Edward Dickenson returned home to his loved ones and enjoyed a combination thirty-day leave and honeymoon. This fact explodes Communist charges that you and your family will be harmed if you return.

I assure you nothing shall happen to your family at the hands of the United States Government regardless of your decision—whether to remain or to return to the United States.

If there are any of you who have been fearful of expressing your desire to return to America, now is your opportunity, now is the time. Come forward and inform the guards nearest you. Indian guards will protect you. You have nothing to fear. This is the last time you will have such an opportunity with full protection in immediate presence of strong Indian guards. The guards will protect you and in a matter of hours you will be on your way home.

We shall wait here with the Indian guards for half an hour for those of you who may desire to come forward. I repeat, no such safe opportunity to come here is likely to come again. You need not fear for your safety. If you really want to come home, now is the chance for which you have been waiting. The ninety-day explanation period expires tonight, 23 December, at midnight.

The fact you have not accepted repatriation prior to this time will not be held against you.

[At this point the broadcast text as originally prepared by the U.N.C. and submitted to the N.N.R.C. contained this sentence: "This is your final opportunity." A U.N.C. spokesman said that sentence had been censored out of the text.]

With the protection afforded you by the Indian guards you are free to make your choice.





FOR THE MARINES, OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE

## *190 m.p.h. Cessna OE-2's join Marines*

To give its air "arm" greater versatility, the Marine Corps has ordered the 190 m.p.h. Cessna OE-2. This new plane is designed to meet highly specialized Marine requirements.

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Self-sealing fuel tanks, flack curtain and armored seats give greater protection to Marine pilots during combat operations.

The OE-2 meets a specific need. Cessna considers it a privilege to cooperate with the military in planning for today's air age.

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having denied Floyd's appeal petition, the sentence has been ordered executed.

Following the Floyd court-martial the second RECAP-K case came to trial in the person of Corporal Dickenson. Dickenson's trial lasted from 19 April to 4 May at the Military District of Washington. He was convicted of unlawfully corresponding and communicating with the enemy by making speeches, signing petitions, and making recordings inimical to American interests; acting as an informant to the enemy on the activities of a fellow prisoner; assisting the enemy in influencing American prisoners; and reporting to the enemy the activities of a named fellow American prisoner resulting in this prisoner being placed before a mock firing squad, beaten and placed in solitary confinement. It is significant that he was not tried for failing to return to U.S. control when the opportunity was first offered. Dickenson was sentenced to dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures and confinement at hard labor for 10 years. His case was affirmed by the Board of Review and was argued before the United States Court of Military Appeals which ruled against Dickenson. He is now serving his sentence.

**O**N 29 April 1954, almost immediately prior to the announcement of Dickenson's conviction, the U.S. Navy's board of inquiry released its findings in the case of Colonel Frank H. Schwable, senior Marine officer held captive by the Communists. The Navy's action was not a trial but merely a preliminary inquiry to determine if trial should be undertaken. As is well known, it was decided that court-martial action was not appropriate in the case, although the board found Colonel Schwable's acts aided and comforted the enemy.

It would be well to note that Colonel Schwable's case was substantially different on its facts from either Floyd's or Dickenson's or any other Army case, for that matter. In the first place there was no allegation in Colonel Schwable's case that he had informed on fellow prisoners of war or in any manner capitalized to his advantage on the misery of his fellows. The second important difference was that the Board of Inquiry was apparently convinced that the degree of pressure brought to bear upon Colonel Schwable by his captors was sufficient at least legally, to excuse him. In neither Dickenson's nor Floyd's case were the courts-martial persuaded that the accused had had to suffer duress or coercive pressure to the degree that it would constitute a defense. The issue was clearly raised, however, and the holding of the court-martial is, of course, subject to review by the various appellate agencies.

**S**HORTLY after the public announcement that Dickenson had been charged, but before his trial had commenced, the Secretary of Defense directed on 20 February 1954 that no RECAP-K case would henceforth be brought to trial without prior clearance through his office. In order that there would be no RECAP-K tried without first establishing a sufficient basis for

trial action, the Secretary of the Army thereupon created a special Department of the Army Board on Prisoner of War Collaboration that had upon it representatives of the offices of The Judge Advocate General, The Surgeon General, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2. One branch in the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, was designated Special Counsel and charged with the duty of working up materials to present to this board. Out of about 215 cases, representing those persons still in the Army, the Special Counsel presented to the board 82 cases, requesting authority to proceed further in 72 cases. The board recommended favorable action by the Secretary of the Army in 56 of the 72 cases. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Forces (M&RF) was appropriately briefed on the board's recommendations and then forwarded 51 recommendations on to the Secretary of Defense for final clearance. The Secretary of Defense approved proceeding further in 47 of the 51 cases. Field commanders were then notified that there was no objection to proceeding under the provisions of Chapter VII of the *Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951*. This chapter deals with the manner of referring and acting upon court-martial charges. Even with such an authorization, however, it was not necessary that a field commander initiate trial action. That prerogative was and still is his, and his alone. After all, as any lawyer knows, it is a far cry from the preliminary receipt of information alleging a crime to the ultimate commencement of a trial. Witnesses had to be interrogated all over the country, search had to be made through masses of files, and many incidental legal problems had to be solved before a trial could start.

**I**N pursuit of the established legal procedures, eight more RECAP-K cases were brought to trial. Following Dickenson there was the trial of Corporal Claude J. Batchelor at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, from 30 August to 30 September 1954. He was convicted of participating with the enemy in planning for the formation of subversive organizations of secret agents to be sent to the United States for communistic work; making certain speeches, circulating petitions, writing articles and otherwise acting in a manner inimical to American interests; making public utterances to American civilians designed to promote disloyalty and disaffection among the civilian populace; informing on the activities of his fellow prisoners for the purpose of obtaining favorable treatment from his captors; participating in a trial of an American prisoner being held by the communists, recommending that his fellow prisoner be not allowed to return to the United States, in violation of Articles 104, 105 and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Batchelor was sentenced to dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures, confinement at hard labor for life, which was reduced to dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures and confinement at hard labor for 20 years by the convening authority on

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28 October 1954. An Army Board of Review affirmed the sentence in this case. Note that Batchelor was not tried for having remained behind with the Communists after Operation Big Switch.

Lieutenant Colonel Harry Fleming, a senior Army POW, was tried at Fort Sheridan, Illinois, from 30 August 1954 to 23 September 1954, and convicted of writing articles, broadcasting, and leading discussion groups reflecting anti-American views designed to promote disloyalty and disaffection among American troops, and making certain broadcasts inimical to American interests, in violation of the old 95th and 96th Articles of War and Articles 133 and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. (The Articles of War were superseded by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, effective 31 May 1951, after many RECAP-Ks were captured but before repatriation.) He was sentenced to be dismissed from the service (equivalent to a dishonorable discharge for an enlisted man) and to forfeit all pay and allowances. This sentence has been affirmed by an Army Board of Review.

Master Sergeant William H. Olson was convicted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on 3 March 1955 of collaborating with the enemy and sentenced to dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures and confinement at hard labor for 2 years.

**M**AJOR Ambrose J. Nugent was acquitted at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, on 7 March 1955 of violations of the 96th Article of War and Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. On 28-29 June 1955, Corporal Harold M. Dunn pleaded guilty and was convicted at Governors Island, New York, for collaborating with the enemy. The court announced a sentence of dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures, and confinement at hard labor for 8 years. The convening authority subsequently reduced the confinement in this case to two and a half years and this sentence has been affirmed by a board of review.

A general court-martial at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, acquitted Corporal J. L. Tyler on 23 July 1955 of charges involving collaboration, and another general court-martial at Fort Lewis, Washington, acquitted 1st Lieutenant J. D. Erwin in August 1955 of similar charges.

At Governor's Island, New York, on 19 August 1955, a general court-martial sentenced Sergeant J. C. Gallagher to life imprisonment, total forfeitures, and a dishonorable discharge, upon his conviction of two specifications of unpremeditated murder of fellow prisoners of war, collaborating with the Chinese Communists, and mistreating and informing on fellow prisoners of war.

As of the date of writing there are 12 other RECAP-Ks who have been charged but not yet brought to trial. This includes Private John D. Martin who, on 1 September 1955, obtained a court order from a Federal District Court judge in San Francisco, directing Martin's release from confinement while awaiting trial

by court-martial for the offense of aiding the enemy while he was a prisoner of war. Also included in this figure are the cases of Cowart, Griggs, and Bell, three of the 21 so-called "turncoats" or voluntary non-repatriates. These three men returned to the United States on 29 July 1955 and have been in military custody since then awaiting trial by court-martial.

**I**N the midst of this program, on 4 May 1954, the U.S. Air Force announced that it would undertake no trials of airmen who had been captured in Korea. A special board of Air Force officers had screened the files of the 224 repatriated Air Force POWs, had made further study of 87 such cases, and closed 69 of these without further action, but had recommended additional administrative study of the remaining 14 cases. Ten of these 14 were eventually eliminated from the service.


The RECAP-K cases were not all going before courts-martial. As for those 211 who had been separated from the service subsequent to their alleged misconduct, the records were transmitted to the Department of Justice for the consideration of civil trial action. As of this date no civil trial action has been initiated.

The 215 or so RECAP-K personnel suspected of wrongdoing in the POW camps and still in the service faced possible administrative separation either as security risks or, in the case of some officers, elimination under the provisions of administrative regulations. These administrative separations will not be discussed here but it should be understood that these actions are *not* punitive, do not result in dishonorable or bad conduct discharges or confinement, and are designed primarily to remove those officers and men deemed unfit to continue to serve, particularly in positions of leadership.

**R**EFERENCE should be made here to the Clearing Center operated by The Adjutant General to expedite exchange of information between the army areas. This system arose after it was discovered that in some cases it was necessary to examine approximately 2,000 POW statements. In August 1954 The Adjutant General created a team at the Pentagon to receive inquiries from field investigators seeking to locate and re-interrogate witnesses. This team, after tracing the present addresses of the witnesses, sorted out the inquiries and forwarded them to investigative teams nearest the witnesses' homes. This procedure had the advantage of reducing the number of times one witness had to be questioned when he had knowledge of several RECAP-K cases.

The fact that the three services used somewhat different procedures in approaching the problem apparently has caused the greatest public concern. The problem was primarily an Army one because, inevitably, the largest number of prisoners of war are foot soldiers—infantrymen and artillerymen. They always run the greatest risk of capture. About 9 out of every 10 American POWs in North Korea were soldiers. The manner of dealing with POW problems is, then, most acute





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Stratos Division, Bay Shore, N. Y.

for the Army, and is inextricably entwined in the discipline and morale problems of those who have to meet the enemy hand to hand and face to face, day after day.

**I**t cannot be overemphasized that there was no untoward desire on the part of the military authorities to undertake a trial of a POW. Each service, the Army certainly no less than any other, is intensely conscious of the morale of its fighters. American military leadership has been characterized by its extreme fairness to the individual. In the face of this great tradition, it is, of course, absolutely unreasonable to believe that that leadership would suddenly lose its compassionate understanding of the situation faced by its fighting men when they became prisoners in the hands of an inhumane, vicious enemy.

True, the American serviceman is instructed to give to the enemy, upon capture, only his name, rank, service number, and date of birth. This much he is required to give under the Geneva Conventions of 1929

captors in exchange for monitoring or collaborating for his captors, merits punishment.

Then there is the type of crime committed by a few officers and noncommissioned officers—abuse of their position by either misleading or failing to lead their fellow prisoners when it was in their power to do so. This too merits punishment. The third type of crime is the treason type. It is committed when a soldier voluntarily furnishes intelligence or propaganda materials to the enemy. It is nonsense to play down the importance of such materials for the enemy. Certain areas of the world were unconvinced about American and UN intentions in Korea, and Chinese Communists, together with the North Koreans, saw to it that the treasonable anti-American propaganda furnished by American POWs reached those sensitive areas.

The "germ warfare" propaganda attack, carefully planned and diligently pursued by the Communists, must have gone far in spreading the lie to the unread Asiatic that American baseness had exhibited itself in

### Three Who Returned And Are Awaiting Trial

LEWIS GRIGGS  
OTHO BELL  
WILLIAM COWART



(which the United States had ratified) and 1949 (which the United States ratified in the summer of 1955). *Anything that a prisoner thereafter gives the enemy he gives upon his own responsibility.* But it is ridiculous to suppose that a prisoner is not permitted to say anything more to his captors, and this is well understood by each of the services. A man held in the helpless situation in which a POW finds himself must cooperate with his captors by getting in line when required, by falling out for formations, by obeying the other routine POW camp orders. He must speak to his captors occasionally, to ask for medical aid, to register complaints, to obtain necessary clothing, and so forth. All of these things are expected and tolerated.

**T**HERE are, however, three general types of offenses which are of basic interest to the services, particularly the Army. One type arises when a prisoner seeks to take advantage of his fellow prisoner's misery. In the service view, a prisoner who informs to the enemy on other POWs, who steals from his sick buddies, who robs the dead, who obtains extra benefits from the

undertaking such a horrible method of warfare against innocent and defenseless civilians. Literally hundreds of thousands of people in the world today actually think that the United States engaged in such activities! Even when confronted by stout and obviously truthful denials by America and its colleagues in the United Nations, many people (including many returned POWs!) retain the thought, on the basis that "where there is smoke, there must be fire." Had the Communist lies not carried the apparent indorsements of some American servicemen the effects of the propaganda would not in any manner be so serious.


The defense of "brainwashing" introduced a new feature into these RECAP K cases and one which must be examined. Actually this argument takes two courses. In one it reasons that the enemy's brutal treatment of the accused so affected his mental powers that, although the accused knew "right" from "wrong," he was no longer able to adhere to the "right" and thereafter committed the alleged acts. Assuming the accused is successful in urging these facts, military law would hold that he has a good defense to any crime he might

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
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be alleged to have committed during the period he was so affected.

The second line of reasoning is that, while the accused was mentally responsible for his acts, he was compelled by the enemy to commit the acts of collaboration. In such an argument it is necessary to examine the facts carefully. What was the nature of the enemy's compulsion? Was it physical, mental, or both? Was it any greater than that faced by other prisoners? Was death threatened? Under all the circumstances of this particular case was it reasonable for this accused to yield to the enemy and commit the particular act alleged? Each case has to be looked at separately.

**T**HERE is legal authority, both civil and military, for the proposition that a serviceman is to be held to a higher standard than a civilian, that he may legally raise the defense of duress or coercion only by establishing that he was subject to a reasonable apprehension that he would be immediately killed if he failed to comply with the demands of his captors. There is some authority, however, that duress or coercion is not a defense at all to a charge of aiding the enemy, but goes only to the matter of mitigation. The theory proceeds from the fact that if a soldier is told to attack an enemy position he cannot raise the defense of duress or coercion for his failure to obey. He may be tried and punished, even executed, for his cowardice, notwithstanding the "duress" imposed upon him by the enemy in the form of well-aimed missiles. Duress and coercion are defenses in only certain types of cases—not in murder, not in misbehavior before the enemy and, according to this theory, not in aiding the enemy. This problem is one that can only be solved ultimately in an appropriate case by the United States Court of Military Appeals.

**F**ROM the foregoing, it must be obvious that the entire RECAP-K problem, tremendous that it is, has been approached, particularly by the Army, by a great deal of study, caution, and care. It is safe to say that the system of military justice, with its extensive appellate processes, will insure that no man will be unjustly convicted for these or any other offenses. Those of us who are practicing law in the military system have great faith and confidence in the fairness of our system. We believe that it represents most of the finest traditions of the civilian system, that it is a thoroughly enlightened, humane, and just system that will err, if at all, on the side of the accused and not against him. When we cut away the highly colored, sensationalized material that covers these RECAP-K cases we find that all of the services have been creditably restrained, tolerant, and considerate of the unfortunate POWs. We find that a bare handful have been or are likely to be punished, and these only if a serious offense can be proven in a manner conforming to the rigid requirements of American jurisprudence. The offenses being punished are only those which no military service can

tolerate and expect thereafter to have battle discipline or any sort of proper patriotic conduct of POWs. It would be a cruel travesty upon those many who stood their ground against all their communist captors could throw at them, and who did not crack, if the nation should today say, in effect, that they were foolish to hold out, that they could have given in after little pressure and would not be thereafter held to account. The nation has a right to expect a soldier to give his life for his country, and it matters not where the call comes to him, on the battlefield or in the POW compound. It is true that each man probably has a breaking point, and that each man's breaking point is different from another. But all soldiers need a standard to rely upon—a standard easily recognized if not always easily adhered to. This standard is and has been a reasonable one and a single one. The vast majority of the prisoners were able to adhere to it. The Department of the Army has decorated 57 former Korean POWs for outstanding bravery and meritorious conduct while captive, although each was subject to communist brutality. In addition, some 1,400 others have records indicating strong resistance to communist indoctrination. Trial action has been or will be initiated only in those few cases, probably less than one hundred POWs, where the failure to adhere to the standard was deemed to be so gross, so aggravated, that there was really no logical alternative but a court-martial. No two of the cases are alike—and each case must be considered on its own merits. The alleged offenses in each case differ; the circumstances surrounding the charges against each accused are different; and the defenses offered in each case are different. Except in the Floyd case, the sentences are not final in any of the RECAP-K cases tried to date, but each is being examined and reviewed at the various appellate levels for appropriateness of findings and sentence and with due regard for the law and the facts. It is inevitable that different circumstances will evoke different punishment—and the heaviest punishments will undoubtedly be found in those cases where one POW has mistreated a fellow POW.

**H**ERE then, in the RECAP-K program as pursued to date, is the standard of conduct together with the rules to be applied in testing for cases where the standard might not have been met. The lessons are available now, and are recorded in the report of the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War (published in part in the October 1955 *ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL*) and the Code of Conduct (published in full in the October 1955 *ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL*), subsequently expressed as an Executive Order to all of the services. It remains to put these lessons into effect, emphasize them in the training programs, and to refine them when refinement becomes necessary. Rather than feel a sense of shame in the RECAP-K program, the Army, and the Nation, may well take pride in the fact that so few of its members succumbed to the Communists' terrors.



## Foreign Area Specialist Training Program

TODAY'S Army officers are deeply involved in certain phases of international relations. Particular areas where this is true include overseas assignments such as Army attaché, troop duty abroad, and service with MAAGs and military missions. A greater need has arisen for officers who are thoroughly familiar with the languages, customs, geography, history, and social and cultural life of other nations. Also, a better understanding of nations and peoples can be achieved through mutual understanding and the exchange of ideas, folklore, and philosophies of life.

For some years now the military establishment has recognized the need for such a program. The program has had several names, but its purpose remains unchanged. The Foreign Area Specialist Training Program, as it is now called, is the Army's recognition of the increasing requirements for officers with the needed knowledge of foreign areas and peoples.

NORMALLY, foreign area training is given at the postgraduate level, with the study of languages an early objective. However, the program is designed to produce highly qualified area specialists, rather than superlinguists.

Studies stress the cultural life and psychological characteristics of the people concerned. Courses include geography; historical and cultural background; regional and international relations; and the military, economic, political and social institutions.

Complete foreign area training may extend through four years. Besides the training given at the Army Language School, there are courses at universities like Yale, Princeton, Columbia, Pennsylvania and Stanford, and at overseas institutions. Programs are being conducted in areas where the Russian, Chinese, Japanese, Greek, Turkish,

Arabic, Persian and Hindustani languages predominate.

Typical assignments for graduates are to the Department of the Army General Staff, the Army's attaché system, MAAGs, or military missions. After an officer completes his initial assignment in this field, he reverts to his basic branch for troop duty or other appropriate branch assignment. Participants in the Foreign Area Specialist Training Program are subject to additional subsequent tours in their area of study, consistent with the needs of the service and the ability of the individual.

Officers assigned to the program are given equal opportunity to attend the senior service schools for which they are qualified, to enable them to remain abreast of their contemporaries in every respect.

THE roster of foreign area graduates reveals the names of some of our most outstanding military leaders. Prominent among them are General Maxwell D. Taylor, Lieutenant General Willard G. Wyman, and Major General Thomas S. Timberman.

Mandatory prerequisites to selection for participation in the Foreign Area Specialist Training Program are outlined in SR 350-380-1, 15 September 1954. (The application period for officers entering the program in fiscal year 1957 is 1 November 1955 to 1 February 1956.) These prerequisites have been set high. It is imperative that only highly qualified officers, with a good knowledge of the over-all operation of the military, cultural, political, and economic aspects of the American way of life be selected for training in the program.

This program is indeed a challenge to the vigorous young officer who is not afraid of hard work or complex problems and situations.

## THE MONTH'S FILMS

CAPTAIN JACK F. McAHON

**TF 20-1980, Part II: Laying the Minefield** (11 minutes), shows and describes the materials, equipment and personnel needed to successfully lay a minefield, including cluster laying. The duties of each member of the mine-laying party are pointed out. **TF 20-1982, Part IV: Recording and Reporting** (13 minutes) covers the forms used and the steps required in reporting on minefields. **TF 20-1983, Part V: Arming, Disarming and Camouflage** (24 minutes) spells out the correct procedures for each operation. For demonstration, the M15 heavy AT, the M14 plastic antipersonnel mines are used, along with the M49 trip flare. Safety precautions to be observed are stressed. **TF 20-1986, Part VII: Nuisance Mining** (15 minutes) teaches the use, features and procedures of area mining, route mining, installation mining, and mining behind enemy lines. Dirty-trick devices, booby traps and butterfly bombs are included. It is extremely important that such mines be reported, so that they are harmless to friendly troops while hampering and confusing the enemy.

During the assault phase, the deliberate breach or the hasty breach of a minefield may be used. **TF 20-1987, Part IX: Assault Breaching** (19 minutes) takes the viewer through these types, explaining the steps of each. The deliberate breach is made when time is available, and is done in four steps. Hasty breaches are made with no attempt at security, using the bangalore torpedo, tank snake, or other devices.

A new concept in training films is exemplified by **TF 7-2202: Trigger Squeeze, M1 Rifle** (10 minutes). The new treatment covers only one step of a training phase. This film shows the correct method of trigger squeeze—the most important step in marksmanship. It covers grip, breathing, sighting, taking up slack, and pressure, using the BASS system.

**Is it soft? Will it work?**

## **New Discipline for the German Army**

**LIEUTENANT DAVID M. ABSHIRE**

THE necessity of finding some way of increasing the moral fiber of American fighting men was starkly emphasized by the defection of some U.S. POWs in Korea. Plainly, simple patriotism and devotion to democratic principles can no longer be taken for granted. The code of conduct for the U.S. armed forces is a good beginning, but it is only a code and does not in itself create in the soldier what it demands of a soldier. Nor can survival courses build character. In the opinion of many, more serious thought and fundamental research into these problems are necessary. For that reason, it is of great interest to consider the approach being taken by the new German Army. Finding that German youth, seared and soured by defeat in World War II and the division of Germany, no longer respond to traditional appeals, the West German government has turned toward the development of a standard of conduct and duty that is in many ways totally alien to current systems of military organization.

A description of the system and the reason for adopting it are provided by Count Wolf Baudissin, a division head in the German Ministry of Defense, in the October issue of *Foreign Affairs*, published by the Council on Foreign Relations. Superficially, the methods he describes smack of "softness," and the question that will be asked by American soldiers is whether it actually would produce a more disciplined and stronger fighting man.

THIS is Count Baudissin's outline of the problem: "... We realize that there are intangible forces threatening to which not even veteran democracies are immune. The magnetic attractions of anonymity existing in the modern mass society make it difficult to describe democracy any longer in terms of the value of the individual and dignity of man. The rapidity with which the conditions of modern life change makes it very hard for the individuals to have the same sense of mutual interdependence that used to exist in a simpler society.

"The desire for security is often stronger than the desire for freedom and a chance to develop according to individual aspiration. These dilemmas are intensified by the fear caused by nuclear weapons and the fact that Germany has only just recovered from a total defeat brought on by her own leaders. Together they may give an idea of the difficulties facing German

political leaders and military planners today."

The Count clearly recognizes the dangers of cold wars. "Before weapons speak, the soldier of today is already fighting in a jungle of ideas, slogans, sensational propaganda and disguised aggression." And with what weapons can he face these dangers: "To fight it successfully he needs more insight, vision and confidence than were ever involved hitherto in the 'art of soldiering.'"

"The 'unpolitical' soldiers will not in the long run prove able fighters," he writes. Men "held together mainly by various fears or by *esprit de corps*" will not be reliable under the conditions that face soldiers in Europe. "Only the man who knows that as a citizen he is at one here and now with the state and who sees its capacities for development as his own—only that man can survive in and win the cold war."

Count Baudissin discusses the effect of modern weapons and equipment on the military social structure. "Yet the war [World War II] proved that the supposedly firm standards summed up in the phrase 'the world of the soldier' were unable to cope with such abominations [as the Hitlerian regime]. A secularized 'soldier's honor' which describes obedience, duty, hardihood and readiness for action as unquestioned and absolute concepts abandons the soldier blind and helpless to the whim of criminals and charlatans.

"Traditional ways also fail in the face of technical progress in so far as concepts of military authority and soldierly obedience derive from the world of patriarchal feudalism. The range, speed, and complication of military operations in the age of motor and radio, and the variety and complexity of weapons and equipment have left their mark on the military social structure. The tactical and technical specialist has taken his place as an equal in importance alongside the tactical leader. ... mere subordination can accomplish little. Success will depend upon mutual confidence, latitude in orders and delegation of initiative to the lower echelons. The 'melting' of the superior into the group (or rather the raising of the subordinates) becomes particularly evident in the airplane, tank, or submarine. The superior ranks above his subordinates for purposes of coordination, but since he usually is less well equipped in special knowledge he is restricted to that one special function. In other words, he has to rely on the cooperation of his subordinates in thinking and acting just as much

as they rely on him for leadership. These new social conditions in motorized and armored units, in the air arm and in submarines produced attitudes and codes during the war which come far closer to the concept of a free community based on mutual partnership than to the traditional picture of patriarchal authority over 'minors.'

**M**ANY of you will exclaim at the radical implications in Count Baudissin's analysis. His own summary is no less so.

"We may now state in summary form, some of the essential measures for the inner structure of the future army. The soldier is to have the right to vote and engage freely in political activities in so far as this takes place outside the service routine and off military reservations. In other words, he will keep the basic right of the citizen in the framework of his military duties. All ranks will choose representatives in a free and secret ballot to speak for their comrades before the commanding officer and help the head of the unit look after its members properly. Superiors will be entitled to exercise the authority of their rank only in fulfillment of their own duties. Off-duty they will not possess such authority except in cases of public emergency such as riots or where the behavior of men in uniform jeopardizes discipline in general. Training for citizenship will not be just one subject among many on the instruction program; it will be considered an indispensable part of the education of all ranks, and all commanders and heads of units will have responsibility for seeing that it is not neglected. Courses in general and current information will equip the soldier to view his country and himself against the larger background of world problems. Other items on the program for the care of the soldier will be: training in civilian professions; maintenance of cultural civilian contacts during the period of military service; guidance in off-duty activities; and encouragement of social activities."

This last quoted paragraph deserves careful consideration.

**I**T has become increasingly apparent in our own army that the old idea about the Regular officer not concerning himself with politics is narrow and sometimes dangerous to the security of the nation. On the eve of the Civil War, for example, Regular Army officers were individually forced to make a decision of loyalty which was related to the national political situation. Today, failure to understand national and international affairs will blind an officer and make him a pawn in Communist hands.

The proposal about elected representatives to appear before the commanding officer seems most unmilitary and dangerous. Actually, however, in the U.S. Army of today we have NCO guidance councils that furnish valuable insight to the commander. These are appointed by the commander, but they could be elected if proper safeguards were instituted. There is the necessity of

eliminating any possibility of usurpation of the authority and confidence of the chain of command. The system that Count Baudissin suggests, therefore, would demand very exact policies limiting the activities of such representatives.

The Count's comments on off-duty authority of superiors is a recommendation for writing into regulations what already exists in our army. Note that he is discussing *authority* rather than the *privileges, prestige, and courtesy* that are due superiors. Our sad experiences after World War II demonstrated that if these are reduced, the entire morale, discipline and self-respect of the military establishment are impaired. The cure for misused privileges in any officer corps is better officers, and better officer training and indoctrination, rather than liquidation of the privileges.

**M**ORE freedom of action and trust in subordinate leaders is certainly a requirement of all modern armies. There is no excuse in times of peace for any army in a free country not to build a quality corps of officers and NCOs. Officers who are outstanding in combat but lack educational background, for example, should be assisted in completion of college work. Top NCOs should be high-school graduates. Standards of honor, mutual respect and wise personnel handling will, perhaps more than anything else, make or break an army. They cannot be advanced or even maintained when shortsighted expediency dictates greater supervision of the subordinate until his honor is doubted, his efficiency limited, and his initiative stifled. The evil stemming from a concern with immediate results only starts by improper command emphasis at a higher level. An idealist on a lower level trying to swim against this tide of wrongly directed command pressure will merely drown himself in the struggle.

More training for citizenship, as Count Baudissin implies, is of course the crux of the matter in any free country. Initially the problem of the home, the school and the church before the soldier enters the service, it finally becomes the problem of the army itself.

To increase unity and *esprit* in community army life, great stress must be placed on the traditions of the unit, and affording a soldier one unit that will be his home while in the Army. In this important respect, the U.S. Army has slipped badly, but a comeback seems to be in the wind.

**W**E should consider the paradoxical background of Count Baudissin's new look. Many of the concepts of discipline that he desires to discard originally stemmed from the old Prussian-German traditions. Development of eighteenth century tactics, where the musket and the bayonet were used by lines of troops fighting shoulder to shoulder, required a mechanical discipline. Frederick the Great and his Prussian contemporaries recognized this, and introduced disciplinary methods which, after unusual Prussian combat suc-

(Continued on page 49)

# MIRROR IN THE SKY

MAJOR THEODORE WYCKOFF

## ***"Take the high ground. Take the air, too."***

**T**HERE are three dimensions to ground warfare, but we are getting full use from only two of them. The third dimension, the air—the vertical element—is not being used by soldiers to the fullest possible extent.

What we call the tactical war, as fought by regimental, division, corps, and army commanders, is not an air war and a ground war but one war. Neither the air battle nor the ground battle can be isolated and treated as a separate operation.

The tactical commander's search for targets beyond the line of contact is conditioned by the nature of the ground. We always say, "Take the high ground"—because we want to

observe the enemy so as to be able to fire on him at maximum range. Let's go one step better and take to the air, too. Then we can observe his *whole* zone of activity and can direct fire on him anywhere.

**I**f you say, "We do this now; what's so new about your suggestion?" I reply that we haven't even scratched the surface of air observation. Let's put as many air observers up and over the enemy as we now have OPs on the ground. Let's use high-performance armed aircraft, including vertical-take-off types, down to regimental level. All commanders and all observers should be trained to use the all-weather capa-



bilities of modern aircraft and infra-red and radar equipment. In short, let's exhort every ground commander to use a "mirror in the sky" concept to show him continuously and completely everything of interest that is going on in the enemy's zone. With this kind of information he can plan his battle intelligently.

So, the first phase of the "mirror in the sky" concept is intelligence and target selection. The second phase is operations—the theory that the third dimension must be added to the actual fighting at every level, from regiment to army group. This is done to some extent now, but again I say the surface has barely been scratched. The Air Force's contribution must include much more than the occasional attack of targets reported by ground agencies on call through the field army's JOC and TAF's air control center.

Modern war is *one war*, in which ground and air are inextricably linked together. Just as machine guns extend the range of rifles and artillery extends the range of mortars, air power and guided missiles extend the range of artillery. The enemy's action is the same: he may present point or area targets whether he is close to or far from our front; he may present an immediate threat or an eventual threat.

The only difference from our point of view is that the higher the commander, the farther into the future and the deeper into the enemy's territory he must look. Platoon and company commanders are concerned with the immediate enemy threat and with the weapons he has directly to their front. The battalion commander is concerned with the area out to the combat outpost line, and as far beyond it as the limits of ground observation. Within this area he can call for light and heavy mortars, light or heavy artillery, as he sees fit. And if he needs an air strike on a particular target he can ask for it. The infantry commander at battalion or lower level can do a pretty good job of fighting with the equipment he has.

But look at the missions of regimental, division and corps commanders, whose responsibilities extend out to areas where ground-based eyes can't see the enemy. Soldiers on the general outpost line and in the covering forces can keep an area under surveillance, but they can't look into the enemy's back yard. The only eyes directly under regimental, division and corps con-

trol that can do this are those of the pilots and observers in the units' organic light aircraft. But these aircraft can't look very deep into enemy territory and they can't shoot at what they see. The best they can do is adjust artillery fire.

Division and corps commanders need organic or attached fighter-bomber aircraft to take the war deeper into the enemy's rear. The infantry regiment commander must have high-performance "pogo-stick" aircraft as extra eyes and an extra arm to use wherever he wants to use them—wherever other means cannot reach. Further, I am sure that effectiveness of medium and heavy artillery would jump two hundred per cent if high-performance aircraft were integral parts of the artillery observation team.

**T**HE theory that modern war is one war has another ramification: the field army commander must be a "unified commander," just as a general officer is a "general commander," trained in the integrated use of combat arms and support services as a fighting team. Every field army commander must be trained in welding air and ground combat units into one fighting team, to fight one war. We must include air and guided missiles as we include artillery and tanks in the fighting team, except that they must be used

at the ranges where they are most effective. Therefore aircraft and guided missiles must be a part of the troop organization—in the command structure—where they can be withdrawn only on the order of a higher ground commander, not on the order of a higher air commander.

Under present policy, in a theater of operations only the theater commander is a "unified commander," and those he may designate—the commander of an "airborne unified command," for example. I propose that this basically sound idea be extended down to army group and army levels, and that our operations maps show army group and army boundaries several hundred miles into enemy territory, so that we can carry our war to the enemy *all* the way—to the maximum capabilities of aircraft, guided missiles, and long-range artillery.


Artillerymen have always wondered what glory could be gained by closing to kill the enemy with bayonet and bullet, when he could be killed by effective artillery at long range. Really, the bayonet and the bullet should be saved for those few who filter through our artillery screen, and that screen should be strong and fine-meshed. Let's extend this concept outward by going upward, to where we can command the situation by seeing the situation, by using a "mirror in the sky."

Helicopters can look into the enemy's back yard



# FIRE POWER AND SPEED WILL BEAT THE ODDS

MAJOR RODERICK A. STAMEY, JR.



**T**HERE are some refreshing indications that we are getting over the trembles and are now going about the business of working the atomic bomb into our weapons systems. This is good, and to get a sound underpinning we need to understand that terms like "atomic war" and "conventional war" have no true meaning. They are only symptoms of the confusion we experience in trying to fit the new weapon into our system. When the atomic bomb made its appearance, atomic warfare became conventional warfare. Whether the atomic bomb is used or not makes no difference. Our strategy have to be geared to the supposition that it will be used.

We should give the atomic bomb the recognition it deserves, but not be blinded to the real danger. The belief that tactical atomic weapons are the key to decisive results reflects a gross misunderstanding. If such were the case, our potential enemy could also expect decisive results. Let's not forget that he also has an atomic capability. Further, he is intelligent, clever, and most uncooperative. We have no basis whatever to expect him to follow a tactical course of action that would facilitate our destruction of his forces with atomic weapons. The real danger is his superiority in men, tanks, planes, and guns. But we can cope with this danger. Genghis Khan and Napoleon grew fat on poor odds.

As an area weapon, the atom is capable of magnificent results. But it has its limitations. The outstanding one is its requirement for targets sufficiently important to merit its use. Target importance stems from concentration and criticality. Acquisition of tar-

get becomes extremely difficult when enemy forces are dispersed and critical installations are hidden. In such a case we are unable to realize the full capabilities of the weapon. Though it dictates the conditions of the battlefield, we are denied decisive results. But we need decisive results.

It is precisely these conditions of the battlefield that offer us our opportunity for victory. A mutual atomic capability will force both ourselves and our enemy into dispersed formations. On any given front neither of us will enjoy a numerical advantage. The potentialities of his mass army are negated. Locally we can face him on something approaching even terms. Already the odds change in our favor. Still, we don't want to trade one for one.

**F**ORTUNATELY we have the economic and technological capabilities of acquiring battlefield mobility that will permit us to concentrate rapidly into a superior mass to strike with decisive results and return to dispersed formations. Superior battlefield mobility contemplates increased infantry mobility. Though infantry units comprise the major portion of ground forces, they possess the least degree of mobility. Here lies the greatest opportunity for achieving the advantages of increased battlefield mobility. Here the odds can change definitely in our favor.

The physical capabilities of the individual soldier with weapon and equipment limit his cross-country movement to a rate of 1.5 miles an hour during daylight hours. Obviously a type of carrier will be required to



furnish the rapid cross-country movement we desire. By adding light armor, we are able to transport the infantryman to the point where he can perform his mission in optimum physical condition. If we weld the men and the machines together with a modern organization providing a **large measure** of flexibility and decentralized control, we have what may be called mechanized infantry; infantry that employs lightly armored vehicles to move across country to a point where it dismounts and enters action on foot.

Having outlined the conditions of the modern battlefield and having determined the critical importance of mobility, let us formulate our tactical concept. As a general condition, the concept conceives the use, or threatened use, of tactical atomic weapons to force the enemy to dispersed formations. This will require him to accept grave risks in massing for offensive or defensive operations. Then we employ our non-atomic weapons, together with superior mobility, to defeat him in detail. Of course, this is an oversimplification as stated, so let's explore a few of the tactical principles required in implementing the concept.

**T**HE losses we will experience from enemy atomic weapons will be less in a series of smaller actions. This is especially true at the beginning of hostilities when his stockpile is largest. As he depletes his supply, we can risk larger actions with less expectation of losses. Additionally, a series of swift, decisive, successful offensive actions will affect enemy morale, even though they are relatively small.


Unless we have a reasonable expectation of success, we should avoid action. Only a wise and judicious employment of our forces can prevent a war of attrition. By avoiding action, it is not contemplated that we break contact and bug out every time the situation appears grim. It doesn't mean

that there will be no small-unit actions resulting in local reverses. It means avoiding decisive major actions until the tactical advantage is ours. Though forced to avoid decisive action, we must continue harassing actions by small units. Such actions can quicken **the process of bringing about the tactical advantage required for larger offensive operations.**

We must seek decisive results so we won't have to engage the same enemy force twice. Defeat in detail is like fighting an octopus. It results in victory only when the last arm is cut off. However, with the destruction of each arm, the monster's strength diminishes. It is not enough to contain an enemy penetration, or to drive him from a terrain feature. These are actions without decisive results. Tomorrow he will penetrate again, or we will have to force him from another objective. The destruction of the enemy must be more direct. Every action must result in a diminution of enemy strength, rather than seizing land area he occupies. Seizure of terrain features to facilitate further operations is a dangerous course of action. First of all, such objectives do not guarantee decisive results. Secondly, they cannot be occupied after capture, since their retention requires massing.

Economy of force requires that in every action we move as swiftly as possible, with the least effort, to produce conditions that will put the enemy in a disadvantageous situation. We cannot permit him to develop his full capabilities.

Massed enemy forces must be attacked with mass-destruction weapons. However, the primary effect of such weapons will be to discourage his massing and permit us to defeat him in detail with our mobile forces. We cannot expect to be able to make the enemy mass. When he does, it will be as a result of his carelessness rather than our



**MORE MOBILITY FOR THE FOOT SOLDIER WILL GIVE  
US THAT ONE STEP ADVANTAGE ON THE BATTLEFIELD**

cleverness. He is not that stupid. If the enemy doesn't have our ground mobility, his best method of massing will be through infiltration of small units. These will attempt to rejoin into massed forces at critical points. Such tactics offer us almost unimagin-




FIGURE 1. The Attack

able opportunities for defeating him in detail.

### Massing on the battlefield

Successful operations, offensive or defensive, require a massing of forces. We can define "a critical density" on the modern battlefield as that density of forces constituting a profitable atomic target. Forces for offensive operations should be massed in time. Forces for defensive operations must be massed in space. When not moving, mechanized forces may be widely dispersed so as to achieve far less than critical density. Their mobility permits them to mass at any given place in a relatively short time. Thus, timewise, they are in effect massed. This is the method used by mechanized forces contemplating, but not actively engaged in, offensive operations. When moving, their density may be increased beyond a critical density without a comparable increase in risk. Mechanized forces that are not moving may be massed in space to a degree just short of a critical density. This is the method of massing when on the defensive. Defensive forces selected as a reserve are massed in time since they contemplate offensive action.

Mechanized forces are able to switch quickly between offensive and defensive operations as their tactical opportunities change, and they can and

should be concentrated in both time and space.

### In the attack

When attacking, we must seek first to isolate the enemy from his long-range fire support, his sources of supply, and his link with the next higher echelon. Then we must turn fire and shock action against him. A type of offensive action is illustrated in Figure 1. The gaps existing between enemy forces of less than critical density are chosen as avenues to the enemy rear. Our armor-protected fire power is rapidly massed while moving, in order to reduce the risk of atomic counterattack. Then we drive deep behind his lines to those sensitive areas where physical isolation of his forward elements can be effected. This maneuver will seriously impede the ability of enemy forces under attack to continue effective action. It will block enemy reserves beyond the scene of action, and it will place us in a position to make the assault from any direction.

After accomplishing the destruction of the enemy, our forces are preferably employed elsewhere. In any event, they must be withdrawn without consideration of area relinquished to the enemy.

THE final phase of an attack is the infantry's assault of the enemy position. Heretofore, the assault has usually been undertaken by overloaded doughboys worn out from marching, and thinned out by artillery fire. The battlefield mobility of mechanized infantry will change all this. The assault will now be characterized by its shock action.

Infantry shock action is a result of the speed with which an overwhelming concentration of fire power can be brought to bear on the enemy from an unexpected direction. We must exploit the psychological effect of the disaster that threatens the enemy. Our fast, fierce use of superior fire power will create anxiety and panic. Whether he chooses to die or surrender is immaterial in relationship to our mission. However, his choice of surrender will materially reduce the effort required to destroy him as a fighting force.

Whenever possible, the frontal attack should be avoided. The advantages of attacking from an unexpected direction are obvious. At such points the enemy defenses are weakest. Heretofore, mass armies have been able to maintain protected flanks. The prob-

lem has been one of how to get around them. Lacking a direct solution to that, tacticians have tried penetrations followed by a change of direction. This was not an ideal solution, since the strength of the maneuver was dissipated in the penetration. However, in a war involving tactical atomic weapons, opponents are forced to disperse, and a penetration in the gaps between enemy formations can be made by swift-moving mechanized forces.

When an enemy commander decides that one of his subordinate elements has been destroyed, he will consider use of atomic weapons against the forces that attacked it. It thus is imperative that we complete the destruction of a crumbling enemy element with minimum forces, and then get out. We will then hit him somewhere else. Such use of our mobility will facilitate mopping-up operations by the smaller forces detailed for that job.

A static concentration of force should be attempted only in close proximity to the enemy. Though the enemy may far outnumber us, he will hesitate to destroy effective elements of his command in order to damage our forces. Hence, concentration in space beyond a critical density may be attempted without a comparable increase




FIGURE 2. Phase 1 of the Defense

in risk when we are closely engaged with an enemy force. We have already stated that concentrations in space above a critical density may be achieved by mechanized forces while moving. Now we see they may be continued after being stopped by a collision with enemy forces. Defensive forces concentrated in space below a critical



density may be reinforced beyond such a density after the enemy has closed.

### In the defense

Heretofore, the defense has been passive. This has left the attacker free to call his own tune. The attacker knew what he was doing and could, within limits, reasonably predict subsequent events. However, the defender was initially in the dark. Often he didn't recognize the attacker's intentions until it was too late.

When on the defensive, we should seek to dissipate the enemy's momentum, splinter his mass, destroy his control, and divert his direction. Then, when his tactical advantages are lowest, we must isolate and destroy him. If exercise of the initiative is in favor of the attacker, time is against him. The moment an attack commences, it begins to lose its effectiveness. Momentum declines as men and machines tire and are lost. Formations begin to lose alignment, and fracture. Control and maintenance of direction become more difficult. An attack fails when a combination of these factors reduces the enemy's effort to less than that required for success. This emphasizes the importance of reserves, personal leadership, and supporting fires delivered from a place of security.

**T**HE proper course of action for the defender is to increase the speed with which these factors take effect. Intrenchments will not increase our fire-power differential sufficiently to insure success. Figure 2 illustrates the first phase of a defensive operation. However, it is not enough that we repel his attack. Destruction of the enemy in every action is our primary mission. When his tactical strength has declined to no more than ours, we must swiftly isolate him from the rest of his command, and destroy him. This second phase of the defense is illustrated in Figure 3.

Only the offensive promises decisive results of a continuing nature. Therefore, plans for every defensive operation should be based on the offensive action to follow. When the enemy attacks, he does not expect to be defeated. At the conclusion of an attack, whether successful or not, the enemy is in a state of confusion and disorganization. His entire command is keyed to the offensive and is poorly disposed to assume the defensive. This is the moment to seize the initiative and to counterattack.

A force should undertake a position defense only when it is part of a larger force engaged in a mobile defense. When the enemy greatly outnumbers us in strength, there is nothing to be gained from defending a position at all costs, except the eventual reduction of our strength. If the enemy wants the position, he must take it by




FIGURE 3. Phase 2 of the Defense

imposing a sheer weight of numbers. If it is necessary as part of the offensive plan of a larger force, a subordinate unit must hold its position at all costs.

**F**OOT soldiers are most vulnerable while moving. They have no armor protection, and their inherent mobility is the lowest on the modern battlefield. For this reason, their rapid movement is linked to established transportation routes, and their ability to deploy when attacked is seriously limited. They offer excellent opportunities for attack when moving forward or to the rear, and while employed as reserves. Their destruction will hamper the efforts of enemy armored forces which depend upon them for assistance and protection. Thus, enemy infantry becomes the priority target. When it has been destroyed in an area, the enemy's armor may be successfully attacked.

### Ruses and stratagems


Use of ruses and stratagems must become routine. They must not fall into a pattern if they are to have continued effectiveness. The number and types of ruses available to the field commander are limited only by his imagination. With a flavor supplied by the particular circumstances, they

fall roughly into six different categories or combinations thereof: failing to attack when expected; failing to defend when expected; attacking when expected to defend; defending when expected to attack; attacking unexpectedly; and defending unexpectedly. The opportunities for employing ruses and stratagems are fleeting. They require the existence of a great degree of decentralized control coupled with keen minds and courageous hearts. Actions of this type use mobility to achieve tactical surprise in order to offset a relatively inferior mass. When successfully applied they result in the most remunerative and decisive results.

**F**AST-MOVING, long-ranging light cavalry should be the chief source of battlefield intelligence. Intelligence processes for a war of movement must be extremely quick and simple. They can require only a minimum of correlation and interpretation. The speed and distance encountered on the modern battlefield have moved the point of intelligence interest far behind the enemy's front lines. The primary collection method will be surveillance. The collecting agency must be swift light cavalry designed for reconnaissance missions only. Screening and security missions can be performed by mechanized forces themselves. Light cavalry must move on the ground and in the air. It must have speed, range, and adequate communications.

**I**n general outline, this is a concept for the future employment of infantry forces; a concept which recognizes the strength of potential enemies on the ground and the need to avoid a war of attrition; one that sees tactical atomic weapons as a force determining the conditions of the battlefield, rather than as a means for achieving decisive results; a concept which uses the mobility of mechanized forces to increase our strength and defeat the enemy in detail with non-atomic weapons. No attempt has been made in this limited space to relate the concept to the future use of armored or airborne forces.

The chances are that you won't agree with everything you have just read. If you did, I have failed in my purpose. If there is disagreement in your mind, I hope it is because you are thinking. Don't stop thinking. As long as we keep thinking we'll be ahead of the enemy and able to defeat him if he decides to take the chance—a long chance against very poor odds.



*Giusti*

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## BETTER UMPIRING MEANS BETTER MANEUVERS

# AN AREA UMPIRE SYSTEM

MAJOR GENERAL HAMILTON H. HOWZE

SKETCHES BY LT. COL. ROBERT B. RIGG

**I**N this article I am introducing a new umpiring system for two-sided maneuvers. It is a pretty drastic revision of our current system, but I am moved by the personal conviction that present umpiring procedures in two-sided maneuvers lead to long, frustrating delays in the action, and umpire decisions which manage, by some evil magic, to be intensely painful and manifestly unfair to both sides.

I believe the system I propose here will accomplish the following:

- Obtain better tactical decisions by providing an umpire of rank and experience in direct control of each tactical situation. Our present system of tying down senior umpires at large headquarters does not assure experienced judgment in the critical area of troop contact.
- Speed up decisions, by eliminating argument between umpires of equal rank and prerogative, representing opposite sides. Fast decisions can be made if it is the direct responsibility of an umpire of experience who is immediately available.
- Remove the factor of allegiance, which at present colors umpire decisions to a pronounced degree. Allegiance springs from assignments of umpires to units. It's hard to be mean to a messmate.
- Make a clean break from the mathematical system of determining effectiveness of the application of military force. In place of the mathematical process we substitute the judgment of experienced tacticians, taking into proper but strictly unmathematical account the factors of strength, terrain, initiative surprise, ma-

neuver, utilization of fire power, use of cover—and all other factors that have a bearing on the situation.

- Give needed flexibility by permitting the assignment of more umpires where they are most needed, thus largely eliminating the present waste of umpires assigned to units not in contact.

- Provide a significant saving in manpower. The system will decrease the very undesirable load placed on all tactical units in furnishing umpires for maneuvers other than their own.

**I** MUST first discuss certain matters which bear on the whole system of conduct of large-scale exercises. Even though these proposals are not adopted, the validity of the proposed umpire system will not be affected, except as respects the handling of casualties.

It is our current practice to run a large-scale maneuver for a period of four to six days. This has certain advantages, the most important of which is that fatigue becomes a realistically important factor. However, normally the general tactical situation becomes confused after two or three days, with the result that in the later phases the umpires are often forced to halt part or all of the maneuver to unscramble forces, with much attendant ill feeling on all sides.

For this reason, and in view of proposals developed below, it is suggested that action in each large-scale maneuver be suspended at a universally understood time about forty-eight hours after commencement of the exercise. The break should be for approxi-





mately twenty-four hours, after which action should resume for one or more additional forty-eight-hour periods. As soon as practicable after commencement of the break, the director will announce such modifications of the situation as he may desire, and will permit such reorganization as may be effected within the twenty-four hours.

### Lack of Night Action

In most big exercises it has been the practice to prohibit more than very limited offensive action at night. This has imposed a major artificiality.

The reasons often advanced for the prohibition of night offensive action are that umpiring is too difficult and the action is too dangerous. The first point will be met by the system of umpiring proposed in this paper: a sufficient number of umpires, operating on an area basis, should have no serious trouble in umpiring a limited-objective night attack, especially in view of the fact that vehicles will operate with headlights. As respects danger, it is believed that the fact that each maneuver period will run for only forty-eight hours, will lessen the fatigue factor. Moreover, any additional danger is more than justified by the increased realism and the intensely valuable training which will result.

It is therefore proposed that the restriction against night offensive action be removed, with the proviso that attacks be made upon objectives no farther than four or five kilometers from the line of departure. It is sug-




gested that, for purposes of safety, vehicles participating in combat action at night be required to use headlights.

### Artificial Assessment of Casualties

Currently, umpires assess casualties against units, rule units back, or render them inoperative, for varying periods of time. This injects another artificial element into maneuvers. It results in a company or battalion commander who has successfully damaged an opposing

FIGURE 1. ORGANIZATION FOR UMPIRING a maneuver between a corps of three divisions (Blue) and one division (Red). The numbers of teams shown in the umpire pool are estimated requirements for a maneuver of this magnitude.



## TYPES OF UMPIRE TEAMS

	Title	Composition (excluding drivers)
Type A	Atomic Blast Team	1 Team Chief 6 NCO Assistant Umpires 2 NCO and 15 EM Guards (Average)
Type B	Battalion Action Team	1 Team Chief 1 Assistant Umpire Variable number of C Teams
Type C	Company Action Team	1 Team Chief 2 Assistant Umpires
Type I	Isolated Action Team	1 Umpire
Type AFM-G	Artillery Fire Marking Team—Ground	1 Team Chief 2 Assistant Fire Markers
Type AFM-S	Artillery Fire Marking Team—Aerial	1 Team Chief 1 Assistant Fire Marker
Type AFM-C	Artillery Fire Marking Group—Coordinating	1 Team Chief 4 Assistants
Type AFM-R	Artillery Fire Marking Group—Relay	1 Team Chief 2 Assistants
Type L	Logistics Team	1 G4 Team Chief 1 Ordnance Officer 1 Engineer Officer 1 Signal Officer 1 Chemical Officer 1 Medical Officer 1 Transportation Officer 1 Quartermaster Officer
Type RS	Senior Resident Umpire	1 Umpire
Type RU	Resident (Combat) Unit Umpire	1 Umpire
Type RSL	Resident Senior Logistics Umpire	1 Umpire
Type RL	Resident Logistics Umpire	1 Umpire

unit getting only the briefest advantage from the decrease in enemy strength, whereas in combat he might expect a major advantage accumulating as he whittles down the opposition. Moreover, all sorts of difficulties arise in the "coming alive" of units which sometimes find themselves, by reason of being knocked out and then resurrected, in highly artificial positions—perhaps behind enemy lines, and sometimes looking down the throat of the very same enemy unit that has lately done them in. Finally, units are not made to feel their losses acutely enough, since losses are restored in a relatively short period of time.

I suggest that casualties (both personnel and vehicular) remain in casualty status for the duration of the 48 hour period regardless of the moment at which they become casualties. The way in which this may be arranged is discussed a little later in this article.

There is almost never available sufficient blank ammunition to provide even a reasonable minimum representation of fire. This is likely to remain true by reason of the expense of blank ammunition. The lack of sufficient fire representation, combined with deficiencies in our present manner of umpiring, leads to the all-too-frequent situation in which the attacking unit innocently finds itself all tangled up with a defender who wrathfully contends that he has "had you guys under fire for the last two thousand yards."

Although it is not suggested that we abandon the

use of blank ammunition, I do propose that umpires augment blank ammunition fire representation by the use of colored-smoke hand grenades. The throwing of a smoke grenade each five minutes would indicate continuous fire. The following are suggested as useful conventions:

**RED-SMOKE HAND GRENADE:** tank or antitank fire is coming at you from this area.

**GREEN-SMOKE HAND GRENADE:** small-arms fire is coming at you from this area.

**WHITE-HC-SMOKE HAND GRENADE:** smoke projectiles are landing in this area. The white smoke may represent either enemy-laid smoke or friendly laid smoke. Success of the screen will be adjudged by observing the location and movement of the smoke.

**COME** now to a description of the proposed umpire system. An umpire organization chart is shown in Figure 1 (page 39).

The chief umpire will have control of the whole business. He will be assisted by several assistants chief umpire, each capable of being assigned responsibility either for a certain large geographical area, or for the entire area for certain periods of time. The chief umpire and his principal assistants will be served by a small staff, of the general staff type, to keep tabs on the tactical and logistical situations of the two forces.

The box on this page shows the type umpire teams and the individual umpires that will be provided.

## Umpires are VIPI

Special notice should be taken of types A, B, C and L team chiefs, all of whom are Very Important People Indeed. Type A team chiefs should be technically competent to judge the effects of the atomic blast. Type B team chiefs have the most important tactical umpiring responsibility, being carefully selected line officers, colonel or lieutenant colonel in rank, preferably with combat experience and a generous measure of tactical wisdom. Type C team chiefs should also be tactically competent, having the rank of lieutenant colonel or major. Type L team chiefs should be colonel, lieutenant colonel or major, with experience as G4 or assistant G4 at division or higher level.


Assistant umpires of type C and type AFM teams, and type RU umpires with battalions, may be selected senior noncommissioned officers. This is an important point. An umpire pool will be established and located so as to minimize travel time from the pool to likely areas of action.

All resident umpires are permanent, to be assigned to a unit or installation for the duration of the exercise. Resident unit umpires (type RU) will be assigned to all tactical headquarters down to include battalion. Additionally, the senior participating headquarters on each side will be assigned a type RS umpire.

A resident senior logistics umpire (type RSL) will

Certain logistical organizations (ordnance, quartermaster, engineer, medical and signal units) will provide their own resident umpires (type RL). The duty of umpire may be assigned, as an additional duty, to the unit executive. This has worked satisfactorily in the past:

The chain of umpire command runs (see Figure 1) three ways: to the Blue side, to the Red side, and to the umpire pool. The resident senior umpire, Blue (Red), maintains overall coordination and control over all *resident* umpires (whether combat units or logistics



Each type RU umpire, in addition to functioning as indicated when attached to a type B team (see material to follow) will keep the umpire system informed of sudden or unexpected actions, which are really very seldom forthcoming, by the unit to which attached (in this respect, he is an umpire *liaison* officer). In the absence of type B or C teams on the spot, he must also umpire isolated actions affecting the unit.

An action in which one or more infantry or tank battalions (or equivalents) are engaged in the fight for a single objective or in a single terrain compartment will be umpired by a type B team, assisted as necessary by a number of type C teams. Type C teams normally are not assigned area responsibility. Type B team chief

A type L team chief advises the resident senior logistics umpire when the logistical situation is not adequate to support the tactical operation. The resident senior logistics umpire places appropriate restrictions on the affected player units, and notifies the chief umpire of his action.

Each umpire and assistant umpire, except in type A teams, is equipped with a jeep and suitable radio. Umpire jeeps habitually operate with tops and windshields down, so the occupants can see something. Variation from this rule is on authorization of the chief umpire only.

Resident umpires of all types mess with the unit to which attached. Perhaps an umpire mess should be established to serve the chief umpire and staff and whatever reserve remains in the umpire pool. This is an unimportant detail. What is important is that each member of the umpire pool should carry rations and bedding so that he can sustain himself during the exercise.

The standard composition of the type A atomic blast team may be augmented in special cases; for example, for a very large burst, or when the terrain is exceptionally difficult. Normally, only the area of total casualties will be umpired. For umpiring a blast of nominal yield, a team should consist of one team chief (an officer, rank immaterial, technically competent to assess effects

of an atomic blast; equipped with one  $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton truck and radio); six assistant umpires (NCOs, experienced in field duty in a combat-type unit; each to be transported in a  $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton vehicle); two NCOs and fifteen EM (guard detail) transported in three  $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton trucks. All NCOs must be skilled in map reading.

Notified of an impending strike, the chief umpire selects a type A team from the umpire pool and informs the team chief of the coordinates, scheduled time, and type weapon to be used.

**T**HE team chief uses a map and dividers to determine the area of total casualties (and total damage, with reference to vehicles, equipment and supplies) taking into account possible major "shadow" areas due to rough terrain. The team chief assigns sectors of the circle to each of his assistant umpires, and segments of the circle to each of his guard NCOs.



The guard NCOs post their guards on all roads at the point of intersection of the circle so that they will be in position shortly prior to the scheduled time of the blast, if possible, or as soon thereafter as time permits. The blast should not be delayed for the posting of the guards.

The assistant umpires post themselves on the outer edge of their sector in order that they may proceed toward the center at the blast.

The team chief proceeds to the vicinity of ground zero, establishes communication with the chief umpire. Unless the chief umpire states that the round is cancelled or delayed, the team chief sets off a simulator device at the proper time. Thereafter he supervises the functioning of his team and informs the B team

chief, if one is operating in the terrain compartment, of results.

### Maneuver Play in Atomic Exercise

The time of the explosion may be called K time. Upon seeing or hearing the simulator, the guards stop all player vehicular traffic entering or leaving the circle in the period K to K plus 20 minutes. The assistant umpires present the commanders of all units of platoon or larger size in their sector with a form message which informs them of damage and contains appropriate instructions; every effort is made to complete this by K plus 20 minutes. All units are assessed 100 per cent destruction of matériel (including radios) and 100 per cent casualties (all *seriously wounded*, to permit adequate play of medical evacuation problems). Unit parts of platoon size or larger which are clearly outside the blast area at the time of blast, are excluded from this assessment and permitted to remain in player status even though they enter the area subsequent to K plus 20 minutes.

Umpires require units capable of moving organizational equipment and supplies by organic transportation to evacuate that equipment administratively, in casualty status, promptly to a predesignated off-limits-to-live-player-personnel rendezvous area, using minimum driving and safeguarding personnel. Personnel not required for this task are evacuated individually as casualties via normal medical channels. Logistical installations and units not capable of organic movement of their equipment and supplies leave those items in place; the blast location therefore becomes the reassembly point for that unit.

The A team chief may designate certain logically selected roads in the circle to remain blocked to all player vehicular traffic to simulate blockage by fires, fallen trees, and debris. This time will vary according to terrain and the action taken by player units to clear the blockage. In order to conserve umpire personnel, the task of blocking these roads should be performed by guards furnished by destroyed units, or by signs.

Upon completion of the umpiring task, the members of the A team assemble and become available to umpire another strike. Effort should be made to have the team reassembled not later than two hours after the blast.

The number of type A teams required in the umpire pool depends on the extent of atomic play contemplated in the exercise. One team should be able to umpire as many as five or six blasts in a 24-hour period.

### New Fire Marking System

Artillery fire marking in most maneuvers is anything but impressive. A new system is proposed wherein fire-marking teams are not assigned to firing battalions.

Major fire direction centers (division artillery or artillery group) are assigned a small relay group (type AFM-R) which relays to a coordinating group (operating in support of *both* sides of the exercise) fire-marking requests. The coordinating group has at its disposal



a number of ground fire-marking teams and aerial fire-marking teams shown as types AFM-G and AFM-A, respectively, in Figure 1.

The ground teams operate mostly in the area of troop contact, marking direct support fires. The effects of these fires are not judged by the marking teams, but by B and C teams.

Given a mission to mark a fire at a coordinate, the ground team (in a single jeep) proceeds to the spot and goes through a little drill wherein the assistant umpire and driver trot out about a hundred paces on either side of the team chief, on a line indicated by him. The team chief then throws a single artillery ground-burst simulator, at which each of the others throws one. This is repeated twice, at one-minute intervals, representing three volleys. By marking each concentration in a uniform manner and with the distinctness afforded by the simulator device, troops will soon learn to recognize that they are under artillery fire, and will cease making offensive remarks about excited young officers rushing about with flapping red flags.

Aerial teams provide flexibility and are especially effective in marking deep fires and fires on locations not readily accessible to AFM-G teams. Fires are marked by pyrotechnics fired from the aircraft. A shell-report data card, in a message kit, is also dropped.

Control of the umpire system is facilitated by dividing the entire area of the maneuver into terrain compartments, and the establishment of an area communications system. Figure 2 (page 43) is a typical schematic portrayal. An overprinted map or overlay with these data is distributed to all umpires (but not to players) and serves as the basis for assignment of umpire team responsibility and as a location code.

In determining the size and shape of each terrain compartment, one should be guided by a few simple rules. Compartments should not be too large—about 8,000 meters being a maximum dimension. Generally speaking, dominating terrain features should be within a compartment and not on a dividing line. Stream lines, valley bottoms, and woods edges are most useful as dividing lines between compartments, and there is no objection to the use of railroads and roads where indicated as desirable. But it is not necessary to restrict divisions between compartments to any or all of these.


Figure 2 shows also an umpire headquarters, located centrally in the maneuver area on tactically unimportant ground which is declared off limits to all player personnel. And lastly, there may be seen in Figure 2 two area signal centers which, in a maneuver taking place in a very large area, are necessary to assure adequate umpire communications.



Figure 3 (page 44) shows the tactical umpire communications system.

### Communications System

The area signal centers serve primarily as relay points, and may also be assigned as net control stations for umpire A and B teams and AFM-C groups operating in their vicinity. On certain occasions in which an assistant chief umpire is assigned responsibility for a geographical area, he may use an area signal center as the nerve center for control of his assigned teams, and






FIGURE 3. TACTICAL UMPIRE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

as an umpire rendezvous point.

Resident umpires will have access to player communications on both Red and Blue sides. Direct umpire channels must be provided from each resident senior umpire to umpire headquarters. Subordinate RU umpires will be included in an FM net either under an area signal center or under umpire headquarters.

Prior to the commencement of each 48-hour maneuver period, the staff of the chief umpire, by visit and by use of resident umpires as liaison officers, informs itself fully as to the plans and orders of both sides, Red and Blue. On the basis of this information, certain of the available B teams, supported by appropriate number of C teams, are assigned initial terrain compartment responsibility. A teams and the several types of AFM teams are dispatched to the proper spots. There will be no difficulty in getting the umpire teams properly disposed and ready, and the possibility of tactical action going unumpired is very remote.

### Umpire Plans and Dispositions

As the action progresses, two alternatives are possible:

B teams (with attached C teams, in each case) are assigned alternate compartments on each avenue of advance, in a leapfrog process; or, a B team (with C teams) is assigned responsibility for each avenue of advance, moving from one terrain compartment to the next with the action, and being relieved by another B team after twelve hours. The latter system appears simpler and surer, and therefore preferable in most instances.

Of course, it is true that in some stages of big maneuvers, action can get pretty fast and less predictable than is the case in a set-piece attack. But in truth, maneuvers don't move as fast as we sometimes believe, and there should be no difficulty in keeping the area of contact under umpire surveillance. It should be remembered in this connection that the chief umpire retains a proportion of his means as an uncommitted reserve.

It is worthwhile to consider a small segment of a typical maneuver action, more by way of convincing the reader that the system will work than for reasons of illustration.

## How the System Works

Figure 4 shows an attack by two Blue battalions (as part of a larger attack) against a position held by a single Red battalion which, however, has call on the Red regimental tank company shown in the northeast corner of the terrain compartment. The Blue attack is to be immediately preceded by a gun-delivered atomic strike, ground zero selected at point X.

The chief umpire will have assigned a type B team, with perhaps three type C teams attached, responsible initially for the terrain compartment (which I will call No. 26) in which the action will take place. A type A team is also dispatched to No. 26 to umpire the atomic blast. The team proceeds with its task as described earlier, meanwhile checking in by radio with the over-all umpire boss in No. 26: the type B team chief. The artillery fire-marking coordinating group likewise positions itself and disposes its AFM-G teams (in No. 26 and other compartments) to take care of fire requests relayed by the relay groups working with the FDCs.

It is obviously desirable for the types B and C teams to visit the area early enough to determine in advance the military realities of the terrain and the tactical possibilities open to each of the contending forces. This is not always possible, but it will frequently be


so; even fifteen minutes of looking about will be helpful, and it will be rare indeed when this much time is not available.

The type B team chief will receive reports-for-duty by the type RU umpires with the Blue 1st and 3d Battalions, and will attach them to appropriate C teams. However, it should be recognized that their services, though normally to be used, are not an indispensable requirement to the umpiring of the action.

Participation of the type C teams will be as follows:

**T**HE first will umpire the action between Blue 1st Battalion and Red Company G, and thereafter follow the action between these forces through to completion on Objective 2. With the benefit of prior knowledge of the intended action by both Blue and Red forces, the type C team will be alert and ready when the action commences. Prior to the attack, the type RU umpire with Blue 1st Battalion should observe carefully the preparation made by that battalion for the attack, including especially the organization and employment of supporting direct fire elements; these matters should be subjected to continuing report to the type C team chief. Also closely observed is the action of the artillery and mortar fire marking teams and

FIGURE 4. UMPIRE SYSTEM IN A TYPICAL MANEUVER ACTION



the reaction of the troops to the fire; from these observations is determined the effect of the fire on the units, and how it would logically be expected to influence the action. Then, from properly selected spots on the terrain, the type C team will watch the advancing Blue forces and the action being taken by Red Company G, and possibly the tank company (minus), to defeat them. The type C team chief will receive periodically reports from all of his several umpires, and by direction to them control the action, with due consideration to both direct and indirect supporting fire.

The second type C team, reinforced by the type RU umpire with Blue 3d Battalion, will be assigned to umpire the action of the 3d Battalion in its attack to take Objectives 1 and 3. The team chief must take note of the effect of the atomic blast as umpired by the type A team; in the normal course of events, this should permit the Blue forces to move rapidly through Objective 1 (troops of both sides will know when and where the atomic blast occurred, by reason of the use of the simulator device). The type B team chief may instruct the C team to continue to umpire the action as it develops between Blue 3d Battalion and Red Company E possibly reinforced by the tank company. An alternate arrangement is to permit this team to become the local umpire reserve as soon as Objective 1 is passed by the Blue forces, in which case the third type C team would be used to umpire the action between Blue 3d Battalion and the Red forces defending Objective 3.

The effects of possible air attack will be judged, and casualties assessed, according to the accuracy and intensity of the attack, and the dispersion and counterfire of ground units. This is a function of the types B and C teams, with no need for reference to other authority.

### Umpiring the Action

Throughout the action in No. 26, the type B team chief, aided by his regular assistant, and with the Red 2d Battalion type RU umpire also available, will maintain close supervision over the activities and decisions of subordinate type C team chiefs. Since none of the officiating umpires (with the exception of type RU, who are acting in a subordinate capacity to the type C or type B team chiefs) has any allegiance to the participating units, impartial decisions should be reached. A single, coordinated group of selected officers and noncommissioned officers, positioned to observe the dispositions, movements, effects of direct and indirect fire, effects of air attack, effect of atomic attack, and the use of cover and concealment and of surprise by both contending forces, will be in an excellent position to judge the results, assessing casualties and ordering the hold-up of attacking units or retirement of defending forces based entirely on military realities. This may be accomplished without recourse to mathematical computation of fire power, nor to fruitless argument between umpires of equal stature and strong attachment to the units they mess with.

Casualties are assessed and tagged by B and C teams,

as well as by A teams. Each vehicular casualty is given a form order which requires it to go at once with minimum driver and safeguarding personnel to a rendezvous area, an installation which requires additional description.

### Rendezvous Areas

Rendezvous areas will be established by each division, corps (for corps troops) and army (for army troops) centrally within lateral boundaries of the several sectors, with some consideration as to where the centers of gravity of the formations are expected to be at the close of the 48-hour maneuver period. Rendezvous areas are selected to insure that they will not be overrun by the enemy and not occupy terrain likely to become tactically important. There is no necessity for these areas to be in cover.

Each rendezvous area is commanded by a junior officer, who manages his area with perhaps a single assistant and a small party of guides and messengers. Certain prominent signs will be useful, including signs marking sub-assembly points within the areas. Minimum administrative arrangements should suffice, since vehicle drivers can continue to subsist on field rations.

Personnel casualties are all evacuated in the medical stream, with small percentages assigned for return direct to units from each of the forward echelons of evacuation. The majority of the casualties, however, will be distributed throughout the evacuation system as of the time the maneuver period ends. The medics request for that time transportation which will pull all these casualties out of the evacuation stream, wherever they may be in it, and return them at once to appropriate rendezvous areas.

Detachments of vehicles arriving in casualty status at a rendezvous area will report to the commander thereof. He will sort out arrivals according to units and assign each a subassembly point within the area. On arrival of personnel from the evacuation stream, which should occur only during the armistice period, it will be the duty of the rendezvous area commander to reunite the personnel echelons with the vehicular echelons. He then releases assembled units to move as directed by the division, corps or army headquarters concerned.

I HAVE struggled to be reasonably clear in this difficult exposition. I feel that the system proposed has great merit, but at the same time would acknowledge that modifications and refinements are bound to come with practice. These modifications should not be allowed to change the basic aims outlined at the beginning of this article.

The end result of a better umpire system will be better maneuvers—much better. It is in the field of umpiring that the greatest progress may be made in the major exercises which occupy so much of our time and effort, and use up a sizable blob of the taxpayers' money.



# CEREBRATIONS

## AA Duty in USA

I HAVE served with the AAA for seventeen years. During that time we have made tremendous strides in developing better equipment and more effective fire. This modern equipment, with its electronic and mechanical features, the gunnery problem involved, and its importance to the national defense, challenges the interest and enthusiasm of our scientifically inclined American men. With a fair chance to learn and master it, they go for it.

But make no mistake about it: this antiaircraft equipment is complicated and delicate; it requires trained officers and men to maintain and operate it. And, in my opinion, the training of key men in antiaircraft in the States is inadequate.

Consider the officers. All attend the basic course at Fort Bliss. There they are taught to know about antiaircraft: the guns, automatic weapons, machine guns, antiaircraft gunnery, electronic computers, and radar. They also study field artillery gunnery, infantry tactics, and common subjects. Obviously, they retain a little of each subject when they go on to the next. Later they go to units as battery officers, where they practice what they have learned. Their theoretical training needs a solid assist from practical experience.

In "the Old Army" the NCOs helped the new officer to learn the practical points about the equipment. Now the new officers find that not all their noncoms are fully qualified for AA service. Inexperienced in leadership as yet, new officers start doing the jobs the noncoms should do, and that doesn't help the morale of either.

Then there is the confining duty. These AAA batteries on site are manned day and night. With full T/O&E strength that is not so bad. But with the reduced strength, which has now become normal, married officers and men can spend only two or

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three nights per week with their families. Bachelors have the same restrictions in liberty. Even with the best of leadership, the actual existing conditions are trying on morale. The young officer looks forward to the end of his tour and few indeed sign a new category. A check will disclose too that young Regulars also seek a way out of the assignment after their first year.

Properly assigned, noncommissioned officers are capable enough, but with the rapid turnover many join without the required AAA training. Here's an example of one battery, perhaps worse than average, but still indicative. The two first-graders are ex-infantrymen. Among the three second-graders, one is a heavy-truck driver, one is a communications sergeant, and the third is a quartermaster specialist. Among the four third-graders we have an ex-Navy truck driver, another driver from a truck company, a motors sergeant from a headquarters battery, and an ex-infantry mechanic. Among all the first-three-graders in this battery in the AAA defense of an important industrial city, not one has attended the Antiaircraft and Guided Missile School. The corporals in the unit each have about two years' service. Hardly any of the sergeants or corporals intend to reenlist in the battery, and there are few men qualified to replace them. Before the replacement can be

trained he, too, will be discharged.

Obviously, some definite steps are needed to improve training. A good start would be for groups or battalions to set up schools to train all potential NCOs and key specialists in the equipment they are to man and operate. Naturally, the instructors would come from the recently graduated officers and selected men. What better method is there to learn than in teaching? Busy in their preparations to teach, they would become better qualified and happier. Likewise, the student NCOs and men will be getting ready to return to duty better qualified in their work and happier in their batteries. The morale of the units would soar to new heights, and this would help the long-range reenlistment program, too.

Necessarily, the courses will have to be short and restricted to the subjects the men need to know to perform their jobs efficiently in their own particular batteries. They should be designed to contribute toward the revival of effective gunners' instruction in the batteries. Results from this type of training will be readily discernible in a short time, and if carried on universally will serve to rejuvenate the AAA throughout the service.

LT. JOHN J. ENGLEBERG

## Infantry Needs Research

IN this day and age, when *atom* and *electron* are important words in the lexicon of new terms describing new scientific vistas, the infantry might well ask itself these questions: Does the scientific approach to problem-solving have any validity for infantry? Can infantry scientifically establish that it is essential in modern warfare, or that it is important as a branch? What new techniques has the infantry developed and applied in social psychology, group dynamics, and the handling of men as individuals or as units? Has infantry evaluated time as a parameter in its tactics and operations?

What new management techniques

has infantry developed and applied? Can new uses be discovered for infantry as well as old uses for infantry with new weapons? Are there upper and lower limits of fatigue or other ambient conditions not under infantry control that affect the relationships of infantrymen to their weapons, their supplies, and their equipment? Or, resorting to a mixed metaphor: can the infantry be more attractively packaged (organized), and can the advertising and selling be raised to a higher level than "Be a tough guy, join the infantry and serve your country under the rudest, the crudest, and the most elemental conditions"?

We of the infantry can get some answers through research. To get it we need individual infantrymen who are research-minded as well as large-scale applied research to meet predicted future military requirements. These individual researchers need not be assembled at any one place. They could and should be encouraged to work at their own pace wherever they are stationed, on a personal basis, in a quest for military knowledge beyond the range of their daily duty requirements. They should be encouraged to publish their findings or to assemble periodically to present papers and discuss their research with others with like interests.

Within the framework of the present research and development program of the Army as a whole, there appears to be an opportunity for infantry to push its own branch research on subjects and in areas that are unique to infantry. Through research infantry could well examine its successive changes in position and its progress in public acceptance since the Revolutionary War days.

The infantry needs to engage in creative research in contradistinction to applied research and development engineering. The distinction between these types was clearly set forth in the testimony of Major General John F. Uncles, then Chief of Research and Development, in an appearance before the House Committee on Government Operations. The Army, it seems, is concerned chiefly with applied research and development engineering as related to new weapons and new equipment. Most of the Army's creative research, somewhat limited by the scope of the requirements set by the services, is performed on contract by civilian agencies. In both types of re-

search the Army limits itself to supporting the research with troops and supplies, testing the final product, adopting it into training, and preparing statements of additional requirements. Under this very large program we find that four-fifths of the Army's annual appropriations for research and development are allocated to the Ordnance Corps, the Signal Corps and the Chemical Corps, in that order, with the major portion to Ordnance.

In the field of creative research infantry might begin by evolving a workable mathematical theory of tactics, and then proceed to develop new tactical concepts and training devices. Such a mathematical approach to tactics has already been suggested in a paper at the U. S. Ballistics Laboratory in connection with the mathematics of weapons development. This paper suggested that the philosophy of Clausewitz could be substantiated through the mathematics of human relations of Rashevsky. Certainly infantrymen, who know tactics better than anyone else, could take up this research and make a bold new approach to tactics through mathematics.

Perhaps infantry research could be expanded and simplified through the use of one of the new electronic computing machines. These computers not only can handle problems in arithmetic, algebra and higher forms of mathematics at fantastically rapid rates, but can handle just as easily nonmathematical facts. They can translate from Russian to English. They can forecast the weather. They can play checkers, or chess, or poker, or other games requiring the use of strategy, tactics, and dissimulation. They can remember. They can compare thousands of different sets of facts and make a decision as to the most logical course of action.

Such a machine is Aggressor made to order and waiting for a few thousand infantry facts in figures.

In fact, I believe there is an important parallel between the scope of these proposals, and the historic past of infantry and the development of electronic computers. While these new machines, using the binary system of numbers instead of the decimal system that we know and use every day, perform mathematical computations at speeds measured in millionths of a second, and perform other feats that seem like magic, the principles upon which they are constructed have been known since ancient times. So it is

with infantry: the principles and techniques developed out of the historic past and already known, need to be put to new uses through research.

In addition to the creative research needed to develop the mathematical theory of tactics and the research needed to perfect a machine useful in making logical tactical decisions, the infantry needs to expand its program of historical research and research in social psychology in order to have more combat-proven facts to feed into the machine to supplement and support and confirm its theoretical findings. Just as General S. L. A. Marshall developed the post-combat interview technique in World War II and used it in Korea to find out and record what actually happened at the small-unit level, so other research techniques in the social sciences await discovery. Who could do these jobs better than infantrymen?

These are but a few of the possibilities in infantry research. In addition to the direct benefits, an infantry research program would have numerous beneficial secondary effects. An infantry research program would present an intellectual challenge to infantry officers, noncommissioned officers, and high-powered privates who have been introduced to science and the scientific method in colleges and universities before they joined the infantry. An infantry research program would afford a peacetime scientific education to officers that could be used to fill the critical need for managers and directors of large scientific laboratories in wartime. An infantry research program might enable the instructors in the infantry schools to make researches and write and publish papers of such quality that Master degrees or Ph.D. degrees could be awarded in collaboration with civilian universities. Quality research would help give the infantry status in the scientific community, in the military community, and in the civilian community, as well as reinforce its fighting position with scientifically arrived at facts.

These proposals for research do not envision discarding the history, tactics, techniques, or principles developed by infantry from successful past experiences, but they do envision, to continue the analogy of the corporation, a searching inquiry, remodeling, restyling, and improvement of labor relations and customer acceptance.

LT. COL. WALTER H. DABNEY

## Front and Center

(Continued from page 11)

itself is new—it is as old as the first Alamogordo test—but because each of the new weapons may release a thousand times the amount of radioactivity produced by the bomb we detoned in 1945. This is new; and it is unexpected. The original idea of thermonuclear weapons anticipated an enormous increase in blast power, but only a much smaller increase in radioactivity produced by the explosion."

### 'Ten Cardiac Commandments'

Maj. Gen. Dan C. Ogle, the Air Force Surgeon General, who was responsible for the directive to Air Force officers to avoid unrelieved tensions and take time out for recreation, has added the comment that the best statistics he has "indicate that the incidence of heart attacks among military people is lower than it is in comparable civilian age groups." The purpose of the instructions is to make persons in executive-type jobs "health-conscious and not allow their jobs to throw them."

Some practical advice is given by Dr. Irvine H. Page, President-elect of the American Heart Association, in an interview in *U. S. News & World Report*. This takes the form of "Ten Cardiac Commandments":

- (1) Understand heart disease, do not fear it.
- (2) Keep the weight of your youth, do not become obese.
- (3) Avoid fatigue; it's a warning signal.
- (4) Cultivate a good muscle tone and keep it by regular exercise.

### New Discipline for the German Army

(Continued from page 29)

cesses, spread throughout the world. It is against the carry-over of this rigid dogma that Count Baudissin is speaking.

**I**N 1955 it is Germany, as a result of her defeats, her political miscarriage in Hitler, and the threat within and without of Communist attack, which takes an entirely new look at what a military establishment in a free country should be. The fearful question of every commander is: Will these measures reduce discipline and make a soft army? Baudissin, near the conclusion of his article, sagely observes: "It is a mistake to ask whether there should be more or less 'discipline.' The point is to find ways and means to encourage self-discipline and a readiness for cooperation."

All those who are inclined to find much to cheer in Count Baudissin's approach recognize that *outward* discipline cannot be relaxed until the self-discipline has been proved. If West Germany keeps this in mind, perhaps she will smoothly effect methods we are all looking for to increase the moral fiber, self-reliance, and toughness of the fighting soldier.

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(5) Be moderate in the use of salt and fatty foods, sex, tobacco and alcohol.

(6) Avoid drugs, vitamins or diets except on medical advice. Have your physician treat streptococcus sore throat.

(7) Learn equanimity in a world full of stress and strain.

(8) Become attuned to nature, so as to adapt to the inevitables of life or death.

(9) Cultivate mind and soul to your utmost—they alone are indestructible.

(10) Select a physician in whom you can truly confide and in whose understanding and judgment you have implicit faith.

### New Members of the Executive Council, Association of the U. S. Army



MAJ. GEN. LOUIS W. PRENTISS  
Commanding General,  
The Engineer Center



MAJ. GEN. DONALD P. BOOTH  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G1



BRIG. GEN. THEODORE S. RIGGS  
Chief, Information and Education



MAJ. GEN. JAMES D. O'CONNELL  
Chief Signal Officer



COL. WILLIAM E. MAULSBY, JR.  
Asst. Chief, Armor Branch, CMD



M/SGT. EUGENE F. BRITTI  
Sergeant Major, 3d Infantry

# THE MONTH'S READING

## The Paths of Glory

G2 Consolidated Interrogation Report  
021800A February 031800A February 1945  
Headquarters 1st Infantry Division

A furlough deserter from whom great things were expected turned out to be a disappointment. He was a former member of the German 1st Infantry Division (no relation) and was expected to view with ecstatic surprise the fact that he had been captured by the U.S. 1st Infantry Division. Jeweled epigrams were awaited ("Isn't it a small world?"; "What will they think of next?"), but the dull oaf said nothing. He had never heard of the 1st Infantry Division. He did say, however, when he saw the interrogator's lip begin to tremble, that the German 1st Infantry Division was considered a crack outfit, having distinguished itself in the battles of Leningrad, Vinnitsa and Tarnopol. As a special extra, he added that *his* division was horse-drawn.

## Faults in Code of Military Justice

MAJ. GEN. EUGENE M. CAFFEY  
Address Before Criminal Law Section, American  
Bar Association, at Philadelphia  
24 August 1955

In military circles the police court which functions in civilian life is the summary court. Our new Code [of Military Justice] makes it impossible to try a minor offender before a summary court of one officer if the accused person objects to trial by such court. In other words, an accused person can force the Government to dispose of a minor misdemeanor by resorting to a special court-martial composed of at least three officers and a prosecutor and a defender, and to the preparation of a somewhat lengthy record—all of this perhaps for a case that can result only in an imposition of a \$10 fine.

The new Code provides for a great many built-in delays. For example, an accused person who has been convicted by a general court-martial cannot waive his right of appeal except by allowing the time limit for appeal to expire. Other delays result from a cumbersome system of centralized appeals or actions in the nature of appeals. The requirement that practically every court-martial case be examined or reviewed in the Office of The Judge Advocate General, even where there is no controversy concerning the facts or the findings or the sentence, which is the situation in the vast majority of cases, results in delay and a waste of money and energy that could be devoted to better purposes. The unrestricted right of appeal to the Court of Military Appeals even following a plea of guilty makes for further delay.

The whole appeal process is centralized in Washington, which requires of course the use of a great deal of time in sending papers back and forth between Washington and all parts of pretty nearly the whole habitable globe.

The further requirement that all death sentences must be laid before the busy President of the United States causes other and further delay.

... It seems to me that the time has come to take a new look at what we have in the light of what we are trying to do. I sometimes think that we have forgotten that courts exist for the benefit not of the accused but for the benefit of society. A criminal court is society's instrument for coercing into conformity with society's rules a person who prefers to establish his own rules. Both in the civilian world and in the military world a court is an instrument of discipline in the hands of public authority, and that is the only reason for the existence of a court. In both worlds the accused person should be treated fairly and given every reasonable opportunity and assistance in presenting his defense against the charges which he faces. What is needed is a system that is fair both to society and to the accused citizen and which will accomplish its purpose of enforcing discipline.

## Personality Projection

BRIG. GEN. HARRY H. SEMMES  
Portrait of Patton  
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955

On the eve of Third Army's commitment to battle, a young officer wrote to his father of his first meeting Patton. He was on the staff of the Third Army, who with others had been working on the plan of the breakthrough in the headquarters that were established in France in advance of General Patton's coming to the continent and during the period when it was desired to keep from the Germans knowledge as to whom the Army Commander was to be.

The letter told how one afternoon, about July 25th, the staff was assembled, by order, on the lawn in front of the chateau housing the headquarters, and how, while they were speculating as to what it was all about, the front doors were thrown open and a strange officer walked out and stood in a ray of sunlight, looking them over and at first saying nothing. Everyone stopped talking and looked at him and soon he began to speak, in a high and somewhat unpleasant voice. Their first impressions were of a powerful figure, immaculately and superbly uniformed, shining boots and insignia, looking every inch the soldier and leader. And before he had talked very long, they knew that he was a soldier and a leader. As the writer said, "I suppose the performance was carefully staged and that he came there to hook us all, but I'll say he did it! As for me,



he not only hooked, but landed me, and I will go with him to the ends of the earth."

## Automation in the Army

MAJ. GEN. JAMES D. O'CONNELL  
Address before RETMA Symposium on Automation  
University of Pennsylvania  
26 September 1955

I can classify the Army's interest in automation into three major categories. Together they have one common objective: to increase the combat effectiveness of the Army.

In the first category are our weapons systems and strategic and tactical operations. Efforts to apply automation in such areas as air defense, fire control and guided missiles have already proved successful. In military communications we have been extensively applying automatic teleprinter switching centers ever since our initial installation in Chicago in 1952. In the weapons area, we are just on the threshold of automation's potential. Under the demands of new concepts of ground warfare which the Army is now developing and testing, automation is going to play a major role in tactical communications, battlefield surveillance, air navigation and traffic control, and electronic warfare. At our Army Electronic Proving Ground at Fort Huachuca in Arizona, new doctrines, devices and systems are daily being tested and refined.

The second major category is the business and administrative affairs of the Army. Here are included logistics, financial management, personnel and manpower administration, record-keeping, etc. We are trying to apply electronic data processing systems to the handling of our vast amount of data and clerical transactions. Already, major high-capacity data processing systems are being acquired and will be installed during this fiscal year at the Ordnance Tank and Automotive Center in Detroit and the Signal Corps Supply Agency in Philadelphia. The Army Map Service has been using a high capacity electronic data processing system for the past four years. Major studies are now going on for exploitation of automation systems in other areas of supply management. Involved in these studies are our depots, stock control points, procurement agencies, industrial mobilization offices, posts, camps and stations, and units in the field. The Army is also conducting studies and tests for new concepts in supply and manpower activities. Here again, our approach is based upon maximum exploitation of electronic data processing systems. Of particular interest, we are engaging in major field experiments to prove the feasibility of these new concepts. Just as we test tactical concepts at Fort Huachuca, so do we also engage in developing and testing ideas for modernizing and improving the Army's business management.

The third category is the exploitation of automation in the production of components and items of military equipment. Here, of course, our efforts are aimed in two related directions: to obtain better equipment at lower cost and to reduce the costs and problems associated with repair and servicing; and to augment our industrial mobilization base through automatic production techniques. I do not need to elaborate on the Army's efforts in this field. It has sponsored automation design, assembly and manufacture

of crystals and batteries, elaboration of auto-assembly techniques, application of automation to production of VT fuzes and 155mm shells, etc.

## Strength that Stays

ADMIRAL ARTHUR W. RADFORD  
Address Before the 35th Annual National Convention of  
the Military Order of the World Wars at Chicago  
23 September 1955

... It seems to me we have two fundamental requirements which are essentially military in nature. . . .

First, we require a superior defensive strength—a strength which has the stamina and the skill to discourage, and if need be, to counter enemy surprise moves with convincing force. This emphasizes the importance of forces in being, forces of all military services which can help keep the peace.

Second, we need this strength indefinitely for many years to come. We must develop our programs with that in mind for we need our "effective" strength for the long-term pull. Here, I stress the word "effective"; for in the main, large forces are worthless unless they are effective; and to be effective, they must be superior.

Now to attain this superiority, there is a third requirement, one that is not exclusively military, but rather is the genius and the animating spirit of the nation. We must have a high morale, and an unswerving sense of devotion to God and country.

Thus, to maintain a true position of strength, we must keep in our armed forces a qualitative superiority in men, weapons and equipment; and we must be true to our ideals of individual liberty, human dignity, and spiritual values under God.

In short, militarily we must stay ready to fight if necessary.

## Most Favored Nation Policy

RALPH L. POWELL  
*The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912*  
Princeton University Press, 1955

China's practice of depending on foreign powers to supply essential weapons of war was a hazardous policy half a century ago, while today the real power and independence of action of the communist armies is gravely threatened by their dependence on the Soviet Union for such vital weapons as planes, tanks, electronic equipment, etc.

Despite her military schools and the officers sent abroad to study, China has suffered from a permanent shortage of technical specialists for her vast armies. This plus her lack of funds and industrial backwardness have largely accounted for the failure to create adequate special or auxiliary services. The deficiency of fully qualified officers is also a prime factor in the continued employment of foreign military advisers. This policy is always potentially dangerous, for the basic loyalty of such officers is to their native country. The tendency has been to engage soldiers from the most favored nation or the one whose military establishment is currently most admired. Hence China is today infiltrated by Soviet officers, as in 1910 Japanese officers had penetrated throughout the empire.

## THE MONTH'S AUTHORS

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT A. SCRUTON, USA, Retired ("The Bergenschultz Schletterkume Method," *Cover 2*), a frequent contributor, spent twenty-six years in the Infantry and retired a few months ago. He lives in Biloxi, Mississippi, where, he says, he "is taking it easy, writing short fiction for magazines in the mornings and fishing and playing tennis in the afternoons."

MAJOR GEORGE S. PRUGH, JR., JAGC ("Justice for All RECAPs," *page 15*), entered the Army as a second lieutenant of Coast Artillery in 1942. He was integrated into the Regular Army in 1949,



MAJOR PRUGH

and transferred to the JAGC the next year. He holds an AB (1941) and an LLB (1948) from the University of California. He is a member of the bars of the Supreme Court of California, the U.S. District and Circuit Courts of that state, and the U.S. Supreme Court. Major Prugh spent seventeen months in the Southwest Pacific with an artillery battalion during World War II, and served in Germany during 1950-53 as trial counsel, staff judge advocate, and member of a board of review. He is now a member of the Military Justice Division, Office of TJAG, where for a year he has been associated with the RECAP cases.

LIEUTENANT DAVID M. ABSHIRE, Infantry, USAR ("New Discipline for the New German Army," *page 28*), is a 1951 graduate of the Military Academy. He served in Korea for sixteen months, as platoon leader, company commander, and the combat intelligence officer of the G2 section, 25th Division. More recently he was an instructor and an assistant operations officer with the Tactical Department, TIS. Presently he is pursuing graduate studies at Georgetown University in history and international relations.

MAJOR THEODORE WYCKOFF, Artillery ("Mirror in the Sky," *page 30*), is a 1942 graduate of UCLA. He was commissioned in that year and integrated into the Regular Army in 1950. During

World War II he served with the AAA and antisubmarine defenses of Puerto Rico and as an instructor at the AAA School. His postwar service includes a tour as AAA adviser to the Brazilian Army, and antiaircraft assignments in the United States and Germany. He graduated from the Artillery Officers' Advanced Course at the Artillery and Guided Missile School in 1955. Recently he began studying international relations at Princeton.

MAJOR RODERICK A. STAMEY, JR., Infantry ("Fire Power Will Beat the Odds," *page 32*), entered the Army as a private in 1942, after graduating from The Rice Institute with a BA degree. He was commissioned in

1943 after graduating from the Medical Administrative Corps OCS at Camp Berkeley, Texas. He served with the 42d Infantry Division during World War II in the ZI and in two campaigns overseas, and accepted a commission in the Infantry in 1949. Major Stamey continued in a Medical Service Corps assignment until 1951, when he joined the 4th Infantry Division in Germany to serve as a company commander. He graduated from the Advanced Class at The Infantry School in 1953, and then was assigned to the Combat Developments Office, TIS. Recently he was ordered to the Far East Command.



MAJOR STAMEY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WALTER H. DABNEY, Infantry, USAR ("Infantry Needs Research," *page 47*), is a graduate of Howard University (BS in civil engineering, 1929), and took his MS in highway engineering (1933) from Iowa State College. He went on active duty in 1941 and served in Italy as a rifle company commander, infantry regimental S3, and engineer regimental S3. He has been awarded the Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Cluster and the Purple Heart. As we go to press he is en route to the Far East after a tour as PMST at Tuskegee Institute.

LIEUTENANT JOHN J. ENGLEBERG,

Artillery, USAR, ("AA Duty in USA," *page 47*), enlisted in the 62d Coast Artillery (AA) in 1937, attended The Infantry School in 1943, and served in the Ardennes, Central Europe and Rhineland campaigns of World War II. He is now assigned to the 737th AAA Gun Battalion at Fort Tilden, New York.

MAJOR GENERAL HAMILTON H. HOWZE, USA ("An Area Umpire System," *page 38*), graduated from the Military Academy in 1930 and was commissioned in the Cavalry. During World War II he commanded a combat command of the 1st Armored Division. He is a graduate of the Equitation Course (1936) and the Regular Course (1935) of The Cavalry School, the Command and General Staff College (1946), and the National War College (1949). This is General Howze's sixth contribution to this magazine, and was written while he was Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of Seventh Army in Germany. He is now Chief of the Army Aviation Division of G3, and has been nominated for promotion to major general.



MAJ. GEN. HOWZE

ALL eight of our book reviewers have previously contributed to these columns. MAJOR ORVILLE C. SHIREY, Infantry Reserve, spent his entire World War II service with the 442d RCT. COLONEL IRONPANTS is the pseudonym of an officer of long service in the USAR. BURTON D. MUNHALL is an ordnance engineer who collaborated in compiling two volumes on pistol and revolver cartridge identification. RALPH W. DONNELLY is on the staff of the American Military Institute and its publication, *Military Affairs*, and is a member of the Civil War Round Table. COLONEL S. LIGREE has served many years in the Artillery Reserve. N. J. ANTHONY has been with *The Journal* since 1930. All of the service of COLONEL H. D. KEHM, retired, was with the Artillery. RICHARD GORDON McCLOSKEY is a lieutenant, MI-USAR.



Lt. Gen. Weible, the Vice President of AUSA, presiding at the business meeting

## AUSA'S Annual Meeting: Milestone in the Army's History

*"Until this meeting the Army as a whole had lacked [a semi-official] public relations instrument; therefore the meeting just ended, attended by about 600 members of the Association [of the U. S. Army], most of them in uniform, marks a milestone in the development of the history of modern land power."*  
Hanson W. Baldwin in *The New York Times*, 23 October 1955.

By far the most inspiring event at the meeting was the letter from President Eisenhower addressed to his former "comrades-in-arms"; that message and the Association's formal reply appear on the next page.

The demonstrations and displays were visible exhibits of the Army's progressiveness—of its advances in hardware and services. They exhibited too the Army's tremendous complexity: everything from dentures to the new T101 airborne antitank gun and the mammoth 280mm "atomic" cannon. The addresses by



Mr. Brucker and Gen. Taylor listen to discussion by panel

The new T101 airborne AT weapon, mounting a 90mm. gun, was on display at Lawson Field



NOVEMBER 1955

Mr. Brucker and General Taylor and the talks by Generals Weible and Gavin were inspiring and to the point of the theme of the meeting.

The tipoff of the success of the meeting came towards the end of the business session when the question of "where do we meet next year?" was raised. There was no suggestion, not even a hint that anyone thought perhaps there shouldn't be a next year.

For reasons of space it was necessary to condense some of the addresses and talks that appear on the following pages. A report on the business meeting will appear in the December issue.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Denver, Colorado  
October 19, 1955

To the Association of the United States Army:

The first annual meeting of the Association of the United States Army is a historic occasion. During it, you will examine the scientific, professional and human elements in the Army's combat effectiveness, readiness and flexibility. You approach this examination well prepared to establish high standards for the Association's future work.

Thousands of you were my comrades-in-arms through the trials and perils of World War II. I know that on the battlefields you demonstrated your courage and selfless patriotism. On staff duty, with troops, in schools, you manifested your alertness to new ideas and proposals, your quickness in adapting them to the old and proved, your unflagging perseverance in the finest traditions of the Army.

These qualities, always the characteristics of successful military leadership, are more valuable than ever in this day of rapid change and global responsibility for the Armed Forces of the United States. In this year's meeting, and on your assignments thereafter, I am confident that you will exhibit them for the good of the Service and the security of the Nation.

Sincerely,

*AUSA's Response to the President's Message*

Fort Benning, Ga.  
21 Oct. 1955

Mr. President:

The members of the Association of the United States Army, gathered here for the first Annual Meeting, are sincerely grateful for the expressions of confidence and encouragement expressed in your letter of 19 October 1955.

The Association of the United States Army pledges its membership to the continuing task of making the United States Army a combat-ready, closely knit element of the nation's military strength, dedicated to our national security. As we develop in strength and unity, so will our contribution to this essential cause. Under your leadership we face this task with confidence.

You have our continuing hopeful prayer for a speedy and complete recovery.



# *I'm Proud to be a Member of the Splendid Army Team*

The Hon. Wilber M. Brucker

Secretary of the Army



**N**OT for many years have so large a part of the leadership of the Army been able to gather together on common ground and, through communion of spirit, strengthen the bonds that unite them in service to our Nation. This is a stimulating experience, and makes me prouder than ever to be at the head of this splendid Army team.

This afternoon we saw displays and demonstrations which constituted an impressive panorama of the resources of our magnificent modern Army. To me it was a particularly striking reminder of how tremendous have been the advances in the art and science of war since I served on the Mexican Border with the National Guard nearly 40 years ago, and later in France throughout the First World War as a platoon leader with the Rainbow Division.

\* \* \*

I reflected, however, that the most important things, as we knew them when I was in uniform, have not changed at all. Nobody has yet invented a gun, a missile, or a gadget to replace the soldier himself. And nobody has devised an electronic substitute for the teamwork that chiefly distinguishes an army from a rabble. As a matter of fact, as war has become ever more complex, trained soldiers and perfect teamwork have steadily become more necessary.

Not one of the things displayed here today—no matter how great a miracle of technology it may be—is, by itself, of the slightest importance to our national security. Standing alone, each is inert and useless, incapable of providing a scintilla of military power. Each has value and significance

only as an integral, functional element of a military system. It takes trained soldiers to do the job!

Likewise, each part of the Army organization—each branch, each component, each individual, whether in or out of uniform—is of importance to the national defense only as an integral element of the whole—united with every other part by the cement of an indestructible cooperative spirit—working together with single purpose to accomplish the Army's mission. It takes teamwork to do the job!

**T**HIS Army is a mighty organization and we can be proud to belong to it. It contains over a million uniformed men contributing to our defense at posts of duty throughout our own land, and in 73 foreign countries and eight other foreign areas. In addition the Army has nearly 700,000 civilian employees and supporting personnel. The Army is backed up by more than 40 billion dollars worth of property, of which over 25 billion dollars worth are weapons and equipment. The Army is not only the hard core of our own national defense but is also one of the central elements of the collective strength of the Free World. In addition to providing major combat elements to fight alongside our allies, our Army assists in the training of more than 200 of their divisions.

Here at home in addition to maintaining an effective active Army we are responsible for our own vital Reserve forces. You are all familiar with the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. As you know, the first young men to start their six-months training came into the Army on October 3rd. These form the nucleus of what we hope will ultimately be a fully manned, equipped and trained Reserve force. It is incumbent upon the Army—each of us—to see that the program works. It is too early now to evaluate the program or the provisions of the Act. Only grass roots experience and time can provide facts needed for evaluation. For years we have asked for such an Act. We now have it. Although it may not embody all the features we desire, it is up to the Army to exert every effort to make it a success.

The Reserve Forces Act of 1955 will not alone give us the strength we need. It is only part of a formula of military, economic and spiritual mobilization by which the United States can be made equal to the tremendous tests which lie ahead. The Reserve Forces Act is not a cure-all, even for our military manpower problem. Greater willingness to serve the Nation, and a reawakened responsibility on the part of our people toward the Nation must precede if it is to achieve any worthwhile goal.



Major General  
Joseph H. Harper  
greets the AUSA



The Army Aviation Center's helicopter square dance team does its stuff at the AUSA demonstration

Col. Erwin A. Jones, JAGC, and Brig. Gen. Guy Henniger, Adj. Gen. of Nebraska; Col. Edson D. Raff, Col. F. A. McCulloch and Hanson W. Baldwin at PsychWar exhibit



Mr. Brucker and Gen. Weible greet three master sergeants who attended the dinner: David D. Whiting, Paul Thompkins and William I. Goolsby



The building of a strong military reserve to supplement the standing Army is in line with a vaunted concept to which the Nation must return if it is to retain its birthright. We are suffering from a faulty idea of freedom. Too many of our people have come to believe that an American has no real or lasting obligation to anything other than himself.

The all-important mission of the Army is to uphold the interests of the United States in peace, in cold war or in a shooting war. This means that the Army must be mobile and flexible—prepared to move on short notice by land, sea, and air to fight any enemy, any time, any place. Paramount in peace or in cold war is its mission to deter aggression—to prevent war by being thoroughly prepared for it. If the Army is to be an effective instrument of deterrence, the evidence of its ability to fight—and to win—must be so convincing that any potential enemy knows in advance that aggression on his part would not pay.

Military force disposed as a deterrent obviously needs to be organized, commanded, deployed, and trained so it can be applied quickly and decisively against any form of aggression. The deterrent force should have an appropriate atomic capability, and it should also be clearly able to achieve its mission decisively without being dependent solely on atomic weapons. It is obvious that such a force must include a major proportion of ground elements. It must be able to cope with any devious threat that can be contrived by the communist mind, be it an urban riot, a border war, a plotted insurrection, or all-out aggression.

I believe the Army is an indispensable component of our national security. Nothing has occurred on the world scene

that diminishes the fundamental role of land forces.

\* \* \*

FOR a number of years now there have been some assertions that the Army's role has become one of subordinate importance—that atomic bombs have rendered ground troops relatively unnecessary. This is wishful thinking. As in the past, the United States Army will bear the brunt of any future conflict in which the Nation engages. The Army will be a dominant force in the struggle and the Army will provide the ultimate force by which victory is achieved.

There is also a myth that national security can be obtained solely through productive capacity and matériel. This, too, can be dangerous. We would not for a moment lessen the great credit due those in production, but industrialists would be the first to agree that the production of weapons is just a preparatory step toward placing them in the hands of men who will use them to secure victory. It is man that is paramount, not his machines, tools or weapons.

During this critical era, when the real and ugly threat of aggression is ever present, the ability of the Army to do its job is of especially grave consequence to America. Every person connected with it—from the Secretary and the Chief of Staff down to the rawest recruit and the newest clerk—owes no less than undivided allegiance to the Army team.

I expect from every officer and soldier in the Army unqualified loyalty to his Nation, respect for his fellow Services, and also unqualified personal loyalty to this Army

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of ours. Each of us must develop a spirit of dedication and singleness of devotion to this great Army that will stamp us as worthy in the tremendous days that lie ahead.

I want to say right here that the kind of teamwork I have been talking about is the kind that does exist topside in this Army of ours. General Maxwell D. Taylor is my Number One military adviser. I respect his views as those of the best qualified military expert in the Army. We work together in hourly contact, closely coordinating the solution of problems confronting the Army. We rely heavily upon the civilian Assistant Secretaries as well as the Army Staff, whose professional competence is at all times high. This is the team that guides the Army in the tremendous job that is being done for America.

**T**HERE is no room anywhere within the structure of the Army for narrow self-interest or divisive behavior which subtracts from the effectiveness of the Army as a whole. I am by no means selling honest competition short. Competition is highly commendable when it impels a man or an organization to do the best possible job—to outstrip all others in excellence of performance.

\* \* \*

In individuals, as with an organization, there is a vast difference in the vital element of morale. One of the strongest factors toward building morale is the creating of a "sense of urgency." I mean by this a high degree of sustained enthusiasm. When a large proportion of an outfit believes in the importance of its job and gets the "do or die" attitude, it shows in a moment to one who comes in

from the outside. That's the kind of an Army we want!

There is another quality that we need to encourage—a "sense of belonging." I mean by this a feeling by every man that he belongs to the Army team and is not considered an "outsider." Some people have more difficulty than others in acquiring a sense of belonging. Each man must be shown by the rest of us that he is not only "in" the Army but that he is "part" of the Army. . . .

**W**E have taken many positive, worthwhile steps in the recent past to help our men attain this sense of belonging. I am sure we all recognize, for example, the great value in this regard of our new policy of rotating complete units, rather than individual soldiers, between stateside and overseas stations. "Operation Gyroscope" affords the soldier an opportunity to develop a strong feeling of identity with his unit and with the Army as a whole. . . .

Every individual and each branch in the Army must support the other, and the Army as a whole under all circumstances. What affects one part will ultimately affect all. In order to achieve the teamwork which the military complexity of the age demands, we must strive diligently for the most perfect union of spirit and identity of interest. I am confident that we will do so. I want you to know that I speak from the bottom of my heart when I say that I have the most profound admiration for all the men and women who constitute our mighty Army—for their splendid accomplishments—for their sturdy devotion to a sacred trust.

For my part, I consider it one of my major responsibilities



Col. W. D. Jackson, QMC, explains a footwear display to Secretary Brucker; Dr. Allen D. Albert, Jr., Georgia aide to Secretary of Army and Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Hickey



Brig. Gen. Robert L. Cook, 2d Lt. Dewey Yapp and Lt. Col. Charles Sample meet Lt. Gen. Floyd Parks

Interested group in front of Transportation Corps' terrain board listen to Lt. Col. James R. Truden

Maj. Gen. Bryan L. Milburn and Maj. Gen. Robert G. Gard; Maj. Gen. E. M. Cummings, Chief OrdC, and Col. O. T. McCloskey





Chap. Francis Bridenstine, Chap. Patrick J. Ryan, Chief of Chaplains, and Chap. Earl D. Compton

to bring to proper public recognition the Army's magnificent achievements, and the capability and dedication of its men and women. It shall be my purpose to urge that everything possible be done to see that the American people are given a true picture of the United States Army, its mission, its principles and its progress. It is an undertaking to which all of us on the Army team ought to devote our best efforts at every opportunity.

\* \* \*

The Army has a tremendously important job—a job it is fully capable of doing. But we must continue with un-



Col. Louis W. Correll meets Lt. Gen. S. D. Sturgis, Chief of Engrs.; Lt. Gen. Thomas W. Herren, CG, 1st Army



flagging zeal to seek improvement. We may well stand on the thought expressed by Lincoln when he said: "I do the very best I know how—the very best I can, and I mean to keep doing so until the end."

\* \* \*

Bright as are the pages of the Army's story which dedicated and heroic men have been writing for 180 years, the brightest pages are still unwritten. My high confidence in its future is well expressed in this couplet:

The Army's strong; the Army's young,  
And its greatest songs are still unsung.



## *I'm Glad to be in the Army*

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor

Chief of Staff

I'VE been looking forward to this first meeting of the Association of the United States Army. I was particularly glad to come, for many reasons. First, I have not been back to Benning since my return to the United States, after an absence of nearly three years. Next, I looked at the list of people to be here and saw on it many personal friends and many friends of the Army. So I regard this meeting as a kind of family reunion, which I know will be good for all of us privileged to take part.

As I got in the plane yesterday and, looking forward to this gathering, departed Washington in a rather holiday spirit, I had occasion to say to myself, "My, I'm glad to be in the Army"; and as I thought over that reflection, I decided that it should be the title of the few remarks which I have prepared for this meeting.

If I were asked to explain this satisfied feeling and to specify what I like about this outfit, without much reflection I could advance at least three strong reasons: I like the people who are in the Army; I like the kind of service the Army offers; and I like that feeling of belonging to an enterprise with a mission of transcending importance.

We who grow up in the Army tend to take our associates for granted. That attitude is particularly true in our early days, as we pass from adolescence to manhood and from manhood to middle age. But the fact is that the Army is an unusual society, motivated by purposes which are far from universal. It is filled with people of unusual qualifications, of unusual competence, and of unusual character. I refer not merely to the uniformed Army but also to the thousands of civilians who are indispensable contributors





Gen. Charles Bolte, Rtd.,  
former Vice Chief of Staff



Lt. Gen. S. R. Mickelsen  
CG, Army AA Command

to the execution of the Army mission. They begin with our civilian secretaries, and extend through the ranks of the 400,000 civilians who are truly as much a part of the Army and as devoted to the Army as we who wear the uniform. Clemenceau, the great Premier of France in World War I, once said that war is too serious a business to be left entirely to the soldiers. I agree with that statement completely, feeling that the Army team, to be effective, must be a merging of able soldiers and civilians—all motivated by a common feeling of service.

The people in the Army are remarkable because of the depth of their ability. I've often had occasion to express my admiration for the so-called "Indians" of the Pentagon, the relatively junior officers who support and sustain the front-office "Chiefs," who in turn guide the policies of the Army. This depth is a unique source of strength in the fighting services. It guarantees that, as we move along, there is an unbroken stream of qualified replacements to fill the positions which we vacate. Sometimes, we senior officers are reluctant to concede that fact; but I can assure you that my day-to-day contact with the junior officers of the Army is a constant reminder that no one of us is indispensable.

LIKE the Army because it encourages the development of independent thinkers with whom daily association is a constant source of intellectual stimulation. I have never understood the popular idea that gruff generals terrify their subordinates, suppress their independent judgment and reject unorthodox views. If such a tendency exists, it is necessarily short-lived, because it has a built-in self-destroying feature. The general who deprives himself of the considered advice of the able people around him will soon be a failure and out of a job. The young staff officer can feel that, like Napoleon's soldier, he carries a marshal's baton not in his knapsack perhaps but in his store of ideas which, recommended to his seniors, will obtain recognition and implementation according to their merits.

In my experience in the Pentagon I am happy to report that I have encountered no overawed subordinates—quite the contrary. I remember an incident several years ago, when the chief of staff was receiving a briefing on the service position to take at a coming meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the middle of the briefing by the Deputy Chief of Staff, the latter was interrupted by a messenger from the outer office who thrust a paper into his hand. He opened and read it aloud. The text was something as follows: "If the Chief of Staff undertakes to alter Paragraph 2 of Slant 193 with a view of weakening the G-3 position, resist him to the limit. As long as we have majors on the General Staff—majors throughout the Army—who are willing to stand on their judgment, at least during the formative period prior to decision, we have no cause for concern as to the creativeness and intellectual honesty of our officer corps.

LIKE the people in the Army because of the unusual characters produced by long life in the Army. I can detect no pattern among these men who get to the top, no suggestion of a common mould which produces generals like peas in a pod. One has only to recite the roster of some of the most respected names of our Army in World War II to be struck by the great difference in their personalities, in their methods, and in their over-all approach to problems: George Marshall, Omar Bradley, George Patton, Douglas MacArthur, our Present Commander-in-Chief—some of the greatest names in American history; yet, certainly there is no suggestion of the similarity of a single standardized product. The great variety found among our leaders is evidence of the freedom of the mental and moral environment in which they have had their growth. . . .

Of course, there have always been characters in the Army who are "characters" in a sense not connected with their achievements. Recently, I was sitting with a group of generals who were reminiscing about some of the old "characters" of the Army they had known and one of them said, "You know, we just don't have people like that in the Army any more." There was a little silence, and then one piped up and said, "Well, it could be that we are they."

I'm glad to be in the Army, not only because of the people I have met in it, but because of the breadth of experience afforded by Army service, because of the great diversity of its activities and the complexity of its operations. The modern Army requires a wide range of skill and competence on the part of its members. We Army men are partners in the greatest business operation in the world, one whose capital assets amount to over 44 billion dollars. We are members of a geographically far-flung organization, offering service in more than 70 countries of the world.

We of the Army belong to a profession which, by the nature of its service, requires a man to grow. This growth is occasioned in large measure by the increasing load of responsibilities which fall more or less automatically to a man as he gains in age and in rank. The Army has been good to us in guiding our development, in providing us the opportunities of its great school system—so largely responsible for our most successful leaders. I know of no other profession which so wisely allocates school time at appropriate intervals after periods of learning by doing—school interludes where an officer can assimilate his past experience and concentrate upon self-improvement for a

time, relieved of the day-to-day requirements of ordinary duties. We allow our lieutenants a few years service before we send them to the school of their arm; we guide their careers into varied types of experience before they enter the command and general staff college; and finally, only they who have shown solid evidence of potential leadership in command and staff obtain another year of the highest level of instruction at the war college. An academic Ph.D. may be won with considerably less evidence of formal scholarship.

\* \* \*

I'M glad I'm in the Army, not only for the people who are in it and for the breadth of experience which it offers, but because of the feeling which I have of belonging to an outfit which really matters, one which has a mission of tremendous significance. If I were asked to state that mission in simple words, I would say that the Army exists to prevent the greatest of human tragedies: the occurrence of general war. If that deterrence of war is unsuccessful, then the Army is ready to fight and win the war, upon the outcome of which the survival of our Nation depends. Furthermore, it is ready to fight it with a view to establishing a better world, as the objective of the post-war peace.

I think that we are all becoming increasingly aware of the importance of the deterrent nature of our military efforts. In common with its sister services, the Army is bending every effort to emphasize its deterrent strength. By deterrent strength I mean visible, tangible evidence of military effectiveness, which will remind a potential aggressor that any attack on the free world will be resisted, and will fail. This strength must be real. It cannot be phony. It cannot be a bluff. There must be real muscle and not merely shoulder padding. It is the obvious big stick and not the resounding tread which produces true deterrent effect.

ONE may ask, how does the Army contribute to deterring war? It contributes to deterrence by its overseas deployments, where the American soldiers arrayed along the Iron and Bamboo curtains are a constant reminder to an aggressor that if he moves forward, he will be met by the American Army. It contributes to deterrence in places such as Korea, where the Eighth Army mans the battle position facing the Communists, and is visibly ready to resist in case of attack. The Seventh Army in Europe is the backbone of the "NATO" ground forces, whose presence makes it impossible for an enemy quickly to overrun Western Europe. In case of war, General McAuliffe's

Gen. James M. Gavin, Mr. Erle Cocke, civilian aide to S/A, Mr. Brucker and Maj. Gen. R. R. Hendrix



forces would hold back the ground forces of the enemy, until the powerful weapons available to our side took their toll of the attacking forces and prepared their ultimate defeat by the Army.

At home, the Army can contribute to deterrence by the evident soundness of the strategic reserve units of the standing Army which are ready to reinforce our overseas deployments; by the effectiveness of our civilian reserve components, who are the ultimate reinforcement for any prolonged military effort. A corps of officers and noncommissioned officers of obvious professional excellence, qualified and equipped to lead American Army units in any kind of operation, may be another element of deterrence.

Not only is the Army a deterrent force; but if war comes, it must be prepared to fight to a finish and assure that the finish is victory. Much of our effectiveness in winning a war depends on the readiness of our deterrent strength. That strength, as I have said, must be real and hence must be a positive asset if deterrence fails and war ensues. However, the ability to win in the long pull requires reserve strength, over and above the requirements of deterrence. The Army capability for the big war depends upon the adequacy of our mobilization planning, upon our readiness to expand promptly and develop the full military potential of the resources made available in general war. These resources are more than manpower and equipment. Much of our reserve strength is found in the hearts and minds of the individuals who make up the Army. It is their latent ability—latent genius, if you will—which will be a major source of abiding strength in time of general crisis.


Not only is the Army ready to fight the war wherever it occurs but it is prepared to fight it on the element where it will end. As long as men lead their lives on land, as long as they draw their strength from the earth—in short, as long as they are men—all wars will end on the land; and



Maj. Gen. Paul Adams and Maj. Lawrence G. Matthews; Lt. Gen. W. G. Wyman and Sgt. J. C. Quebodeaux

Lt. Gen. M. S. Eddy, Rtd., Gen. J. E. Dahlquist and Gen. Taylor; Maj. Gen. W. C. Zimmerman, Insp. Gen. of Army





Pfc. Glen R. Southworth shows Maj. Gen. J. D. O'Connell, Chief SigO, some TV equipment; Judge George Latimer, U. S. Court of Military Appeals

MPs all: Col. Edwin W. Wissman, Col. Howard Hobson Dep PMG, and Lt. Col. George A. Bieri



Maj. Gen. Paul F. Yount, Chief TC, Gen. W. D. Palmer, Vice C/S, and Brig. Gen. Rush Lincoln, Jr.

Col. Forrest J. Agee and Maj. Gen. H. M. Jones, Dep. AdGen; Gen. Palmer talks to SFC William L. Anderson of an Honest John missile crew



it is here that the Army, the military force designed to gain and hold land objectives, finds its secular justification.

Whatever the destructive effect of firepower—and whether in the form of bullets, shells, rockets, or bombs—there will always be the need for men on the ground to exploit the success of that firepower and to clinch the victory by occupying that portion of the earth's surface from which the enemy derives his strength to wage war.

Not only is the Army prepared to fight the war to the finish on the decisive element, land, but it is prepared to fight it with discrimination, proportioning destruction to the requirements of the hour. Flexibility is a unique characteristic of Army weapons—its arsenal varies from the MP's pistol to the kiloton blast of its atomic weapons. It is able to distinguish between friend and foe, to adjust the punishment to fit the crime. It is able to act with due regard to the postwar conditions which military operations will create. The Army has had the job of picking up the pieces, so to speak, too often after wars to be able to think in terms of the purely military effects of weapon systems. I have personally been engaged, as have many of you, in the economic rehabilitation of Italy, Germany, Japan, Okinawa, and Korea. I think it is characteristic of us Army men to be particularly conscious of our duty to wage war with measured, not massive, destruction. That attitude is reflected in the family of weapons of which we dispose—a complicated family, it is true; but like a well-equipped orchestra, able to strike the appropriate note or chord at the appropriate time.

**N**OW, because the Army is able to do these things, to contribute to deterrence of war, or if war comes to

win that war, I'm glad to belong to it. I'm glad to belong to an association with such people as make up the soldiers and civilians who compose the Army past and present. I can assure you that this is no time for discouragement in Army ranks. When I came back to Washington, some people told me that the Army was "in the doghouse," that it was consistently in a minority position in the important decisions taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that it was a forgotten service. I do not share that feeling.

Many of you recall the cadet expression, "The Gloom Period," used to describe the months between the return from Christmas leave and the celebration of Hundredth Night, marking 100 days till June. Gentlemen, this is not the gloom period of the Army. Rather, it is the time for all of us to rally together in pride of the uniform that we wear, in pride of the mission which we share—to close our ranks and go forward, ever the stalwart defenders of our Nation. We have the people, we have the experience, we have the skills, we have the will—to discharge the mission of tremendous importance which falls to the Army.

**I**T is the duty of all here present to see that the importance of this mission is accepted and understood by the American people. I call upon you in your daily tasks, by the excellency of your performance of duty, to show that the Army has an important job which it is doing with supreme competence. That is a picture which will reassure our friends and deter our enemies, and thus play a decisive part in maintaining the security of our nation. "If the trumpets give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?" Now is the time for a strong, clear, and confident note from every Army bugle. I'm glad to be in the Army.

# This Is a Significant Beginning

Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer

President, Association of the U. S. Army



TOKYO  
Mr. Secretary, General Taylor and Members of the Association of the United States Army:

It is a matter of deep personal regret that my present duties in the Far East and United Nations Commands make it impossible for me to be with you today. I wish it could be otherwise, for I have long anticipated and would welcome an opportunity to renew acquaintance with many old friends and visit with you in surroundings which carry many personal and pleasant recollections for me. I would like to extend personally to our esteemed guests, the Honorable Wilber M. Brucker, our Secretary of the Army, and General Maxwell D. Taylor, our Chief of Staff, and to all members present, my warm and cordial best wishes for a profitable and pleasant meeting.

I am particularly sorry to miss this first annual meeting of the Association for I am convinced that it will be of special and lasting significance for the Army. In my opinion we are well on our way toward a position where the Association of the United States Army in fact represents a major segment of the United States Army. Thus for all of us, today's meeting marks a milestone in the years of devoted effort to create a single representative organization, the only one which devotes its entire time and effort to the interests and betterment of the Army as a whole.

I recognize and appreciate fully that there may be some officers who view the merger of former branch associations with nostalgia and deep misgivings. This attitude is entirely understandable, but I would point out to them that this development does not mark an ending, but rather a beginning. The day has long passed when any one military branch or component can function as an independent entity.

In another sense this is an important "beginning." Each service has not lost its own forum but instead has actually gained a vastly greater audience. We will no longer be telling our story only to ourselves and merely convincing those already convinced. Through the Army Combat Forces Journal, we have a much greater opportunity to exchange ideas with members of all elements of the Army than we have had before. Already this publication is a high-caliber, widely quoted professional military journal which is doing outstanding work in keeping large segments of the Army abreast of the latest developments in weapons, equipment, tactics and organization.

This progressive expansion of the Association of the United States Army, however, is more than an adjustment to realities; I consider it to be a long step forward toward the achievement of greater unity and teamwork in the Army. It must be apparent to all those familiar with problems confronting the Army today how important it is to

have balanced and professionally tested military views concerning the Army presented accurately and convincingly to the Public and Congress. In the past, I believe the division amongst us, due to understandable devotion to the narrower interests of branch, service and component, has constituted a very serious weakness. This is true principally because of its limitation on the Army's ability to formulate and present publicly a single, over-all Army position, even when urgently required. Today it seems to me that the very survival of the Army, as we presently conceive it, is at stake and depends in large measure on our ability to close ranks promptly and effectively for the good of the Army and the Nation as a whole. This association in promoting teamwork and working to bring all elements closer together will soon permit, I fervently hope, all members of the Army to speak with one voice when the occasion demands.

I KNOW you will all agree that our progress to date will avail us little unless we enter this association with the spirit and determination to make it work and build it into the large representative organization which the brilliant historic record and honored position of our Army merit. Although the current membership drive has had considerable success, only a small fraction of a tremendous potential Army membership has joined to date. In my opinion, we should take the most vigorous measures to enlist in the Association the widest possible membership regardless of branch or component. Those who are already members of separate branch or component associations, while retaining present connections, should be encouraged and urged to join the Association of the United States Army on the basis that this organization alone represents Army-wide interests. Additionally as a special project, I suggest that we seek to obtain as active members, all former Secretaries of the Army, Assistant Secretaries and the many other civilians both within and outside the Army and the government who have demonstrated a keen interest in Army affairs.

In summary, I urge that we seize this opportunity by giving to the Association our full loyalty and active support; let us make it truly representative of Army-wide interests and our spokesman for new ideas in the adjustment of the Army to necessary change. Finally, let us use it as a rallying point from which all members of the Army and our civilian supporters will, when necessary, speak collectively and firmly in the expression of a common point of view and thereby attain the unity and strength that will best serve the interests of the United States Army and the Nation in the future.



# Can We Meet Our International Obligations?

Lt. Gen. Walter L. Weible

Dep. Chief of Staff for Administration



*In the first part of his presentation, Gen. Weible listed an imposing array of collective security arrangements that the United States has made with other governments. He then continued as follows:*

**I**F the U. S. Army is called upon to honor all the commitments of the United States it will have its hands pretty full.

What have we in being to meet them?

On 1 July 1955 major Army forces consisted of 20 divisions and 12 regiments within the total strength of approximately 1,112,000.

At the end of this fiscal year the Army must reduce to a strength of 1,025,000 with a consequent change in the troop structure.

Strong Army forces make a vital contribution to America's over-all deterrent strength. The deployment of Army forces to strategic overseas areas and their state of readiness to move rapidly to troubled areas of the world, constitute a declaration of national intent to preserve the peace and deter war. The soldier on the ground, highly trained, combat ready and properly supported, is a most tangible demonstration of America's ability and aim to punish swiftly and severely any resort to aggression. He is there for a purpose which any would-be aggressor can readily understand.

When an Army is reduced in size its strategic deployment is severely affected. If a compensating strategic mobility is not then provided, its deterrent power is sharply diminished. Thus our capability to deter local aggression could be extended by provision of greater strategic mobility. Our capability of deterring general war is likewise affected, but

fundamentally because of our reduced strength and the lack of full readiness of our Reserve Components.

**O**UR capabilities to fight local wars, provided there are not too many of them going on at one time, are obviously greater than our capabilities to fight a general war, but, because of the limited state of tactical and strategic mobility, timely intervention might be difficult. Some of our Reserve forces might be needed to fight a local war and all of them would be needed more than ever to fight a general war.

The Reserve Bill recently passed by the Congress is much better than what we had before. It provides a ready reserve of 1,692,335. It provides for compulsory participation of service personnel who enter the armed forces after enactment of the law and who subsequently are separated and become members of the Ready Reserve. Because of the 6 months active duty for training feature, it establishes a new mission for the Active Army. We must make the new Reserve Forces statute work effectively because we rely heavily on our reserve structure in the event of an emergency.

**T**HERE seems little likelihood that Army missions and commitments will be diminished in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, they may even be increased. So, the maintenance of a modern, versatile, mobile and hard hitting Army is and will continue to be an essential aspect of America's preparedness program. In any case, in the event of aggression, we still must be ready to fight a limited war or a large one, and we must be able to enter the fight quickly and bring it to a rapid and successful conclusion.


The orchestra from the WAC Center at Fort McClellan provided the dinner music



# We Can Solve Our Technical Difficulties

Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin

*Dep. Chief of Staff for Research & Development*



**P**ERHAPS no one is more acutely aware than are we soldiers of the confused thinking and talking that have obscured national defense matters since World War II. The age-old hope that the tough business of land fighting might be eliminated was given new promise by the development of new and more powerful "super weapons." However, when the possibilities of new weapons were weighed by the responsible military and civilian leaders, it became clear that we could not safely rely on any one weapons system or any single service. The wisdom of this judgment became quite apparent when the Communists acquired "atomic weapons" of their own. The gist of responsible thinking was and still is that there is no easy way to win wars, no super-weapon to guarantee victory.

In the uncertain world of tomorrow, the United States faces the need for greater military preparedness than ever before. As the Free World's leader, our nation seeks to prevent aggression in *any* form. The military role in supporting this national policy is to be able to win wars, large or small, atomic or non-atomic.

This is a very big order. It establishes a new function for the Army; that is, in addition to being able to mobilize for a large-scale war, the Army must have sizeable forces in being, ready to move by land, sea, or air and *fight* any time, any place. The ability to move rapidly and put out "brush fires" before they get out of control provides a down-to-earth deterrent that no aggressor would misunderstand.

The Army is bending its full efforts to develop the mobility, firepower, organization, and combat readiness for both big wars and little wars. Let me make one thing clear: Many of the solutions to the numerous technological problems involved in a future war have already been found and many of the remaining solutions are definitely in sight. This means that we can look ahead with assurance that the technical difficulties of modern war *can* be solved.

**T**HE United States Army is developing modern techniques to take full advantage of the military innovations introduced by modern technology. The Army is vitally concerned in solving the problems raised by the introduction of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. As you know, our forces in Europe and the Far East are already equipped with atomic artillery. We are training to be prepared to use these low-yield weapons on military targets in case the need should arise and new organizations and tactics are being developed for the "atomic battlefield."

The Army is also intensely developing various types of rockets and guided missiles. We have been the pioneers in the field of missiles and are proud of the progress made so far. We already have many units equipped with various types of guided missiles and rockets, and we intend to

make the fullest use of scientific improvements now being made in such weapons. The traditional artillery gun may well be on the way to obsolescence, for the new missiles have almost unbelievable possibilities both for antiaircraft and antitank purposes and for all kinds of other enemy targets. The potentialities of such missiles if or when equipped with nuclear warheads of various sizes, stagger the imagination. It seems apparent that these weapons eventually may replace piloted aircraft and so greatly alter the structure of our armed forces.

**T**HE Army, like its sister services, faces a dual problem in carrying out its part of the national defense. We must always be prepared for a large-scale war if that unpleasant eventuality ever should occur. This, of course, means that we must develop as best we can our ability to mobilize and move sizeable Army forces and we must keep our reserve forces in the highest possible state of readiness.

At the same time, the Army must be prepared to deter or defeat smaller scale threats to the Free World. The Army believes that in a long period of Cold War, such as the world has experienced in the last decade, one of our most important tasks is to have a respectable military posture that will discourage the continued creeping aggression through which many peoples have lost their freedom. For the Army, in particular, this means a goodly number of ready combat and supporting forces, highly trained and ready for action. These ready forces must be truly mobile and they must be transportable rapidly by air or sea to deter or defeat what sometimes is called "local aggression."

**I**T may be useful to look briefly at the Army on some future battlefield. Radical changes are emerging in the development of the implements of war. To meet the challenge of new weapons of war, our concepts of time and space have been expanded. The combat zone in an atomic war will be vastly extended in depth. Combat action will be characterized by fluidity. Units will be dispersed in space, but through greatly increased mobility will be capable of greater concentration for concerted effort in terms of time. On the future battlefield the decisive margin of strength will fall to the side possessing superior mobility to exploit the effects of weapons yielding greatly increased firepower.

Tactical areas, as in the past, must be fought for and held, and the resulting battle will be characterized by many violent clashes of relatively short duration. These tactical areas will be held, not as ends in themselves, but as a means of controlling the battle or creating favorable opportunities for the employment of nuclear weapons.

To fight successfully on the battlefield visualized for the future, our Army must be mobile not only on the

ground but in the air. Units must possess a high degree of mechanization and improved cross-country mobility with lightly armored personnel and cargo carriers. The majority of supplies for the battle area should be delivered by aircraft of the assault cargo and convertiplane type, and tactical transport of units into and within the battle area must be accomplished by basic reliance placed upon aircraft and fast moving naval vessels.

**T**O achieve the utmost results from mobility there must be flexibility of organization and of mind. Tactical units will possibly be smaller regimental combat teams or integrated battle groups, of all arms; semi-independent and self-contained; capable of operating over extended distances on a fluid battlefield with little control by higher headquarters. Because of the depth and fluidity of the battlefield of greater number of these smaller units may be required. Organizations and weapons systems should be simplified and the number of vehicles and different types of weapons should be drastically reduced. Infantry, on arrival in the battle area, as in the past, must fight on foot.

All but the heavier armored units should have the capability of being air transported into and within the battle zone. By means of ground, aerial, and electronics surveillance, the Army should have the capability of locating enemy concentrations and determining the character of enemy movements.

The Army should be capable of employing atomic firepower at the battle group level, of engaging and defeating a quantitatively superior enemy through superior tactical and logistics mobility, vastly increased firepower capability, battlefield intelligence, control and command facilities. This capability to employ the destructive effects of nuclear firepower, selectively, places the Army in the unique position of being able to defeat the enemy's land forces and control the sources of his land power without

destroying the foundations upon which a firm and lasting peace can be built at the cessation of hostilities.

Today's weapons in the hands of our soldiers, and developed by them, are the most effective of any Army in the world. Our Nike system can destroy any airplane, present or planned, regardless of great height and speed. Our infantry weapons, our armor, and our airborne forces are improving daily. And this is well, since we are entering a period of revolutionary change. What is modern today may well be entirely obsolete tomorrow. We must foresee the changes and develop the means to meet requirements of tomorrow's battles. All of our energies and resources are devoted to this end. Your Army is the principal instrument of military power that has the capability of deterring war and—if the deterrence should fail—of winning a worthwhile peace.

**T**HIS Army is a blend of American character and military tradition with the best that American science and industry could contribute. The American regard for human life is reflected in every aspect of the Army, and the process of substituting machines for men will continue as new developments come along. (Our allies' armies are following this same trend.) But here a word of warning. The ultimate extent to which machines can successfully replace men is one of the great unknowns in the modern world—it is so large an unknown that both the free world and its adversaries have seen fit to maintain large armies, notwithstanding the impact of new means of warfare. As long as there is a war, much of it will be fought on the ground, and that means men and machines.

The Army is deeply conscious of the horror of an all-out atomic war. We are dedicated to the idea that our nation's weapons system should not be our master but our servant. The Army is intent on developing capabilities designed to serve the interests of the United States and mankind.

## Panel Discussion

DR. ATKINSON. . . . In the events of now and the future; I should like to propose four possible things to go out to the panel, and of course, from that, "What can we do about it?"

First, all out atomic war. Secondly, large scale conventional war with tactical attack weapons; thirdly, small scale conventional war, with or without tactical weapons; and fourth, unconventional warfare as in Malaya. . . . What are the possibilities, Mr. Baldwin, of a large scale conventional war with tactical weapons?

MR. BALDWIN. I think I can start from one basic aim, that we have to consider a whole phase of possibilities and I think the Army and all the armed forces have an obligation first to think what kind of policy we want before we decide on the strategy we are going to use. Strategy should follow policy and not make it. Now, on the question of all out nuclear war, we cannot win any kind of a peace as a result of such a war, and I think the Russians feel that is one possibility which prevents the Americans from using it. That is a thought. And I should say here that the major job of the Army of the future, as I see it, is not to advocate all out atomic war. If such a war comes, ground forces will play a very small role indeed. At the same time, I would be quite convinced that we would require ground forces in the end.

MR. COCKE. On the fourth principle you stated, I would

like to say something regarding unconventional warfare. I certainly think that the unconventional warfare that was started in Greece and Malaya is continuing in other countries. The second thing I would like to comment on is the small scale conventional war. I do not think we should

### MEMBERS OF THE PANEL

Dr. James D. Atkinson, Professor, Department of Government, Georgetown University, Moderator.

Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin, Military Editor, *The New York Times*.

Mr. Donald Douglas, Jr., Vice President, Douglas Aircraft Company.

Mr. Erle Cocke, Assistant to the President, Delta Air Lines, and former National Commander of The American Legion.

Mr. Robert T. Haslam, Director, W. R. Grace Company.

Dr. Henry E. Kissinger, Professor of International Relations, Harvard University.

Mr. Willard F. Rockwell, Chairman of the Board, Timken-Detroit Axle Co.

Mrs. Esther Van Wagoner Tufty, Tufty News Bureau, Washington, D. C.



conduct a war in the same manner in which Korea and Indo-China were handled. If you do you will have passed another good opportunity to save lives by using our weapons. . . . whether you are going to use atomic weapons or not: I think there should be no question about that. . . .

DR. ATKINSON. I think this brings up a question which I would like to direct to Mrs. Tufty and see what a woman would have to say about it. Why have an Army anyway?

MRS. TUFTY. Well, of course you have to say that you need an army. We certainly have to be strong and that requires an army, as everybody knows. . . . I think we would have greater strength in the Army and the Army would give greater strength to the people if you will tell your story. It seems to me that where we are falling down in the question you raise, Mr. Moderator, is that the American public needs to feel the need for the Army and its work. Of course, I think, too, one weapon I haven't heard mentioned since I arrived is the mention of a well informed public. I think if the public knew how much Army it takes to defend all these commitments we have around the world, if you would keep them informed about these things, you would have no trouble with your budget. But you have got to keep them well informed.

DR. ATKINSON. Well, if we need an army, some people raise the question, "Does the Army have a vital role to play?" Does the Army have a vital role, Mr. Douglas?

MR. DOUGLAS. Well, it seems to me you have come to the wrong man. But yes, I think we certainly need an army. I for one do not believe entirely that all out strategic air power can be the only answer. I think we need all three services; and actually what we are talking about is the proper balance. That is why I feel capability is so important.

DR. ATKINSON. This poses another interesting question which was raised by Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Cocke and that is this question: You say air power has a deterrent effect in preventing war. Doctor Kissinger, do you agree? Does the Army have anything to do with preventing a war?

DR. KISSINGER. Yes, strategic air power has a deterrent effect. The Army has a deterrent effect against the kind of war which might be phrased a brushfire war.

DR. ATKINSON. Mrs. Tufty raised a question which I think is of great interest and her point was in this question: Does the Army tell its story? . . . In other words, I would ask if you have told your story to the public? The American public is a free and good public, but do we tell them often enough, Mr. Rockwell?

MR. ROCKWELL. I certainly would be glad to give my views on that point. . . . I think a group of senior retired officers should be organized. We should hear from them and they should attempt to handle public relations. . . .

DR. ATKINSON. Now, you good people in the audience: We have had you at our mercy for some time now. I think it's time to turn the tables and let you start firing at our panel.

COL. FORSYTHE. Mr. Moderator, I was very much interested in Mrs. Tufty's remarks concerning the Army telling its story.

At the banquet table: Gen. Taylor, C. R. Davis, Asst. Sec. Army, Gen. Palmer, and Frank Orth, Asst. Sec. Army



and I certainly agree. Mrs. Tufty indicated, however, that she had something in mind. I wonder if she would go on possibly further and give us an outline.

MRS. TUFTY. Well, I would break it down two ways. I would like to get to the boy himself in the Army. I remember in Korea I wrote a story, "Does the average GI in Korea know why he's here?" And I really talked to the boys and put it all down in a notebook, and I was amazed, pleased and overwhelmed that I could write that eighty percent of them did. There is so very much that we know the answer to that we don't translate to the boys, who [must serve]. It seems that the story could be told better. . . . It seems to me this is a people's army and I don't mean that in the communist sense. We are not a dictatorship. The Army belongs to the people. The people want to know what the Army is doing. And I wish you would not overlook the mothers, because if the mother feels good about her son going, then you have a wonderful condition. And it is oh, so hard to do. . . .

LT. GEN. PARKS. May I make a speech. I am Lieutenant General Parks. . . . I am indeed delighted that this subject came up because I labored for six and a half years in public information and troop information and I couldn't agree more that we have difficulty in getting our story to the people. Before I go on with the rest of my speech, I want to say that the results you saw when you found some eighty percent of the boys had a good idea of why we were there is because the commanding general was General Ridgway, and he used troop information better than anyone I have ever seen; and one of the first things he did when he got in the theatre was to issue over his own signature a statement of why we were in Korea. And the results were really astounding. Now to get back to telling our story to the public: A ceiling is put on the amount of money that can be spent in a year and that includes the salaries of officers, includes the clerks and right on down the line. . . . I agree we have got to get the story to the public. . . . I would like to point out that if you are going to make career men out of public information officers you have got to give them something to shoot at. . . .

MR. BALDWIN. I would like to add a comment or two to what General Parks has said. I think it is purely a problem of leadership, a question of leadership. Where you have good leaders the story is told and the contrary when you have bad leaders, and every unit has some bad leaders, and you will get some which are average. . . . Now in the problem of nuclear weapons and nuclear capability, I personally think we can rule out the possibility of all out atomic war. I don't think the Army would play a major role and a strategic role in that kind of war.

LT. GEN. EDELMAN. I would hate for this panel to adjourn with Mr. Baldwin's statement going unchallenged, that the Army will have only a minor role in nuclear warfare.

MR. BALDWIN. All out nuclear war.

LT. GEN. EDELMAN. I would turn in my hat now if I thought as a result of one atomic weapon we would have all out nuclear war and that the Army's role would be a minor one. What of the 10,000 jobs that only the Army is equipped to do?

MR. BALDWIN. We are getting now to the controversy which we hoped we would get earlier. General, I said all out nuclear war. By that I mean the use of nuclear weapons, tactically and strategically. No holds barred. No limitations. At any time. That is all out nuclear war, any target, anywhere. I think that nobody would win an all out nuclear war. Don't think I am against the Army or have any question the Army is not needed. I think it has a very definite place indeed, but I still think that conflict exists in the public mind.

DR. ATKINSON. Well if the audience has no further questions of a group of civilians telling you about your own jobs, I want to say thank you very much.



## Resolutions Adopted at the Annual Meeting of AUSA

### Favoring the Adoption of an Army Flag

WHEREAS, the Army does not have an official flag; the Navy, Air Force and Marines each have a suitable flag representing their service; and  
WHEREAS, a flag to symbolize the Army is highly desirable; and  
WHEREAS, it would be in order for the Association of the United States Army to recommend to appropriate authority the adoption of an Army flag;  
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that the Association of the United States Army go on record as favoring the adoption of an Army flag; and  
FURTHER BE IT RESOLVED, that the Secretary of the Association inform the Secretary of the Army by written communication of the adoption of this resolution.

### In Support of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 PL 305 — 84th Congress

WHEREAS, the National Defense and Security of our nation requires strong Reserve Military Forces; and  
WHEREAS, in fulfillment of this need the 84th Congress enacted Public Law 305, "Reserve Forces Act of 1955";  
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that the Association, to the best of its ability and resources, and by all appropriate means, assist duly constituted authority in carrying out the Reserve Program.

### For Establishment of Award for Outstanding Contributions to the Army by Non-military Individuals or Organizations

WHEREAS, there are patriotic Americans, individuals and organizations, who, although not members of the Armed Forces of the United States, believe in the mission of the Army and its importance in National Defense, and  
WHEREAS, these individuals and organizations have, without hope of reward, shown evidence of their esteem of the Army by word and by action, and  
WHEREAS, in these times that are so critical to the Army and to National Defense, it would appear to be a natural function of the Association of the United States Army to offer recognition to these public spirited persons, and  
WHEREAS, the establishment of awards to individuals or organizations who make outstanding contributions to

the welfare and standing of the Army would be an appropriate and welcome form of recognition;  
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that the Association of the United States Army establish awards to individuals or organizations, not members of the Armed Forces of the United States, who make outstanding contributions to the welfare and/or status of the Army; and  
FURTHER BE IT RESOLVED, that a standing committee on awards be appointed by the President of the Association to make recommendations to the Executive Council for suitable award or awards by the Association.

### To Consider Ways and Means for Granting Association Membership As a Group to Other Associations Working in the Interests of the Army

WHEREAS, there are Associations which have been organized for the purpose of advancing within the Army the interests peculiar to the arm, service, or effort which they represent; and  
WHEREAS, such associations, while composed of individuals who have a particular interest in a single arm, service, or effort, are dedicated to advancing the prestige and position of the Army; and  
WHEREAS, concentration of effort in advancing the position of the Army before the people of the United States will lead to better understanding of the unity of purpose which binds the Army together as a whole.  
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that the Executive Council of the Association of the United States Army in consultation with the Executive Councils or such other governing bodies of other Associations dedicated in principle to advancing the position of the Army, consider ways and means for consolidating the effort of this common purpose of all such Associations while at the same time recognizing the special interests and purposes of such other Associations; and  
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Executive Council report to the membership through the pages of the Army Combat Forces Journal the result of any consultation had with other Associations as provided for by this resolution.

### For a Program to Educate Public and Military Services in the Vital Role of the Army

WHEREAS, the land Army is the backbone of military operations today and in the future; and  
WHEREAS, a program to educate the public and the military services on the vital role of the Army and the soldier appears desirable; and  
WHEREAS, the Association of the United States Army is dedicated to fostering the well-being and the esteem with which the Army is held in the public mind;  
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that the Association of the United States Army go on record in support of a campaign for a continuing and vigorous program to educate the public and the military services in the vital role of the Army and the soldier in National Defense; and  
FURTHER BE IT RESOLVED, that the Executive Council of the Association plan and implement such an action program, cooperating where appropriate with official Army public information activities.



At Chemical Corps exhibit: Lt. Col. J. L. Carson, Brig. Gen. J. R. Burns, Maj. Gen. W. M. Creasy, Chief ChemC, and Mr. C. R. Davis, Asst. Sec. of Army

## THE MONTH'S BOOKS

### Memorable Book on War

**NINE RIVERS FROM JORDAN**

By Denis Johnston  
Little, Brown & Company, 1955  
496 Pages; Glossary

Reviewed by

MAJOR ORVILLE C. SHIREY

Most soldiers have their moments of doubt and of wondering "What are we killing these people for; what's this all about, anyway?" This is a question that heads of state, information and education officers, generals, and large numbers of cerebral-type war correspondents have tried to answer without much success.

Denis Johnston was a war correspondent for BBC, beginning when Eighth Army was retreating into Cairo singing, "Oh, They've Shifted Father's Grave to Build a Sewer," and finishing up attending the meeting of Allied armies at the Brenner Pass. This book is his stab at finding an answer to the "why" of war and human evil. In the course of joining his distinguished predecessors who have also found no answer to the question, Mr. Johnston has written a book that shows more of war and goes deeper toward the root of it than a lot of the punditry you'll find around these days.

*Nine Rivers from Jordan* is written at an intensely personal level by an Irishman who is a good writing craftsman. Any soldier will recognize that this is a book about War with a capital W, and not about any particular war, even though its battles are those of World War II. Time and again the reader who has been at war will find his heart twisted or his ribs tickled by a deft picture or a wry absurdity that evokes memories of his own, long buried and thought to be forgotten.

As the author points out in a preface about two thirds of the way through the book, it originated as a collection of diaries, radio scripts, and personal papers which were more or less put into their present form in 1947 and then slightly re-edited for publication. The result is a memorable book, and a strange one. It shifts from passages of straight reporting to allegory to parody to soul-searching; from humor to disgust to fury.

One finds in it the sublimely ridiculous spectacle of the author craftily acquiring a steel helmet from a suspicious American supply sergeant by first badgering him for a scarce flashlight. One also finds a little farther along his sick fury at the

sight of Buchenwald—fruit of the Germans' systematic degradation of humanity.

There is a fine description of one Col. Donovan Yeuell leading an armored task force into the Brenner Pass, headlights blazing, daring the enemy to shoot. There is also a fine quote of the British PIO's monumentally idiotic handout to correspondents when Eighth Army was in full retreat for Cairo and beyond: "Developments in the battle have resulted in certain areas losing their former tactical importance. Accordingly the garrison of Knightsbridge has assumed a mobile role." This pronouncement was greeted, as it deserved to be, with howls of laughter.

Johnston writes with an unabashed love for the English language, and a flair for using it that is all too rare these days. His writing is by turns as spare and terse as Hemingway's and as involved as his fellow Irishman Joyce's. He is deft, amusing, bluntly honest, and more than a little haunted. He crossed his rivers in Africa, in Italy, in France and in Germany without ever finding a real answer to the question of right and wrong in war.

He discovered at Buchenwald that Germany had created a black and monstrous evil—an evil that made her destruction a necessity. Yet in accomplishing her destruction by violence more efficient than Hitler's, were we not taking upon ourselves a burden of guilt as great as Germany's? Were the ends of justice and mercy being served by having only the defeated at the bar of justice at war's end?

A certain amount of this searching for motive is undoubtedly the perversity of a member of one of earth's more perverse races. But behind the perversity is a tough honesty that refuses to acknowledge the sanctity of the catch phrases governments put out to their people in the course of a war, an honesty that wants to know whether evil can only be destroyed by evil.

You will have gathered by now that this is not the sort of book one describes. No two readers will draw the same experience from it. It is a rich, heady book—a book that has in it both humility and arrogance, a book that a soldier will almost instinctively understand. It may be a great book in the literature of war, but we would not venture an opinion on that until we've read it about two more times. And that may well be the best thing we

can say about it. It is not a book you will read only once.

### The Way It Wasn't

**THE SIXTH OF JUNE**

By Lionel Shapiro  
Doubleday & Company, 1955  
351 Pages; \$3.95

Reviewed by

COLONEL IRONPANTS

When a book covers the IV Dynasty of ancient Egypt, or pioneer times in Patagonia, only the professors are disturbed when the author slips. But when a "historical" novel of World War II, a time when most of us were very much alive, has abundant obvious bloopers, then a perfectly good story simply loses its savor.

*The Sixth of June* is a sad example of the latter fault. Written by Mr. Lionel Shapiro, a Canadian journalist who claims in his foreword that his "is a land blest with the heritage of knowing intimately her British kinsmen and her American neighbors," and who covered the war pretty thoroughly for the Canadians in Europe and Africa, the reader expects a story accurate in the details of its background, and credible as to the adventures of its principal characters. Well, the love story is fine, but so far as military background is concerned, Mr. Shapiro might as well never have left Saskatchewan.

The co-hero, a personable young American officer named Brad Parker, joins ETO headquarters in June 1942 as a first lieutenant. After service in England with that headquarters, in North Africa at AFHQ, and then in England again in COSSAC and SHAEF, he is, in April 1944, still a first lieutenant. Well, perhaps it cannot be proved to a mathematical certainty that it was impossible for a lieutenant at such high levels of duty to escape promotion, but anyone familiar with U. S. Army headquarters in World War II would consider the tale considerably more realistic if, by the eve of *Overlord*, the hero had made at least major.

And when promotion finally comes to Lieutenant Parker, it comes the wrong way. The lad volunteers for a Commando outfit with a hazardous D-day beach mission, and is assigned to command a company. Our author writes that "both his company command and the captaincy that went with it were provisional." But

in the U. S. Army, the captaincy went with the company only after the Joe had held the command for three months, and after that, regardless of reassignment, only reclassification could take it away. Sorry, Lionel, but that's the way it was.

Parker's chief for much of the book is an eager-beaver reservist, Lieutenant Colonel Trimmer. He too has promotion trouble: although a lieutenant colonel in June 1942 he still hasn't made colonel by the spring of 1944. Possible, yes; but at large headquarters not very probable. According to one of his Indians, "Lieutenant colonel is about as high as a civilian can go on the staff side"; and, shortly after Dieppe, the colonelcy goes to a West Pointer of the class of 1932. Other things being equal, the WPPA took care of its own, but ground officers of that class weren't making eagles quite so early. And the War Department and theater and army headquarters were full of non-Regular bird colonels on the staff side well before the war was over. I know; I was one myself, and not in any sense unique.

Not Trimmer, however; he gets only the Commando battalion which he loses shortly before D-day because found drunk. Before that happens, however, he still has his dreams: "It was an easy jump from battalion to regiment and that meant brigadier general." Really, Lionel, didn't you ever see an American T/O? Command of a regiment in the U. S. Army meant only colonel, then and now.

Our Canadian friend is shaky on the U. S. uniform as well. While Trimmer is still nursing his nonpromotion gripe, Parker observes that "Nothing at all has changed, not even the silver medallion on his epaulet." A light colonel wears a leaf, not a medallion, Brother Shapiro, and here in the States we call it a shoulder loop. Also, what Parker wore under his parachute insignia on his blouse, said by you to be "two efficiency decorations," were doubtless badges for marksmanship; your term just isn't in the U. S. Army vocabulary. And why did the publishers permit the dust jacket to show Captain Parker with two bars on the right side of his overseas cap? That's the wrong side.

In August 1942, Mr. Shapiro, you have the lovely Valerie asked to accept special duty with an American Red Cross club because "Mr. Churchill, Mr. Bracken, and the new U. S. commander, Major General Eisenhower, have spent many hours in conference over the problem of meshing a million or more Americans into the life of our island." Sorry, Lionel; Ike made lieutenant general early in July.

Then you have two Wacs in the train on which young Parker travels from Connecticut to New York in June 1942. Don't look now, but another of your

slips is showing; the first WAAC officer candidates reported for training late in July 1942 and didn't graduate until the end of August. Maybe our Minervas in o.d. should have been functioning earlier, but they weren't.

And when you speak of Company A of this Commando battalion as Abel Company, you should have remembered that in the U. S. phonetic alphabet the first letter was Able (like Ready, Willing, and Able), not Abel (of the team of Cain and Abel).

Maybe I'm being a bit persnickety. But here's a big blooper: You have Parker's paratrooper friend getting to North Africa in the summer of 1943, saying, "You heard, eh? We jumped on Adak. What a frost. The Japs skedaddled a couple of weeks ahead. . . ." And, speaking of one of his men in the same operation, "Well, he got himself a Bronze Star." Whoops, again! Adak remained in American hands throughout; the only fight in the Aleutians was on Attu, without paratroopers; the place from which the Japs skedaddled was Kiska; and, finally, the Bronze Star wasn't even established until February 1944.

Then there's one fearful civilian foul-up: "He remembered as a boy standing with his mother in the lobby of the Waldorf and feeling an intense excitement as General Pershing came up out of his private railway car which had been shunted to a private siding underneath the hotel." When Pershing returned in 1919, the Waldorf was at Fifth Avenue between 33d and 34th Streets, and it had no private railway sidings. The Waldorf over the tracks with the private siding is on Park Avenue between 49th and 50th Streets, and it was not until the early 1930s, and the general who lives there is Douglas MacArthur.

## Small-Arms Encyclopedia

### GUN DIGEST

Edited by John T. Amber  
The Gun Digest Company, 1955  
292 Pages; Illustrated; \$2.50

Reviewed by

BURTON D. MUNHALL

The *Gun Digest* is advertised by its publishers as being an encyclopedia for shooters and a complete guide to shot-guns, rifles, handguns and accessories. This is a large order to fill for any one volume; but it must be admitted that this tenth 1956 de luxe edition goes a long way, for a volume of its size, in living up to this billing.

There is only one prerequisite necessary for the enjoyment of this book: that being an interest in guns. The arms historian, gunsmith, target shooter or hunter, each will find something of special interest and will undoubtedly enjoy the balance of the information—even if it does

not apply directly to his particular arms interest. Many of the articles were written by such noted authorities as Hatcher, Askins, Page, Whelen, O'Connor and others well known in the gun writing field. Other articles by lesser known writers are none the less interesting, since each is covering a particular field of gun lore in which he has done considerable research or has had wide experience.

John Amber, the editor, has continued his policy of reprinting a number of old catalogs heretofore only to be found in the largest of arms reference libraries. In this edition are the 1871 cartridge price list of the Union Metallic Cartridge Company, and an old catalog of Mauser rifles as made by Loewe & Company and Waffenfabrik Mauser.

If one is simply interested in what sporting arms, ammunition, gun books, sights or reloading tools are currently available, he will find comprehensive illustrated sections on each. A four-page directory is also included, giving sources for almost any item a gun enthusiast might desire.

## The Confederate President's Early Years

JEFFERSON DAVIS: American Patriot, 1808-1861

By Hudson Strode  
Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1955  
470 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$6.75

Reviewed by

RALPH W. DONNELLY

This is the first of a projected two-volume biography of Jefferson Davis by Dr. Hudson Strode of the University of Alabama. As such it covers Davis's life through his inauguration as President of the Confederate States of America.

Dr. Strode, who has had the fortunate advantage of access to hitherto private family papers, has been able to develop a picture of Davis as a loving husband and affectionate father. Davis's early life is reexamined, and it comes as a surprise to find considerable evidence to support the author's characterization of him as a youth of "high spirits, fun-loving nature, and independent temperament."

Davis's courtship and marriage to Sarah Knox Taylor, who died suddenly and tragically just three months after their marriage, is simply and touchingly told. The author makes it clear that Zachary Taylor's oft-repeated objection to the marriage was prompted by his strong desire to prevent his daughter from living the hard and insecure life of an Army wife and not by an objection to Davis personally. Davis's and Taylor's close relationship during the Mexican War and during Taylor's abbreviated tenure as President seems ample proof of their reconciliation and mutual forgiveness.



On the political side, Dr. Strode develops a picture of Davis as a strong believer in the preservation of the Union and only a reluctant secessionist. He is credited as Calhoun's heir as the intellectual leader of the Southern States' Rights bloc. Pictured as a believer in the inevitability of war in December 1860, one questions whether he acted under this belief as President. The author's version of Davis's strength at the Charleston convention of 1860, particularly the vote cited for the Massachusetts delegation, and the speculation based thereon, is open to question on the grounds of accuracy.

The basic sources are listed by chapters at the end of the book to avoid interrupting the rhythm of the reading.

Certain minor irritating errors are to

be found which do not affect the biographical picture itself. For example, the majority of the vote cast for the Douglas resolutions at the Charleston convention was 27, not 37, votes; the great stone aqueduct outside of Washington bears the peculiar name of "Cabin John" from the creek it spans, not "John Cabin,"; and the "Van Benthysen" family (Joseph Davis's in-laws) is known elsewhere and in the family genealogy as "Van Benthuyssen."

Dr. Strode has pictured a human and warm individual in this readable biography of Jefferson Davis in his early years. His portrayal of the Confederate President in the projected second volume will provide an interesting test as to whether a convincing, definitive new biography has been written on this Amer-

ican political and military enigma who is characterized by the author as "the most misunderstood man in history."

## Violent Seas and Violent Men

SEA FIGHTS AND SHIPWRECKS  
By Hanson W. Baldwin  
Hanover House, 1955  
315 Pages; \$3.95

Reviewed by  
COLONEL S. LEGREE

There must be at least a five-foot shelf of three-by-five cards in the Library of Congress covering books on this general subject, and it would be a confident man indeed who would presume to add to the literature on disasters at sea. Hanson Baldwin, Annapolis graduate and military editor of *The New York Times*, so

## A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

*This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a monthly check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 72 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.*

**AIRMAN AT YALTA.** By Gen. Laurence S. Kuter. Duell, Sloan & Pearce—Little, Brown & Company, 1955. 180 Pages; Illustrated; \$3.00. One man's impressions of one of history's most controversial international conferences.

**ALPS AND ELEPHANTS: Hannibal's March.** By Gavin de Beer. Geoffrey Bles, 1955. 123 Pages; Illustrated; Index. Detective work 2,000 years after the event to trace Hannibal's route across the Alps. Short enough to read in an hour; meaty enough to cause an interested reader to study it for many more hours, or to engage in research himself. For students only.

**ANDERSONVILLE.** By MacKinlay Kantor. World Publishing Company, 1955. 767 Pages; \$5.00. An oversize novel of the famous Confederate POW camp, by the author of *Long Remember* and other works, including *Glory for Me*. Hollywood snapped it up.

**THE ART OF PROBLEM SOLVING.** By Edward Hodnett. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 202 Pages; Index; \$3.50. The principles of logic brought down to manageable proportions. A refreshing look at how to make decisions that should be of assistance to the inexperienced and the fuzzy thinkers.

**U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. The War in the Pacific: *Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls*.** By Philip A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1955. 414 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.75. Up to OCMH's usual high standards, but in this one, the Army suffers by comparison to the Marines in *Makin* vs. *Betio*.

**CROMWELL'S GENERALS.** By Maurice Ashley. St. Martin's Press, 1955. 256 Pages; Index; \$4.50. A study of amateur soldiers who became efficient military lead-

ers; despite their military successes they were less than satisfactory as civilian governors. Dull reading for those not versed in the history of the times.

**DOCTOR AT DIENBIENPHU.** By Paul Grauwlin. The John Day Company, 1955. 304 Pages; Illustrated; \$4.00. The heroic story of the medical problems and service during the last 57 days of the siege, by the French major in charge.

**FRONTIERS OF ASTRONOMY.** By Fred Hoyle. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 360 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00. New theories and methods explained for the intelligent and educated. Rewarding to the extent it is studied rather than merely read.

**HELLCATS OF THE SEA.** By Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood and Col. Hans Christian Adamson. Greenberg, 1955. 335 Pages; Illustrated; \$5.00. Another about the submarine service. This readable one emphasizes the penetration of the Sea of Japan.

**A HISTORY OF FORTIFICATION: From 3000 BC to AD 1700.** By Sidney Toy. The Macmillan Company, 1955. 262 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.75. Describes and illustrates fortifications in Assyria, Egypt, Greece and Rome, in China, South America, the Levant and Byzantium, as well as in Europe and the British Isles. Famous sieges, such as the siege of Jerusalem or that of Rhodes, are given in detail.

**INSIDE AFRICA.** By John Gunther. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 952 Pages; Index; \$6.00. Another *Inside* book, exhaustive and exhausting, with a startling conclusion that this vast continent is not high on the Communist priority list at present.

**JAPANESE ETIQUETTE.** By the World Fellowship Committee of the Tokyo YWCA. Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1955.

157 Pages; Illustrated; \$2.00. An important subject, well explained in text and pictures.

**KNOW YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY.** By Arthur Larson. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 220 Pages; Index; \$2.95. If you have any idea that Army pay or the Survivorship Benefit Act is complicated, wait until you delve into this Social Security business. This goes a long way toward explaining it, but more than an evening's light reading is needed to clarify this important subject.

**SO FULL A GLORY.** By Guy Salisbury-Jones. Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. 288 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00. A sympathetic biography of Marshal de Latre de Tassigny, the distinguished French soldier.

**THE MIND OF NAPOLEON.** Edited and translated by J. Christopher Herold. Columbia University Press, 1955. 322 Pages; Index; \$5.00. A selection of written and spoken utterances on a variety of subjects, grouped according to broad themes, and designed to offer some insight into a great military mind. More interesting psychologically than historically.

**MOTORING IN JAPAN.** By Bob Frew. Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1955. 197 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$2.00. A well-illustrated guide book and rule book for English-reading motorists in Japan. Contains scenic photographs, tour strip maps, and 16 pages of four-color road maps. A valuable pocket-size volume for newcomers to Japan, reasonably priced.

**THE POLITICS OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY, 1640-1945.** By Gordon A. Craig. Oxford University Press, 1955. 536 Pages; Index; \$11.00. A scholarly work by a noted historian; its thorough detail might have been more useful before World War II. The lessons hold good for most nations in almost any point of history.



presumed and—in the judgment of this reviewer, at least—he has succeeded.

From the now famous "Bull's Run" at the battle for Leyte Gulf in 1944 to the extremely disgusting performance at the wreck of the *Medusa* off the coast of Africa in 1816, Baldwin's sweep has been wide and his search for facts insatiable. Not content to write a rehash of previous accounts, he has corresponded widely, and in some instances, notably the mutiny on the brig *Somers* and Leyte Gulf, indicates both sides of arguable facts.

This is a book for those who love the sea or adventure, or both.

## Skorzeny Again

### COMMANDO EXTRAORDINARY

By Charles Foley

G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1955

241 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.75

Reviewed by

N. J. ANTHONY

Ask any soldier who was involved in the Battle of the Bulge in 1944 to identify Lt. Col. Otto Skorzeny. He might reply, if he can remember the name, that this was the German who tried to assassinate General Eisenhower—a sort of military gangster who fought by no rules.

Before the war Skorzeny led the prosaic life of the Viennese student. His university thesis was "The Calculation and Construction of a Diesel Engine." He admits having joined the Austrian Nazis because he thought his country would be better off under *Anschluss*, but held no party office. He turned out to be one of those rare individuals who, with no prior experience, find their element as soldiers and soon demonstrate the attributes of a daring leader of daring men.

Hitler, impressed by Allied commando operations, hit upon the idea of a force of special troops, including elements of all three services, that could operate on any front. It would carry on operations in which psychological factors were the key to success. Missions were personally assigned by Der Führer. The rescue of Mussolini was its first, and Skorzeny was chosen as its leader. Skorzeny's early life, his military service up to this time, and the meticulous planning that made for success in the Mussolini affair cover fully half the book.

Skorzeny was never ordered to capture General Eisenhower. He was to raise and train an armored force of volunteers for Operation *Greif* that would wear the enemy's uniform and use captured vehicles. His mission was the capture of the Meuse bridges before they could be blown, thus facilitating the advance of following penetration units. It seems that not even the German Army was free of rumor merchants. During the intensive

and secret training, the word got around among his men that SHAEF was the target. Skorzeny did nothing to discourage the report, for it might help confuse the enemy. His mistake cost him almost three years of imprisonment and trial as a war criminal, resulting in acquittal. General Eisenhower's *Crusade in Europe* tells what followed when some of these Germans were captured in the first days of the Ardennes fighting.

Skorzeny's other exploits are not so well known. It was his force that seized control of government buildings following the attempt on Hitler's life. His capture of Nicholas Horthy, son of Hungary's Regent, was a factor in keeping Hungarian troops fighting on the Axis side until the end, for Admiral Horthy was ready to throw in the towel. Horthy's defection would have meant disaster for several German divisions in the Balkans. Skorzeny's last mission was an attempt to salvage a cut-off German force in the depths of Russia.

Future commanders of special forces can learn much from Skorzeny's experience, obtained first-hand by this author. Such a commander must gather a staff able to evaluate each tiny fact turned up by intelligence. He must have a supply section that can anticipate, and procure by any means, all needed weapons, vehicles, and food. And above all, he must be a master at long and minute preparation, patient rehearsal, and bold execution. As General Telford Taylor says in his foreword: "It behooves us, therefore, to gain and retain mastery of the style of warfare that Skorzeny's name typifies. If we are incapable of waging it, in all probability we will then be the less able to defend ourselves against it. That is why this book is no mere adventure story, but carries a teaching which we cannot afford to ignore."

## Hardly Earth-Shaking

### CROMWELL'S GENERALS

By Maurice Ashley

St. Martin's Press, 1955

246 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.50

Reviewed by

COLONEL H. D. KEHM

Mr. Ashley, a recognized authority on Cromwell, brings together studies of the characters and careers of the key military officers who shaped the policies and actions of the leader of the Free Commonwealth of England in that nation's experiment in nonmonarchical rule.

It is a study of the development of amateur soldiers into efficient military leaders and of their successes and failures individually, and in their relationships with Cromwell and with one another.

The book will be useful for those students of generalship who are interested in exploring how and what kinds

of military leaders have developed under various special political and sociological conditions. Our own Revolution and Civil War furnish other such situations. The English civil war in the middle of the seventeenth century is a particularly special case. Hence the value of this study as a basis for projections into the future may be limited.

The complicated British English in which the book is written makes the reading difficult at times, and the lack of maps adds to the problem. Even so, as an intimate study of such sturdy fellows as Henry Ireton, Thomas Harrison, John Lambert, Robert Blake (a seagoing general), Charles Fleetwood, and George Monk, it makes useful reading. It is a far cry from their horse cavalry, bomb shells, pikes, and muskets to modern tanks, aircraft, and nuclear weapons; but lessons can be learned from the way these men met the problems of their day. This is a useful book, but not earth-shaking or anything to get really excited about.

## German Sea Power in World War II

### THE SECRET RAIDERS

By David Woodward

W. W. Norton & Company, 1955

288 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.75

### DEFEAT AT SEA

By C. D. Bekker

Henry Holt & Company, 1955

222 Pages; Illustrated; \$3.95

Reviewed by

RICHARD GORDON McCLOSKEY

It is man who makes war personal and exciting, despite the bewildering complexity it achieves—or seems to achieve, anyway—when reading the multi-volumed official histories. Naval war, especially, seems to spread itself infinitely over the waters, but when it is brought down to one ship slugging it out with another, then that, too, becomes personal and exciting. The U-boats and small surface craft have had their full play in books and in the press, but Woodward's *The Secret Raiders* is the first account I have seen of those most personal, individual, and exciting ships—the armed merchant raiders. Privateering, it was called in the good old days.

Bekker's book, *Defeat at Sea*, gives the individual stories of the defeat of Germany's surface navy. Bekker is a former officer in the *Kriegsmarine* (rank unspecified) who has done a good job of presenting a sometimes surcharged account of what happened to the German surface warships. Bekker does not go quite so far as Kesselring recently did in proving that the German military did not lose the war, but he manages to find a pretty good reason for the loss of each German vessel. Curiously enough, the real reasons are seldom hinted at by Bekker: the Allied sailors and ships were better.

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